Comparative Literature

Volume I SPRING 1949 Number 2

CONTENTS

The Pléiade and the Androgyne. By Robert Valentine Merrill 97

A Clarification of the Baroque Problem in the Romance Literatures. By Helmut Hatzfeld 113

The Byronism of Lermontov's *A Hero of Our Times*. By W. J. Entwistle 140

The Concept of "Romanticism" in Literary History. II. The Unity of European Romanticism. By René Wellek 147

Orthodoxy and Aesthetic Method in *Paradise Lost* and the *Divine Comedy*. By William J. Grace 173

Karl Vossler (1872-1949). By Helmut Hatzfeld 188

Book Review 190

A Critical Bibliography of French Literature: Vol. I, The Mediaeval Period, ed. by Urban T. Holmes, Jr. (W.P.F.).

Books Received 192

PUBLISHED BY THE UNIVERSITY OF OREGON, EUGENE, OREGON

With the Cooperation of the Comparative Literature Section of the Modern Language Association of America

Issued quarterly. Entered as second-class matter, April 5, 1949, at the postoffice at Eugene, Oregon, under act of August 24, 1912.

Comparative Literature

Editor

CHANDLER B. BEALL
University of Oregon
Eugene, Ore.

Associate Editor

WERNER P. FRIEDERICH
University of North Carolina
Chapel Hill, N. C.

Editorial Board

HELMUT HATZFELD
Catholic University
Washington, D. C.

HARRY LEVIN
Harvard University
Cambridge, Mass.

VICTOR LANGE
Cornell University
Ithaca, N. Y.

AUSTIN WARREN
University of Michigan
Ann Arbor, Mich.

RENÉ WELLEK
Yale University
New Haven, Conn.

FOUNDED at a time when the strengthening of good international relations is of paramount importance, **Comparative Literature** provides a forum for those scholars and critics who are engaged in the study of literature from an international point of view. Its editors define comparative literature in the broadest possible manner, and accept articles dealing with the manifold interrelations of literatures, with the theory of literature, and with broad views of movements, genres, periods, and authors—from the earliest times to the present. They particularly welcome longer studies on broad topics and problems of criticism.

Manuscripts, editorial communications, and books for review should be addressed to: Comparative Literature, University of Oregon, Eugene, Oregon.

The subscription rate is $3.50 a year. The price of single copies is $1.00. Correspondence concerning subscriptions or exchanges should be addressed to: University of Oregon Publications, Eugene, Oregon.

Autres livres à télécharger sur le site
https://abbassa.wordpress.com

COMPARATIVE LITERATURE

VOLUME I SPRING 1949 NUMBER 2

THE PLEIADE AND THE ANDROGYNE

ROBERT VALENTINE MERRILL

WHEN Joachim du Bellay, in the heady days of 1549, urged the readers of his enthusiastic but ill-organized manifesto to enrich their own language with the spoils of Greek and Roman antiquity, he insisted on the transformation of that literature into a thing completely French, by imitation and not by translation. The process of assimilation is, to be sure, clearest in the poetic genres, where for instance Marot's imitation of Vergil (or indeed of Jean Lemaire) evokes the spirit of Augustan pastoral in the autobiographic and wistful mood of the "Tityre, tu patulae . . ." But there is a more complex process at work when a French poet sets out to transfer into his own idiom themes which originate in a discipline like philosophy. Such a theme the poet may not indeed understand in its place within the philosophical structure; he may deform it completely by selecting what suits his fancy and garbling or ignoring the rest.

There is appreciable interest for the student of poetry in considering the stages through which a philosophic myth set forth by Plato became the property and eventually a pale commonplace of French poetry in the later sixteenth century—the myth of the Androgyne.

Of the myths through which Plato sets forth his doctrines, the most influential upon the sensitive and sensual imaginations of the Renaissance was the story narrated by Aristophanes in the *Symposium*:

> And first let me treat of the nature and state of man; for the original human nature was not like the present, but different. In the first place, the sexes were three in number, not two as they are now; there was man, woman, and the union of the two, having a name corresponding to this double nature, which once had a

real existence, but is now lost, and the name is only preserved as a term of reproach. In the second place, the primeval man was round, his back and sides forming a circle; and he had four hands and four feet, one head with two faces, looking opposite ways, set on a round neck and precisely alike; also four ears, two privy members, and the remainder to correspond. Now there were these three sexes because the sun, moon, and earth are three . . . Terrible was their might and strength, and the thoughts of their hearts were great, and they made an attack upon the gods . . . At last, after a good deal of reflection, Zeus discovered a way. He said: "Methinks I have a plan which will humble their pride and mend their manners; they shall continue to exist, but I will cut them in two and then they will be diminished in strength and increased in numbers . . ." After the division the two parts of man, each desiring his other half, came together, and throwing their arms about one another clung, and in their eagerness to grow into one were perishing with hunger without ever making an effort . . . and when one of the halves died and the other survived, the survivor sought another mate, man or woman as we call them,—being the sections of entire men or women,—and clung to that. They were being destroyed, when Zeus in pity of them invented a new plan; he turned the parts of generation around to the front, for this had not always been their position, and they sowed the seed no longer as hitherto like grasshoppers in the ground, but in one another; and after the transposition the male generated in the female in order that by the mutual embraces of man and woman they might breed, and the race might continue; or if man came to man they might be satisfied, and rest, and go their ways to the business of life: so ancient is the desire of one another which is implanted in us, reuniting our original nature, making one of two, and healing the state of man. Each of us when separated is but the indenture of a man, having one side only, like a flat fish, and he is always looking for his other half. Men who are a section of that double nature which was once called Androgynous are lascivious; adulterers are generally of this breed, and also adulterous and lascivious women: the women who are a section of the woman do not care for men, but have female attachments; the female companions are of this sort. But they who are a section of the male follow the male, and while they are young, being slices of the original man, they hang about men and embrace them, and they are themselves the best of boys and youths, because they have the most manly nature . . . And when one of them finds his other half . . . the intense yearning which each of them had toward the other does not seem to be the desire of lover's intercourse, but of something else which the soul of either evidently desires and cannot tell, and of which she has only a dark and doubtful presentiment. Supposing Hephaestus to come to the pair and say to them, "Do you desire to be wholly one; always day and night to be in one another's company? for if this is what you desire I am ready to melt you into one and let you grow together, so that being two you shall become one, and while you live live a common life as if you were a single man, and after your death in the world below still be one departed soul instead of two,"—there is not a man of them who when he heard the proposal would deny or would not acknowledge that this becoming one instead of two, was the very expression of his ancient need. And the reason is that human nature was originally one and we were a whole, and the desire and pursuit of the whole is called love . . . But my words have a wider application—they include men and women everywhere; and I believe that if our loves were perfectly accomplished, and each one returning to his primeval nature had his original true love, then our race would be happy.[1]

[1] *Symposium*, 189-193. The abridgment in the present article is severe.

The conception of the individual human soul as having been severed from its natural complement, and as possessed by an organic need to recover a lost unity, appears in various contexts and intentions among writers after Plato's day. Horace, for instance, recalls it in his address to Vergil's ship,

> ... Reddas incolumem, precor,
> Et serves animae dimidium meae,[2]

where the masculinity of the two parties in friendship is characteristic of the earliest Greek tradition. This tradition is deserted by Plotinus, who is apparently the first transmitter of the story to make love of man and woman its cultural theme.[3] Some Fathers of the Church who are anxious to confirm Plato's standing among the prophets interpret his figure of the divided souls as reflecting the Mosaic doctrine that Eve was created from a part of Adam.[4] The Koran echoes the idea: "He it is who created you from one soul and made therefrom its mate to dwell therewith."[5] The theme may have had some extension in Arabian literature: the Spanish Moor who wrote *The Dove's Neck-Ring* (*circa* 1000 A. D.) is closer than the Koran to Platonistic tradition, in that he is considering the nature of love when he writes:

> There is a good deal of dispute among people about the nature of love, and there is much lengthy discussion. What I believe myself is that it is a reunion of parts of souls, separated in this creation (world), within their original higher element, not according to what Muhammad b. Dawud, may God have mercy on him, said, basing himself upon (the views of) some philosophers, that: "Spirits are divided spheres," but along the line of the resemblance of their (motive) forces in the (firm) abode of their higher world and their mutual approximation to the form of their make-up.[6]

Oddly enough, the *Convito* gives the myth of the double creatures only a perfunctory treatment. Ficino is here, as frequently elsewhere, concerned with establishing the nature and origin of free will; so, after the embarrassed observation that not all parts of an allegory need be supposed to hide a meaning, he turns with relief to the episode of the revolt raised by the overweening monsters against the gods. Here he is on familiar ground. Man's soul, he explains, was originally endowed by God with two guiding lights, the natural and the supernatural; when in his pride man trusts to the former alone, wishing to rival his maker,

---

[2] *Carmina*, I, iii, lines 8ff.

[3] *Enn.* III, lib. V, cap. i, p. 144.

[4] E.g., in the Bishop Eusebius' *Evangelica Praeparatio*, lib. XII, cap. xii; cited, with early Hebrew authorities and others, in Le Roy's *Le Sympose de Platon*, ff. 42r ff.

[5] VII, 189.

[6] *A Book containing the Risala known as the Dove's Neck-Ring about love and lovers*, translated by A. R. Nykl (Paris, 1931), p. 7.

he is promptly halved in powers by that maker, through being deprived of the celestial illumination. As, however, he humbly tries to recover the capacity of using the heavenly as well as the earthly light, his soul regains completeness and the blessed vision of God.[7]

Ficino, then, is willing in the interest of Plotinian ethics to ignore momentarily a theme which Plato had so clearly recognized and set forth—the unvoiced but compelling desire in man for a unity which in human loves is so universally sought but so rarely granted. The boldness with which Aristophanes in the *Banquet* sketches his prodigious figures seems to have shocked the aesthetic sensitivity even of the doctor, and he finds refuge in familiar abstraction.

Thus it is less to the *Convito* than to the Platonic text itself that later writers were indebted for the full picturesqueness and profundity which they found in the story of the double creatures. They were, however, prompt to distort that story in certain details, and to lose from sight the aspects which had recommended it to a Greek public. In the myth there are three classes of beings—the double man, the double woman, and the Androgyne, which is both man and woman. Now, while Aristophanes in his speech expressly denies the importance of this third creature, in the interest of lauding the nobility of purely masculine affections, the Renaissance almost unanimously exalted to the place of literary renown the rather contemptible figure of the Androgyne. The reason is obvious enough: western Christian culture had in the later Middle Ages steadily idealized (unconsciously agreeing with so early a Platonist as Plotinus) the reciprocal love of man and woman, and had reduced the status of masculine loves to that of a perversion; so that the rising amoristic doctrine maintained that atmosphere of potential nobility which characterized the best Greek attitude toward love of man for man, while combining with it the naturalism implicit in love between the sexes. On the whole it seems to be rather this second aspect which caught the lively imagination of nontheological lyricists in the Renaissance; for most evocations of the Androgyne appear in a context which is somewhat less than completely spiritual.

One difficulty which arose in the mediation of Platonic doctrine to the lay minds of the Renaissance received in the allegory of the Androgyne at least a partial solution. If, as the Platonists agreed, the Idea of Beauty shines authentically though dimly through the person of every beautiful woman, and thereby opens to the soul of the observer the path toward highest immaterial beauty, why does not every man who has eyes to see and soul to comprehend necessarily fall in love with every fair lady who comes into his ken? This problem in the application of universal law to particular cases is occasionally met by recourse to the

[7] IV, iv, p. 71.

astrological theory of affinity between individuals born under the same aspect of the heavens, or by the Neoplatonistic doctrine that two bodies occupied by souls from the same level in universal Soul will be attracted; but a more fashionable argument is provided by the supposition of an ancient unity re-established when true lovers meet, and illustrated by the story of the Androgyne.[8]

That the myth of the double creatures had such currency as it reached in French poetry is largely due to Antoine Héroet, pensioner of Marguerite de Navarre and later Bishop of Digne. His *Parfaicte Amye*[9] was at once recognized as a timely affirmation of the Platonistic doctrine against the gnarled ascetics or the *gaulois* in the matter of love; while the shorter piece which follows it in the slender volume of 1542 offered to the reader of French an introduction to the picturesque tale of the double beings. *L'Androgyne de Platon*[10] is chiefly an admitted presentation of Ficino's account in the *Convito*; but between the summary of Aristophanes' story and Ficino's own allegorizing conclusion Héroet has intercalated meditations likely to attract theorists of courtly love. He gives primary importance not to the souls descended from a double male being—in fact, like Ficino, he ignores the triple classification made by Plato—but to the lineage of the Androgyne.[11]

He definitely sets the model for later evocations of the theme: his two half-persons are now clearly male and female. He echoes, by the way, other discussions of love when he explains[12] that man's search for his preordained mate may imply a series of trials and errors which the captious may term inconstancy; but he half-naively laments the wretchedness endured by the lover (be it man or woman) who finds that the person found and possessed is not in fact the mate prescribed by nature, and who must therefore go further in the hope of faring better!

When during his exile in Ferrara Clément Marot wrote his *Blason du beau tetin* and encouraged his friends to imitate him, Bonaventure des Periers contributed to the garland his posy of the *Blason du nom-*

[8] See for instance, Ficino's proem to the *Phaedrus* in his translation of the *Dialogues*; also *Convito*, VI, vi, pp. 137ff; Nifo, *De Amore*, cap. LXVIII, LXIX; Mario Equicola, *Libro di natura d'Amore* (Venice, Giolito, 1554), p. 48, s.n. Francesco Cattani di Diaceto; Cyre Foucault, *L'Image du vray amant* in *Les epistres amoureuses d'Aristénète tournées de grec en françois . . . avec l'Image du vray Amant Discours tiré de Platon. Réimprimé sur la première édition* [Poictiers, 1597] (Paris, 1876) notice par A. P. Malassis, p. 203—the passage beginning "Si vous me demandez."

[9] See Antoine Héroet, *Œuvres poétiques*, Édition critique publiée par Ferdinand Gohin (Paris, 1909).

[10] *Ibid.*, p. 77.

[11] Lines 274-291.

[12] See *Les Œuvres et meslanges poétiques d'Estienne Jodelle*, ed. Marty Laveaux (Paris, 1870), II, 65; Pinvert, "Louis le Caron, dit Charondas," in *R. Ren.*, II (1902), 6. A similar tone appears also in the *Heptaméron*, during the discussion of the eighth *nouvelle*.

bril.[13] Bonaventure's interest in Platonistic reading, even before his entrance into Marguerite de Navarre's household, appears in the reminiscences of the *Symposium* which mark his slightly scabrous verse. He has occasion to apostrophize his subject:

> O l'ancienne cicatrice
> De la rongneure doloreuse,
> Que deité trop rigoreuse
> Feit jadis au povre homfenin,
> Animal sans fiel ne venin!
> Lequel, contre toute pitié,
> Fut divisé par la mytié,
> Et faict d'un entier tant heureux
> Deux demys corps trop langoreux,
> Qui depuis sont toujours errans,
> Et l'un l'autre par tout querans
> En grand desir d'eulx reunir . . .[14]

Although des Periers may have been acquainted with the *Convito,* there is no evidence of knowledge in his works generally; and his source here, as for the translation of the *Lysis,* was probably Ficino's translation of the *Symposium.* This dialogue presents, as Ficino's does not, the mythological origin of the navel; it is noteworthy that, as in Aristophanes' story Apollo completed his task by knotting together the tissues exposed by his surgery, so Bonaventure addresses the "petit neu, qui des mains divines Apres tout le reste parfaict As esté le fin dernier faict."[15] The poet does to be sure, like Héroet, neglect the Platonic classification of the creatures into three types, and concentrates in non-Platonic style on the Androgyne itself—but in so doing he is in accord with virtually all the literary treatments of this attractive subject.[16]

There arises in this connection an interesting question of priorities, for there seems to be an internal relationship between Héroet's *Androgyne de Platon* and des Perier's *Blason du nombril.* The *Androgyne* was presented in manuscript by its author to Francis the First in the winter of 1536-37, but not printed until 1542;[17] the *Blason* was evidently composed in response (immediate or delayed) to Marot's initial effort of 1535, but was not, it seems, printed before its posthumous ap-

[13] V. Pike, "The *Blasons* in French Literature of the Sixteenth Century," *RR,* XXVII (1936), 223-242, quotes the modern editor B* G* as holding that the *Blason du nombril* was not printed until after the 1543 edition of the *Blasons anatomiques du corps femenin;* but Chenevière ascribes it to Juste's edition of 1537—V. A. Chenevière, *Bonaventure des Periers, sa vie, ses poésies* (Paris, 1885), p. 231.

[14] *Œuvres françoises de Bonaventure des Periers revues sur les éditions originales et commentées par Louis Lacour* (Paris, 1856), I, 78-79.

[15] *Ibid.,* p. 78.

[16] An echo appears, *ibid.,* pp. 53-54.

[17] V. P. Jourda, *Marguerite d'Angoulême, duchesse d'Alençon, reine de Navarre* (Paris, 1930), I, 209.

pearance in the *Blasons anatomiques des parties du corps femenin* of 1550. Héroet and des Periers may well have been in communication, since the cleric was already a pensioner of Marguerite de Navarre, while Bonaventure appears to have been attached to her household in early 1536. If, as has been conjectured, Héroet presented to the queen also a copy of the *Androgyne,* her secretary may well have had access to it. It seems probable that his *Blason,* besides deriving from acquaintance with the *Symposium* itself, reflects also Héroet's courtly-philosophical account of the double creatures. Des Periers emphasizes the meekness of the Androgynes after their separation, and the secretiveness with which they pursued their satisfactions when two halves did eventually meet; in Héroet's verse the same themes appear—although they are absent alike from Plato's text and from Ficino's.[18]

It seems likely, then, that des Periers had read Héroet's *Androgyne* in manuscript, and had incorporated some of its elements into his *Blason du nombril,* whose major literary source was however the *Symposium.* Inasmuch as Héroet himself contributed a *blason* to Juste's volume of 1537, while, despite his great friendship for Marot, Bonaventure abstained from publication of his own verses, it may be argued that des Periers wished to give no publicity to his imitation of the *Androgyne.*[19]

Given Marguerite de Navarre's general inclination to a Neoplatonistic spirit, as well as her association with Héroet and Bonaventure des Periers, it is natural that she should have found the story of the Androgyne striking enough to be recalled in her *Prisons.* It is probably under the influence of Héroet's poem, with its theological moral, that she wrote in her half-ecstatic meditation on the unifying and absorbing power of the Beatific Vision:

> Celuy qui Est, à qui bien l'ymagine,
> Se voit aussy dedans ceste Androgyne,
> Qui sa moictié ne cesse de cercher,
> Ne la trouvant ne se fait que fascher:
> Ce feu brullant, ceste amour vehemente,
> Qui met en l'ame une divine attente
> De recouvrer sa part et sa moictié,
> Ne souffrera qu'elle prenne amytié
> En autre lieu, car rien que son semblable
> Ne lui sçauroit jamais estre agreable.[20]

Another reminiscence appears in the argument which follows narration of the eighth *nouvelle* of the *Heptaméron*; here the company is

[18] Lines 189ff.; *op. cit.*, n. 9 *supra*, p. 87.

[19] See n. 13, *supra.*

[20] *Les dernières poésies de Marguerite de Navarre,* ed. A. Lefranc (Paris, 1896), p. 217; also Lefranc's *Grands écrivains français de la Renaissance* (Paris, 1914), p. 230.

evidently familiar with the myth, and interested in its interpretation. As with Héroet's *Androgyne,* so here: the allegory is made the theme of a discussion concerning constancy in love. Dagoucin, whose mild and philosophic temperament makes him a natural commentator in the Platonic vein, points with disapproval to lovers who leave their ladies in the mere hope of obtaining greater favors elsewhere. Of him Simontault inquires:

> Mais que ferez-vous à ceulx qui n'ont pas trouvé leur moictyé? Appellez-vous inconstance, de la chercher en tous les lieux où l'on peut la trouver?—Pour ce que l'homme ne peut sçavoir, dist Dagoucin, où est ceste moictyé dont l'unyon est si esgale que l'un ne diffère de l'autre, il fault qu'il s'arreste où l'amour le contrainct; et que, pour quelque occasion qu'il puisse advenir, ne change le cueur ne la volunté: car, si celle que vous aymez est tellement semblable à vous et d'une mesme volunté, ce sera vous que vous aymerez, et non pas elle.

This observation that the true lover of his mistress loves himself may well be an echo from Bembo's *Asolani,* where a somewhat perfunctory recall of Plato's myth occasions a prolonged sermon on the need that men and women combine difference in function with unity in will—ending:

> Così è senza fallo alcuno: essi sono la vostra metà e voi la loro, si come io della mia donna et essa la mia. La quale se io amo . . . e s'ella m'ama, non è tuttavia che alcun di noi ami altrui ma sè stesso; e così aviene degli altri amanti, et sempre averrà.[21]

This lesson is reenforced in the forty-sixth and forty-seventh stanzas of Bembo's *Stanze recitate per giuoco*:

> Pero che voi non sete cosa integra,
> Nè noi; ma è ciascun del tutto il mezzo . . .
> Così voi vi trovate altrui cercando.[22]

As the sixteenth century wore on, it became less interesting to versify passages from Plato or Ficino than to use lightly some key words from the better known of the themes. So the story and the lesson of the Androgyne themselves tend to disappear, leaving a useful enough token in the word *moitié* for writers who wished to show at most a veneer of Platonism. As will appear, the word appears frequently in contexts which show only too clearly (as does the present-day use of the term "better half") that the user has forgotten or has never known the implications of his language.

Joachim du Bellay's practice is a good example of the habit. He does

---

[21] Gismondo is rebuking Perottino's anti-amorism, in the second book; see Pietro Bembo, *Gli Asolani e le rime,* ed. Dionisotti-Casalone (Torino, 1932), p. 74.

[22] *Ibid.,* p. 272; Baïf translates the poem in his *Second livre des poemes* (II, 106 of the Marty-Laveaux edition), under the title *Embassade de Venus:* "Je pourray bien . . ."

to be sure name the Androgyne when, in the poem *A une dame* of 1553, he is gleefully overthrowing the idols which he has lately worshipped:

> Je ne veulx point sçavoir si l'amitié
> Prist du facteur, qui jadis eut pitié,
> Du pauvre tout fendu par la moitié,
> Sa celeste origine.
> Vous souhaiter autant de bien qu'à moy,
> Vous estimer autant comme je doy,
> Avoir de vous le loyer de ma foy,
> Voilà mon Androgine.[23]

It is clear from this passage as from others in the poem that in Du Bellay's mind Petrarchizing and Platonizing meant much the same thing. Both preached a hypocritical or pedantic doctrine against which Joachim was setting (momentarily, to be sure) an outright profession of stoutly terrestrial love; so that he gives the impression of rushing up—only ten years late—to support La Borderie and his crew in the *querelle des amies.*

Du Bellay's compassionate reference to the *pauvre tout* raises a little problem which reasserts itself when the imposing word appears in love lyrics of his day. In one sense *le tout* corresponds to the Platonic and Aristotelian τὸ πᾶν—the universe as a whole; and in the florid language of lovers it represents the object of total adoration. However, it also appears with some frequency (as in Du Bellay's verse above cited) in the sense of that whole which may be composed or recomposed by the union of lover and beloved.[24] It is unlikely that every poet who so used the term was consciously recalling the Androgyne; but at least the possibility must be considered whenever the word *tout* appears to refer to a person beloved.

Du Bellay names the Androgyne again in the fourth of the *XIII Sonnetz,* where he may be recollecting an appearance in Pontus de Tyard's *Erreurs*; but the context does not suggest the original myth:

> Le premier feu de mon moindre plaisir
> Faict halleter mon alteré dezir;
> Puis de nos cœurs la celeste Androgyne
> Plus sainctement vous oblige ma foy:
> Car j'ayme tant cela que j'ymagine,
> Que je ne puis aymer ce que je voy.[25]

---

[23] IV, 211. The poem was reworked for the *Jeux rustiques* of 1558, where it figures under the more descriptive title of *Contre les Pétrarquistes.*

[24] *Tout* means God for Marguerite de Navarre in her *Prisons,* third canto; see *Les dernières poésies de Marguerite de Navarre,* ed. A. Lefranc (Paris, 1896), p. 290. It designates both a beloved and the world in Ronsard's *Amours* XLII (Laumonier's critical edition, IV, 45) and XXXVII (IV, 40), where, after Muret glosses the word by offering *univers,* the poet recasts his sextet to eliminate the offending word. See also *Amours* LV (IV, 58) and CLXXIV (IV, 165), and the first strophe of the *Ode de la Paix* of 1550.

[25] I, 42.

In his *Elegie d'amour* Du Bellay touches on the familiar theme without naming the double creatures; the term *moitié* serves his need, as it does so universally that of his contemporaries:

> Le vray amour naist du premier regard,
> Et ne veult point se façonner par art:
> Et c'est pourquoy ces moitiez separées,
> Estans jadis par le monde egarées
> Se retrouvans si bien se reioignoient
> Que jamais plus elles ne s'esloignoient.[26]

The chances are good that Joachim had Héroet's verses on the Androgyne in mind when he wrote; for a few lines earlier he had let fall what is probably an allusion to the *Aultre Invention*, which regularly appeared in editions of Héroet's work.[27]

Elsewhere in Du Bellay's verse the word *moitié* loses even any association with Plato's myth, and represents merely a partner in love. One instance may serve to show the pure formalism with which the word is used. As early as the *Olive* Joachim wrote in his Sonnet XXXIII:

> O prison doulce, ou captif je demeure
> Non par dedaing, force ou inimitié,
> Mais par les yeulx de ma douce moitié,
> Qui m'y tiendra jusqu'à tant que je meure.[28]

Now this quatrain, as indeed virtually the whole sonnet, translates Ariosto's tenth; but Ariosto wrote "bella e dolce *nemica*."[29] The Italian poet was using a commonplace of Petrarchistic vocabulary, which Du Bellay displaces for an equally colorless but more up-to-date bit of Platonism. In his elegy *A Salmon Macrin* he places it in turn in a traditionally mythological context: Macrin is not to mourn his lost Gelonis too despairingly, since at his death:

> Adonc ira ton ame
> Sa moitié retrouver,
> Pour ta premiere flame
> Encores esprouver.[30]

Ronsard's use of the myth offers no proof that he had read beyond des Periers' *Blason du nombril*. It is to be sure reasonable to suppose that he had read Héroet's verses, but if so he neglected completely any such interpretation as the cleric had borrowed from Ficino or developed

---

[26] V, 79.

[27] Gohin publishes it in his text of Héroet, pp. 96ff.; see n. 9, *supra*.

[28] I, 55.

[29] "Avventuroso carcere soave . . ." Lodovico Ariosto, *Elegie, Sonetti e canzoni*, ed. Ardengo Soffici (Lanciano, 1911), p. 91.

[30] IV, 29. See also *Poésies françaises et latines de Joachim du Bellay*, ed. Courbet (Paris, 1918), I, 443; and Horace's *Carmina* I, iii, line 8.

on his own account. He uses the name of the double creature twice. In writing in the *Amours* of 1552 on the subject which had attracted des Periers, he addresses it:

> Signe divin, qui divinement ore
> Retiens encore l'Androgyne lien,
> Combien et toy, mon mignon, et combien
> Tes flancs jumeaux follastrement j'honore![31]

Considerably later, while celebrating the loves of Charles IX and Mademoiselle d'Acquaviva in the *Vers d'Eurymedon et Callirée,* the poet recalls the figure and name. Eurymedon concludes from his lady's lack of lightness in the dance that she is less in love with him than he with her; for, love being a soaring thing, he himself could leap at once to heaven among the gods and constellations.

> Si vous suiviez mon vol quand nous ballons au soir,
> Flanc à flanc, main à main, imitant l'Androgyne . . .[32]

The word *moitié* appears in varying connotations through Ronsard's poetry, but at only one point does he clearly recall the legend. His *Elegie* XXIII is frankly carnal in its intent; but he gives it a color of Platonistic interpretation:

> Mais se rejoindre en un et se remettre
> Et à l'ami toute chose permettre,
> Se rassembler ainsi qu'au premier temps . . .[33]

Until the edition of 1573 there stood in the text a few clarifying lines:

> Ains que le ciel fait jaloux (ce me semble)
> De noz plaisirs, nous separast d'ensemble,
> Simples estions: et chacun maintenant
> De sa moitié manque se souvenant
> Cherche son bien d'un amour mutuelle . . .

Elsewhere the word *moitié* signifies usually the lover or lady; in a few instances the love set forth is directed by a man or woman to someone of the same sex (although Ronsard is very unlikely to have realized that he was being exactly Platonistic), and once the term appears in a scabrously anatomical sense. Like Du Bellay, he recalls occasionally Horace's allusion to Vergil, as in a phrase addressed to "Mon Choiseul, mon demy."[34]

Muret glosses with some thoroughness a casual appearance of the

[31] Sonnet XLVII, in IV, 69, of the Laumonier critical edition. Muret's commentary summarizes the Androgyne myth, and refers to Héroet's poem; see *Les Amours de P. de Ronsard Vandomois commentées par Marc Antoine de Muret . . .*, ed. Hugues Vaganay (Paris, 1910), p. 386.

[32] Lemerre text, ed. Laumonier, I, 231.

[33] *Ibid.*, IV, 130; and see VII, 419.

[34] *Ibid.*, V, 187; Laumonier's critical edition, VII, 357.

word in *Amours* XVII, "Par un destin . . ." Ronsard here laments that his affection lies "Occise aux pieds de ma fière moitié"; Muret explains:

> Il veut dire que son espirit l'a laissé pour suivre sa dame et par ainsi qu'il est ja mort (car la mort n'est autre chose que separation du corps et de l'esprit) mais qu'une telle mort rend sa vie meilleure et plus heureuse. Les Platoniques disent que l'amant ne vit pas en soy, mais en la personne qu'il aime. *De ma moitié.* Cela aussi est pris de Platon, dans un dialogue duquel, qui se nomme Le Banquet, ou de l'Amour, Aristophanes raconte que les hommes estoient au commencement doubles, mais que Jupiter apres les partist par le milieu: et que depuis un chacun cherche sa moitié: de là dit-il, que l'amour procede.[35]

Muret is probably echoing a passage in Ficino's *Convito*: "Et non si sbigottisca quello, che di un certo Amante disse Platone: il quello veggendo un Amante disse, Quello Amatore é uno animo nel propio corpo morto: et nel corpo d'altri vivo!"[36]

An example of Ronsard's absurdly uncomprehending use of the word appears in *Amours* CXXVII. He has apparently referred to the death of a lady beloved before Cassandre, and now continues:

> Puis je disoy, Et quelle aultre moytié,
> Après la mort de ma moytié si saincte . . .
> D'un nouveau feu . . . ardra . . . ma seconde amytié?[37]

But it is in pettish reaction against the Platonic doctrine of purity in love that Ronsard writes to Astrée in a sonnet "Pour retenir . . .":

> Deux cœurs en un rejoincts en leur moitié,
> Voila les poinctz qui gardent l'amitié,
> Et non pas vous qui n'aimes qu'en idées.[38]

The contemptuous reference to *idées* is more characteristic of Ronsard's attitude toward Platonism than are his attempts to simulate an idealistic attachment.

Ronsard's disciple Remi Belleau may have picked up anywhere the colorless word which alone in his work recalls the Androgyne. In his poem to the month of May in the *Premiere journée de la bergerie* he writes:

> Qu'il te souvienne, ma chere ame,
> De ta moitié, ta saincte flame.[39]

---

[35] IV, 21; see Vaganay's edition of the *Amours*, pp. 38ff.

[36] II, viii, p. 42.

[37] IV, 125.

[38] Lemerre text, ed. Laumonier, I, 254. For other appearances of the term, see *L'Hylas* (Lemerre text, ed. Laumonier, V, 126); II, 29; *A Janne impitoiable* (Laumonier's critical edition, II, 34); *Amours* CI (IV, 100), CXI (IV, 110), CLXIII (IV, 155); *Elegie* (Lemerre text, ed. Laumonier, VI, 352); *Sonet* (*ibid.*, p. 353); [*Sur une médaille d'Antinous*], *ibid.*, p. 486; p. 493.

[39] I, 205, of the Marty-Laveaux edition.

The term appears again in *A l'Amour,* in the *Petites Inventions*: Love is

> Celuy qui les desirs modestes
> Inspira de flammes celestes,
> R'accouplant les saintes moitiez
> Du fort lien des amitiez.[40]

This sounds to be sure like a vague reminiscence of des Periers' phrase in the last jingling strophe of his *Quest d'Amytié,* which accompanies the translation of the *Lysis*—the dialogue on friendship.[41]

One might expect that Pontus de Tyard, whose general interest in Platonistic philosophy was considerable, would have recalled the story of the Androgyne with some frequency. However, not only does he ignore the myth as a whole; the two texts which introduce the name are far from Platonistic in their tone. In Sonnet XLVII of his first *Erreurs amoureuses* (1549) he concludes an anathema against Envy with

> Tu ne veus donq que mon desir jouisse
> Du doux rencontre enfin de sa moitié.
> Mais puis qu'au mal d'autrui tu te contentes,
> Contraires soient à toutes tes attentes
> Faveur humaine, et la bonté divine;
> Et mon dessein tant heureux fruit me rende,
> Qu'à ton mal gré ma moitié condescende
> A rassembler l'amoureuse Androgyne.[42]

Again, a happy *Chançon* in the third book of the *Erreurs* shows how far Pontus was from keeping in mind the philosophic implications of his words:

> Ma maistresse esmeüe à pittié
> Du travail de mon amitié,
> Me choisissant pour sa moitié,
> Joigne à ma vie heureuse
> L'Androgyne amoureuse.[43]

Since the clearest doctrine inherent in the myth of the Androgyne is that lovers are *predestined* mates, the poet's attribution to his lady of free will in the matter is strictly anti-Platonic.

Jean-Antoine de Baïf had evidently des Periers' *blason* in mind when in his indelicate sonnet, "Dieu gard le bois . . . ," he thought of the same subject:

---

[40] *Ibid.,* I, 157.

[41] *Œuvres françoises de Bonaventure des Periers, revues sur les éditions originales et annotées par M. Louis Lacour* (Paris, 1856), p. 54.

[42] See *Les Œuvres poétiques de Pontus de Tyard,* ed. Marty-Laveaux (Paris, 1875), p. 48.

[43] *Ibid.,* p. 13.

Quand le voyant je repanse
Le doux amoureux lien
Qui en heureuse alliance
Tint l'homme-femme ancien,
Lors que l'amante et l'amy
N'aloit questant son demy.[44]

The debt to des Periers is rendered the more probable by the appearance of the compound word which corresponds to Bonaventure's "*homfenin.*"[45] An evident reminiscence presents itself in his poem "Je ne puis tenir mon aise": Baïf is complacently describing his lady's physical charms in due order, and late in the list reaches

Le nombril, dont la fossure
Marquoit encor la couppure
Du vieil amoureux lien
Qui joignoit l'amour ancien;
Quand l'une et l'autre partie
N'etoit encore departie . . .
Tel desir me vint époindre
D'essayer de nous rejoindre
En l'homme-femme ancien
Au mesme amoureux lien.[46]

Elsewhere the poet uses the word *moitié* in the familiar sense of an accepted mate, with no recollection of Platonistic idealism or myth; in his "Je ne fay cas . . ." he writes:

J'en ay servi plus de deux en ma vie,
Qui toutes ont rompu nostre amitié;
Je suis à moy: si vous avez envie
De m'avouer, vous serez ma moitié.[47]

The characteristic debasement of the word from its original value appears in "Fuiray-je ainsi tousjours . . . ," where two feminine *moitiés* present themselves to the happy poet's imagination:

Esjouy-toy mon cœur: voicy nostre moitié,
Non l'autre, qui nous fut tant contraire et mauvaise.[48]

Baïf, then, is consistent here in his cavalier use of terminology and subjects of Platonistic origin; he turns up a piquant allusion, uses it a few times, and lets it drop. He does indeed draw for a moment on the Italian tradition when he translates Bembo's *Stanze recitate per gioco* in the

[44] See *Œuvres en rime de Jan Antoine de Baïf*, ed. Marty-Laveaux (Paris, 1881-1890), I, 166.
[45] Page 78 of the Lacour edition; see n. 14, *supra.*
[46] I, 379 of the Marty-Laveaux edition.
[47] *Ibid.*, I, 303.
[48] In the *Second Livre des divers amours*, I, 350 of the Marty-Laveaux edition.

Second livre des poemes. Embassade de Venus: "Je pourray bien ..."; his fourth and fifth huitains run:

> Car vous ni nous aussi ne sommes chose entiere,
> Mais chacun à part soy d'un tout est le demi.
> C'est Amour qui nous rend notre forme premiere
> Quand il lie et rejoint l'amie avec l'ami . . .
> Ainsi cherchant autruy vous trouvez, et faites
> Vous trouvans que tout heur se trouve dedans vous.[49]

The sardonic Estienne Jodelle shows no great inclination toward Platonism generally, whether of spirit or of language. However, so far as the myth of the Androgyne is concerned, he was evidently familiar with some of the quandaries which its acceptance implies. Héroet well before him had touched on the difficulty of finding one's own other half in a disordered and purblind world; something of the same concern tinges the conversation of the *devisants* in the eighth tale of the *Heptaméron*. Now Jodelle, in his vicious *Aultre chapitre d'amour*, assumes the person of a lover who blandly explains to his mistress why he is so unconcernedly faithless to his wife. He has philosophic justification:

> . . . car l'Androgyne est tousjours separée,
> Et de nous noz moitiez sont peu souvent choisies.
> La moitié quelquesfois autre part egarée
> Sans son autre moitié sans y penser se trouve
> Et lors l'une est de l'autre ardemment desirée.[50]

Indeed, marriage is itself a constraint and an absurdity

> Ordonnant qu'un chacun en cela s'ymagine
> Trouver sa moitié vraye, et juste et sortissable,
> Bien que rien de pareil le sort ne luy assine.[51]

So here, as in his *Chanson pour le Sieur de Brunel*,[52] Jodelle uses the arguments of fashionable Platonism toward lamentably un-Platonic ends. A faint reminiscence of the myth shows for a moment at the end of an *Elegie* wherein the poet sadly prepares for a life of solitude:

> Sans pouvoir relier ma disjointe moitié,
> Ny sans pouvoir ailleurs chercher d'autre amitié.[53]

This pair of appearances of the term certainly offers no indication that Jodelle saw in it more than the merest cliché.

---

[49] In the *Second Livre des poemes, ibid.*, II, 106.
[50] II, 47, of the Marty-Laveaux edition (see n. 12, *supra*).
[51] *Ibid.*, II, 41.
[52] *Ibid.*, II, 33.
[53] *Ibid.*, II, 88. Fleeting references appear in the *Epithalame, ibid.*, p. 117; in *A M. Soreau son mary, ibid.*, p. 285; and in the cheerfully anti-Petrarchan diatribe which forms Branle I of *Chanson, ibid.*, p. 53.

A pair of conclusions appears justified by this study. In the first place, the major French poets after Héroet's day tended to consider the story of the Androgyne rather as an idealizing justification of physical union than as illustrative of the lofty intellectual and spiritual ascesis which was set forth chiefly in Plato's *Symposium* and *Phaedrus,* and which became under the mediating influence of Ficino the Renaissance doctrine of Platonic love. Whereas this latter doctrine led away from the delights of the flesh, the myth of the Androgyne lent to them a pseudo-philosophic aura calculated to further rather than to thwart the suit pressed by an eager and well-read lover upon a persuadable *précieuse* of the Renaissance.

Furthermore, it becomes clear that as the sixteenth century advanced the Androgyne became a less interesting figure to a generation familiar with it. Héroet and Bonaventure des Periers retold the myth with a gusto due to its novelty; but a few catchwords from it serve the casual purpose of later poets, who use them frequently enough with little sign that poet or public now recall the full story and significance of the Androgyne.

The University of California at Los Angeles

A CLARIFICATION OF THE BAROQUE PROBLEM IN THE ROMANCE LITERATURES

HELMUT HATZFELD

FOR a clarification of the baroque problem in the Romance literatures it is necessary to concentrate on what is common to Italian, Spanish, and French literatures from the end of the sixteenth to the end of the seventeenth century. Thus "baroque" will be understood only in a strictly historical sense. For the historian of style, Baroque is the period between the Renaissance and the Rococo, and corresponds to that period which the historian of ideas calls Counter Reformation as situated between Humanism and the Enlightenment. The question is whether this literary period, conventionally termed Baroque, is informed by basic principles of a stylistic nature; in other words, "Does Baroque constitute a literary style?"

René Wellek, in his excellent report on baroque studies published in 1946, was ready to accept the term "baroque" only as an heuristic principle, but not as a style revealing particular devices.[1] Heinrich Wölfflin, however, had stated in 1915 that there is a *literary* baroque style, characterized by a unique compound of magnifying epithets, resounding word and syllable echoes, heavy repetitions, complicated structures, slow rhythms, and impressive, unified images.[2] Wellek doubts that the Baroque in any of the arts reflects a particular world view, and this despite many pertinent definitions which have been offered of such a world view. Eugenio d'Ors, for instance, interprets it as an "emancipation from the earth."[3] And, although Professor Wellek questions a peculiar relationship between style and belief during this historical

[1] René Wellek, "The Concept of Baroque in Literary Scholarship," *Journal of Aesthetics*, V (1946), 96.

[2] Heinrich Wölfflin, *Renaissance und Barock* (2d ed., Munich, 1925), p. 83.

[3] "La tierra nos atrae. Parece que de esta atracción la vida puede emanciparse de dos maneras: volando o manteniéndose en pie . . . :

El Greco: pintor de las formas que vuelan,
Poussin: pintor de las formas que se mantienen en pie."

Eugenio d'Ors, *Poussin y el Greco* (Madrid, 1922). See also José Luis Aranguren, *La Filosofía de Eugenio d'Ors* (Madrid, 1945), p. 252: "Las páginas dedicadas a Poussin y el Greco cuentan entre las más importantes que ha producido la crítica de arte."

epoch we call Baroque, there can be no doubt that the Counterreformatory and Jesuitic type of Catholicism was the decisive informing force behind the Baroque, as Weibel,[4] McComb,[5] Weisbach,[6] and others have proved.

The Romance scholar who uses the term "baroque style" does not, then, make an inadequate borrowing from the historian of art, as S. Griswold Morley would infer.[7] On the contrary, Heinrich Wölfflin, before creating his five principles of baroque art, made it clear that he was not interested in formal analysis as such, but in the cultural psychology behind it.[8] He repeated this as his deepest conviction when, later on, he was misunderstood by Benedetto Croce and the Vienna school of Dvořak.[9] Consequently, German scholars like Oskar Walzel blundered when they tried to transfer Wölfflin's principles directly from art to literature, without discrimination. Theophil Spoerri, however, in his pioneer study, *Renaissance und Barock bei Ariost und Tasso*,[10] proved that the pictorial qualities of the arts correspond psychologically and aesthetically to the musical qualities of literature—the lack of clarity in design to the dynamic flux in literary presentation—the principle of the open, quasi-unfinished picture to the principle of an unlimited gradation in a motivistic and nontectonic structure. The formal objects of the art historian and the literary scholar, as far as the Baroque is concerned, are only similar; but they are similar because the mode of conceiving reality is the same,[11] and this same type of concept is anchored in the spirit and will of the men of that epoch.[12]

To keep art and literature together as forms of the same spirit is therefore the surest way to arrive at dependable statements concerning the origin of the literary Baroque. In both domains the same dynamic forms, as expression of a boundless restlessness, develop in opposition to the static forms of the self-sufficient Renaissance. They begin with Michelangelo's later paintings and sonnets and reach a first saturation

[4] Walther Weibel, *Jesuitismus und Barockskulptur in Rom* (Strasbourg, 1909).

[5] Arthur McComb, *The Baroque Painters of Italy: An Introductory Historical Survey* (Cambridge, Mass., 1934), p. 3.

[6] Werner Weisbach, *Der Barock als Kunst der Gegenreformation* (Berlin, 1921).

[7] *Hispanic Review*, XV (1947), 395.

[8] Heinrich Wölfflin, *Prolegomena zu einer Psychologie der Architektur* (Munich, 1886).

[9] Heinrich Wölfflin, *Gedanken zur Kunstgeschichte* (Basel, 1941), the chapter: "Kunstgeschichtliche Grundbegriffe: Eine Revision."

[10] T. Spoerri, *Renaissance und Barock bei Ariost und Tasso* (Bern, 1922), pp. 3-8.

[11] Dagobert Frey, *Gotik und Renaissance als Grundlagen der modernen Weltanschauung* (Augsburg, 1929), p. xxviii.

[12] José Ortega y Gasset, *Meditaciones del Quijote* (Buenos Aires, 1942), ch. IV, "El arte en presente y en pretérito," pp. 289-291.

point around 1580, in Italy, with Vignola's prototypical baroque church, San Gesù, and Tasso's *Gerusalemme liberata*. Whether this origin of the Baroque in Rome has anything to do with Spain, whose literature and art had throughout the Middle Ages a more "arabesque," paradoxical dynamism than the other more static, rational, Romance literatures, may remain an open question, although the influence of San Ignacio's evocative and fanciful genius[13] on Pope Paul III, sponsor of Michelangelo's later works, may suggest Spain as a probable source. Historically, the specific baroque forms discovered in Spain are actually later than in Italy and even show definite Italian influence: witness El Greco and Velásquez, as well as Cervantes[14] and Mateo Alemán. In France both influences, Italian and Spanish, become evident with Poussin and Corneille and finally, though in purely national French forms, with Claude Lorrain and Racine.[15] Thus, through three successive generations, the greatest works of the three great Romance literatures, those of the musical Tasso, the fanciful Cervantes, and the dramatic Racine, are baroque because they have in common the same moods, motifs, structures, and stylistic elements that appear typical of this period everywhere. They show the same simultaneous, rich, condensed conception and presentation in epic, novel, and tragedy,[16] the same stress on essentials, to the neglect of details, typical of "la visión lejana," as Ortega y Gasset calls this style.[17]

The Baroque, as a cultural, representative, and international style of the highest aesthetic value, cannot be identified with its manneristic exaggerations called *secentismo, conceptismo, marinismo, culteranismo,*

[13] Stephen Gilman, "Baroque Ideology," *Symposium*, I (1946), 99-104, admits a similar influence in Spain, through *later* ascetic writers: "Renaissance form . . . could not have evolved Baroque . . . of itself; an introduction of the eternal into the minds of men was necessary for the change" (p. 99).

[14] Leo Spitzer, "Linguistic Perspectivism in the *Don Quijote*," in *Linguistics and Literary History: Essays in Stylistics* (Princeton, 1948), pp. 41-85.

[15] Elisabeth Brock-Sulzer, "Klassik und Barock bei Ronsard," *Trivium*, III (1945), 154: "Es ist wesentlich, wenn man heute die barocken Elemente des Grand Siècle sich bewusst macht. Aber nicht dort sind diese Elemente belangvoll, wo sie offen heraustreten, sondern dort, wo sie als überwundene, unsichtbar gewordene den klassischen Werken der Franzosen den . . . asketischen Zug verleihen. Dass sie es verschmähen barock zu sein, das macht einen Poussin, einen Pascal, einen Racine so gross . . . Der Barock als solcher ist in Frankreichs wesentlichen Bezirken nicht direkt erkennbar . . . Allerdings möchte man dann vielleicht gerade diese Fernstenliebe als das sublimste Barocke überhaupt bezeichnen . . ."

[16] Dagobert Frey, *Gotik und Renaissance* (Augsburg, 1929); Introduction, summarized in English by Ernest C. Hassold, "The Baroque as a Basic Concept of Art," *College Art Journal*, VI (1946), 3-28.

[17] José Ortega y Gasset, *Goethe desde dentro: El punto de vista en las artes* (Madrid, 1933), p. 114.

or *préciosité*,[18] particularly since these forms, in themselves, merely repeat traditional, mediaeval figures of style known since the days of the troubadours,[19] Petrarch, and Cariteo,[20] and reveal, after the Renaissance, simply a lack of discipline.[21] Nor can it be identified with the Italian literary decay which became evident in Guarini, Marino, Achillini, Battista, Artale, or Leporeo, poets whose stylistic emasculation is blamed by Croce as coming from a Counter Reformation hostile to ideas.[22] Actually this decay came from the normal exhaustion of Italian literature at a time when the torch was being passed to the most Counterreformatory country of all, Spain. Nor can the Baroque be identified with the popular vein in Spanish literature, particularly in the dramas of Lope; this erroneous view prevails with certain foreign Hispanists, to whom Dámaso Alonso points out, in the strongest language, that they mistake for genuine Spanish values of the Baroque its barbarously primitive aspects and that they reduce Spanish literature to an art of red Indians and Negroes.[23] Neither can Spanish Baroque be denigrated as an internal decay of the earlier Spanish Renaissance, as has been attempted, for various and conflicting reasons, by Pfandl, Díaz-Plaja, Castro, and Rosales.[24]

Conversely, the insistence of French scholars, such as F. Baldensperger[25] and Henri Peyre,[26] that their national literary style of the

[18] "[The baroque] principle rests upon deeper foundations and is no more dependent upon a taste for conceits than the principles of Jesuitism depend upon a taste for casuistry."—Roy Daniells, *Journal of Aesthetics*, V (1946), 120.

[19] "El conceptismo y el culteranismo, en el fondo son rasgos de estilo medievales. Si lucen con más resplandores en el siglo de oro es gracias a las bellezas sensuales que el Renacimiento les ha añadido embutiéndolas en los antiguos patrones."—Leo Spitzer, *El Barroco Español*, Middlebury lecture, 1944 (manuscript).

[20] Mario Praz, *La Poesia metafisica inglese del seicento* (Rome, 1945).

[21] Heinrich Lützeler, "Der Wandel der Barockauffassung," *Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte*, XI (1933), 620: "Ausgeglichenheit wird in den Händen von schlechten Künstlern zur Langeweile (das Problem der Renaissance), Ueberschwang zur Zuchtlosigkeit (das Problem des Barock)."

[22] Benedetto Croce, *Der Begriff des Barock:Die Gegenreformation* (Zürich, 1925), pp. 15, 25, 63.

[23] Dámaso Alonso, *Ensayos sobre poesía española* (Buenos Aires, 1946), p. 12: "El extrangero que se entusiasma con el popularismo español va a buscar lo bárbaramente primitivo, reduciendo la literatura española a poco más que un arte de indios o de negros."

[24] L. Pfandl, *Geschichte der spanischen Nationalliteratur der Blütezeit* (Freiburg, 1929); Américo Castro, "Lo hispánico y lo erasmista," *RFH*, II (1940), 84, as well as "Las complicaciones del arte barroca," *Tierra firme*, I (1935), 161-168; Guillermo Díaz Plaja, *El espíritu del barroco* (Barcelona, 1940); Luis Rosales, "La figuración y la voluntad de morir en la poesía española," *Cruz y Raya*, XXXVIII (1936), 67-98.

[25] Fernand Baldensperger, "Pour une révaluation littéraire du XVII[e] siècle classique," *RHL*, XLIV (1937), 13: "En tout cas, il suffirait de cette rationalisation d'une partie, et non de la moins noble, des lettres françaises, pour éloigner du

seventeenth century was a classicism "tout court," as opposed to the Baroque, has lost ground to the extent that even Frenchmen like R. Lebègue,[27] Marcel Raymond,[28] P. Kohler,[29] Gonzague de Reynold,[30] and R. A. Sayce[31] have no longer any objection to a baroque Corneille. But they still cannot see that Pascal, Racine, Bossuet, and Molière[32] are no less baroque than the generation of Louis XIII. This thorniest part of the problem of the literary Baroque has none the less gained support since the studies of Erich Auerbach,[33] Hugo Friedrich,[34] Gerhard Rohlfs,[35] Ernst Merian-Genast,[36] Leo Spitzer,[37] and others. It is hoped that more light will be thrown upon it by the comparative and coordinating study which follows.

Comparative literature cannot imitate history of art by linking the Baroque to the Counter Reformation through the religious subject matter, because in literature the spiritual element is extrinsically pres-

---

XVII^e siècle français l'étiquette de baroque, dont des assimilations indiscrètes voudraient nous imposer l'usage . . . Il n'y a qu'absurdité à vouloir traiter la franche, droite et nette stylisation des formes tragiques, comiques et didactiques, de transaction baroque entre l'inspiration antique et les exigences particulières de temps et de lieu, comme nous y invite une 'périodisation' indiscrète."

[26] Peyre is radically opposed to a French literary Baroque in his *Le Classicisme français* (New York, 1942), whereas he would admit it in art: "French Baroque," *Art News*, XLV (1946), 19-21, 65.

[27] Raymond Lebègue, "Le Théâtre baroque en France," *Bibliothèque d'Humanisme et Renaissance*, II (1942), 161-184.

[28] Marcel Raymond, "Classique et baroque dans la poésie de Ronsard," *Concinnitas. Festschrift für H. Wölfflin* (Basel, 1944), pp. 137-173.

[29] Pierre Kohler, *Histoire de la littérature française*, I (Lausanne, 1947), 122: "La notion de baroque, introduite ici pour la première fois dans un manuel de littérature française . . . convient aux œuvres du XVII^e siècle débutant, de la période préclassique, le terme de baroque marquant bien leur irrégularité et leur éclat." And earlier, Pierre Kohler, "Le classicisme français et le problème du baroque," *Lettres de France* (Lausanne, 1943), pp. 49-138.

[30] Gonzague de Reynold, *Le XVII^e siècle: Le Classique et le Baroque* (Montreal, 1944).

[31] R. A. Sayce, "Boileau and French Baroque," *French Studies*, II (1948), 148-152.

[32] See, however, W. G. Moore, "Tartuffe and the Comic Principle in Molière," *MLR*, XLIII (1948), 45-53.

[33] E. Auerbach, "Racine und die Leidenschaften," *Germanisch-Romanische Monatsschrift*, XXVIII (1926); and *Mimesis* (Bern, 1946), pp. 329ff.; and L. Spitzer's remark, in his *Stil- und Literaturstudien* (Marburg, 1931), p. 235, on an oral statement of Auerbach in 1929.

[34] Hugo Friedrich, "Pascals Paradox: Des Sprachbild einer Denkform," *Zeitschrift für romanische Philologie*, LVI (1936), 322-370.

[35] Gerhard Rohlfs, "Racines Mithridate als Beispiel höfischer Barockdichtung," *Archiv für das Studium der neueren Sprachen*, CLXVI (1936), 200-212.

[36] Ernst Merian-Genast, "Die Kunst Racines," *Die Neueren Sprachen*, XL (1932), 135-157.

[37] Leo Spitzer, "Die klassische Dämpfung in Racines Stil," *Archivum Romanicum*, XII (1928), 361-472; also in *Romanische Stil- u. Literaturstudien* (Marburg, 1931), I, 135-268; and "Le Récit de Théramène," in *Linguistics and Literary History* (Princeton, 1948).

ent only in secondary works;[38] in the masterworks, which were secular by definition, it is intrinsic. Rather, literature is linked to the Counter Reformation by Aristotle's *Poetics,* the basis of a new formal humanism.

Aristotelian Formal Humanism

Baroque versus Renaissance means an aesthetic, cerebral,[39] rational, and critical handling of antiquity as opposed to the older ethical, vital, emotional, and naive Platonic humanism which ventured to find in the pagan beliefs the revelation of a dim, symbolic, but divine truth, forming a parallel to Biblical revelation. This poetic-philosophical concept had undergone some changes since Augustinian Neoplatonism was inclined to admit a pagan prerevelation based on the *Logos spermaticos.* It developed into Latin Averroism, which began to put natural pagan lore into opposition with revealed truth and finally made the Platonic Academy in Florence, Pomponazzi, Telesio, Cardano, and Giordano Bruno speculate with the ancients against the Church. There remained the compromise of Erasmus, who mixed antiquity with Christianity according to his program of a "Christian" humanism. The mark of all these attitudes was the desire to derive a vital message from antiquity.

Now the Baroque, precisely, tries to find a way of getting rid of all this—even of Erasmian humanism.[40] P. R. M. Hornedo is, therefore, quite correct in saying that the vital element of the Baroque was the Spiritual Exercises, whereas "para los jesuitas el humanismo es puro valor formal y literario."[41] Toffanin puts it this way: The exultant humanistic spirit dies, Faith has become aware of not wanting it.[42] Writers of this epoch, embarking upon "devout" humanism, do not hesitate to call the ancients "toda la caterva de filósofos" (*Don Quijote,* I, Prólogo), as does Cervantes, and style Homer "il cieco cantalluscio," as does Tassoni,[43] while Gracián speaks even of the philosophers as

[38] Examples: Gerolamo Malipiero, *Petrarca Spirituale* (1536); Sebastián de Córdova, *Las obras de Boscán y Garcilaso trasladadas en materias christianas y religiosas* (1575); Corneille's and Racine's translations of the hymns of the Breviary.

[39] Joaquín de Entrambasaguas, *El paisaje inexistente* (Castellón de la Plana, 1933).

[40] P. G. Villoslada, "Humanismo y Contrarreforma," *Razón y Fé,* CXXI (1940), 23.

[41] P. Rafael María de Hornedo, "¿Hacia una desvaloración del barroco?," *Razón y Fé,* CXXV (1942), 47-60, 361-374, 545-558; and CXXVI (1942), 37-52.

[42] Giuseppe Toffanin, *Storia dell'Umanesimo* (Bologna, 1943), p. 248. R. G. Villoslada, S.J., makes the cleverest statement of all—"La Muerte de Erasmo," *Miscellanea Giovanni Mercati* (Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica, 1946) IV, 406: "Con la muerte de Erasmo desaparece, mejor dicho, se anula y fracasa una forma histórica del Humanismo. Su actitud irónica y conciliadora va a ser suplantada por el gesto batallador y categórico de la Contrarreforma."

[43] Alessandro Tassoni, *Pensieri diversi,* IX, quoted by Giuseppe Toffanin, "Omero e il Rinascimento italiano," *Comparative Literature,* I (1949), 59.

"unos grandes necios" (*El Criticón*, ed. Romera Navarro, I, 27). Only the rediscovered *Poetics* of Aristotle is fully accepted, because it appears to the baroque writers as the missing link in the Aristotelian-Thomistic system. It becomes their aesthetic triumph as well as their aesthetic prison.[44] The distinctive feature of their humanism was absolute servitude to the aesthetic tenets of Aristotle as to a *poetica perennis*, superior to anything Platonic, as Vincenzo Maggi emphasizes.[45]

The consequence of this fact, according to Toffanin, is that the Italian Cinquecento, accepted as being baroque, derived from Aristotle the same principles as did Cervantes and French classicism.[46] Thus Aristotle, interpreted by baroque sensibility, became a link between the European literatures, no less strong than the Aristotle of Lessing interpreted by the sensibility of the Enlightenment.[47] Therefore it is logical that Tasso's three *Discorsi sull'arte poetica*, Cervantes' literary tenets preached to Don Quijote by the Canon of Toledo (*DQ*, I, 48) (which stem, according to Atkinson, from El Pinciano's *Philosophia antigua poetica*, 1596), and Racine's prefaces should reveal the same theoretical ideal. Less obvious is the fact that this Aristotelian theory likewise directed their practical work. It is known that they discussed their theory with others in order to reach aesthetic perfection[48] and to make sure that their works would exemplify the right theories. These works had to be correct and "ejemplares" also from Aristotle's supposed *moral* viewpoint, and this is their strongest link with the Counter Reformation.

All writers, even the most moderate, strove to realize Aristotle's recommended use of ornaments and to "intesser fregi."[49] Ornaments, indeed, were handled in the dramatic peripeties of Tasso's *Aminta* with no less virtuosity than in Racine's *Phèdre*. Metaphors, far drawn out and prismatically broken, are to be found not only in Tasso's and Calderón's showy usage, but also in Góngora's and Racine's milder style, as Dámaso Alonso and Leo Spitzer have pointed out. The mythological

[44] Giuseppe Toffanin, *Il Tasso e l'età che fu sua* (*L'età classicistica*) (Napoli, 1947), p. 12.

[45] Vincentius Madius (Maggi) et Bartholomaeus Lombardus, *In Aristotelis librum de poetica communes explicationes:* "Ut facilius deprehendi possit, quam docte placitis Platonis sui praeceptoris Aristoteles utens, in melius eum reformet." Quoted in Irene Behrens, *Die Lehre von der Dichtkunst, vornehmlich vom 16. bis 19. Jahrhundert* (Halle, 1940).

[46] G. Toffanin, *Il Tasso*, p. 79: "Virtualmente il pseudoclassicismo era già tutto nell'epilogo umanistico del secondo cinquecento; la Francia non fece che dare ad esso . . . i rigori del suo tecnicismo."

[47] See Max Kommerell, *Lessing und Aristoteles: Untersuchungen über die Theorie der Tragödie* (Frankfurt, 1940).

[48] For Tasso, see Gaetano Firetto, *Torquato Tasso e la Controriforma* (Palermo, 1939), pp. 142, 163. Cervantes was in constant discussion with the Lopists; and Racine was indebted to Bouhours' and Boileau's "critique collaboratrice."

[49] G. Toffanin, *Il Tasso*, p. 96.

apparatus appears indispensable even to Boileau who strives, but in vain, to be antibaroque. The stichomythic dialogue, humorously used in *Don Quijote,* reaches its serious peak in Racine.

Those who believe in the tenets of the earlier Renaissance are free to call all these formal, imitative tendencies a Counter Renaissance with Werner Friedrich, or a bastard classicism with Sacheverell Sitwell, because the *imitatio* was based rather on rules than on the quality of literary models. But even so, there was room left for the creative powers of the Baroque. The mythological apparatus, though admitted by the Council of Trent, was entirely transformed by genuinely modern criticism and irony, and even by competition with a direct nature poetry. Tasso rejects the invocation of the Muses as untrue and invokes Mary instead (*Ger.,* I, 2), and ponders on an Achilles with Christian qualities and thus creates Rinaldo. The rosy-fingered Eos becomes a simple "Alba [che] uscia de la maggion celeste" (*Ger.,* VIII, 1). Cervantes pokes fun at the Christians playing a pagan pseudo-innocence in "la Arcadia fingida y contrahecha" (*DQ,* II, 58), at the humanist who spends his time finding cryptic meanings in Homer, Martial, and Vergil (*DQ,* II, 16), and ironizes poetically the indications of time and descriptions of morning by means of "rubio Apolo," the "rosada Aurora" (*DQ,* I, 2), the "napeas y dríadas" (*DQ,* I, 25), and "la señora Diana" (*DQ,* II, 68). Similar jokes can be found in Lafontaine with Thetys and Phoebus (*Fables,* V, 6). After this baroque destruction, a new Dante never again could call the Christian God "Sommo Giove." But there is also reconstruction. Aurora changes into the lovely morning itself as "blanca aurora" (*DQ,* II, 20), or even as "fresca aurora" (without capitals), and inundates the world with "un número infinito de líquidas perlas" (*DQ,* II, 14). Racine, who changes the characters of his ancient sources until they acquire all the qualities which he believes Aristotle would demand in a tragic hero,[50] distills the mythological element in Helios until he becomes in Phèdre's prayer *Soleil,* a much more condensed modern symbol of life and purity, a sun which with Fénelon's type of modernization of myth becomes a direct element of nature and "expands the flames of the day to chase away all the stars of the sky" (*Télémaque,* IV).

Catharsis and Decency

A special link between the Counter Reformation and baroque literature is that of moral preoccupation. The great reform in manners and customs and the care for souls, and the development of the systematic examination of conscience, are reflected in a greater stress on the purgative character of epic and drama. A case in point is the baroque

[50] *Phèdre,* préface: "toutes les qualités qu'Aristote demande dans les héros de la tragédie."

explanation of Aristotle's catharsis. To antiquity it had been a liberation from pity and fear, forces equally negative as hindering the *mesotes* in a carefree life.[51] To the Baroque it is a liberation from the passions and a stimulus to virtue, a killing of the bad and an awakening of the good inclinations. It is even the cultivation of a wholesome fear of Hell,[52] which would provoke greater charity, with the immediate goal of a feeling of bliss,[53] a deserved reward after having shared with one or the other hero all his trials, *affanni, trabajos,* or *douleurs.* The reader or listener to tragedy, i.e., the baroque "comedia artificiosa," becomes aroused against vice and falls in love with virtue, as Cervantes says (*DQ,* I, 48), because he sees what he is, in contrast with what he ought to be (*DQ,* II, 12).

This moral preoccupation furthermore parallels the ethical and aesthetic perfection of literature to the point where moral perfection becomes inseparable from the delightfulness of a work of art. Even if the delightfulness prevails, according to El Pinciano a moral repercussion must be felt. The perfection of Aristotelian form, says Alamanni,[54] must have an echo in the moral perfection of the work. The critic La Mesnardière (1610-1663) defines poetry as "cette science agréable qui mesle les enseignements parmi la récréation" and blames the Renaissance humanist, Castelvetro, for having severed the *prodesse* from the *delectare* and the Spaniard Lope for "sa vicieuse pratique et ses fautes volontaires" consisting in "hablar en necio para dar gusto."[55]

Thus to Cervantes—very revealingly—the imitation of the ancients is recommendable in so far as they can show "la piedad de Eneas, la valentía de Aquiles, la liberalidad de Alejandro, el valor de César, la clemencia y verdad de Trajano, la prudencia de Catón . . . que es enseñar y deleitar juntamente" (*DQ,* I, 47); and he remarks that these heroes were not painted by Homer and Vergil as they were, but as they had to be in order to give an example of virtue to future generations (*DQ,* I, 25). Whatever is common, vulgar, and vile is therefore incompatible even with the most degraded hero. Racine consequently changes the character of the Phèdre of his sources, because calumny is incompatible with a princess.[56]

---

[51] Aristotle, *Poetics* (Loeb's Classical Library), p. 22: "Through pity and fear it effects relief from these and similar emotions."

[52] G. Toffanin, *Il Tasso,* p. 33, says that for Benedetto Varchi catharsis meant "lo spavento dell'inferno."

[53] *Ibid.,* p. 90: "Essere più caro il piacere raggiunto attraverso l'affanno."

[54] G. Toffanin, *Il Tasso,* p. 67, quotes from the preface to Alamanni's *Avarchide*: "Le unità aristoteliche corrispondono con la perfezione morale."

[55] Hippolyte Jules Pilet de la Mesnardière (1610-1663), *La Poétique* (Paris, chez Antoine de Sommaville, 1640), preface and pp. H, T.

[56] "La calomnie avoit quelque chose de trop bas et de trop noir pour la mettre dans la bouche d'une princesse . . . . Phèdre n'y donne les mains que parce qu'elle est dans une agitation d'esprit qui la met hors d'elle-même" (*Phèdre,* préface).

The Counter Reformation injected into Antonio Riccoboni's *Poetica* (1584) still another problem: *Dilettare senza essere pericoloso.* This scrupulous moral stricture produced in Spain an attitude called by Marcel Bataillon "inquisition immanente,"[57] by Cervantes "decencia et decoro" (*DQ,* II, 12). This attitude insists that "no se descubre, ni por semejas, una palabra deshonesta" (*DQ,* II, 3), or that each "libro se escarde y limpie de . . . bajezas" (*DQ,* I, 6). In France, Racine introduces his *Phèdre* by declaring that "les passions n'y sont présentées aux yeux que pour montrer tous les désordres dont elles sont cause." This *bienséance* is dictated, not by the whim of the *précieuses,* but by "un farouche scrupule" (*Phèdre,* line 121), *scruple* being the catchword of baroque literature everywhere, the key to lives like those of Tasso and Racine. Critics who overlook this declare the Baroque to be more sensuous than the Renaissance, but hypocritically sensuous, because, e.g., in describing feminine beauty Tasso speaks euphemistically of "la vietata parte," Cervantes of "cosas ocultas" (*DQ,* I, 17), Racine of "le simple appareil d'une beauté qu'on vient d'arracher au sommeil" (*Britannicus,* line 390). But, after all, they do not describe. Their restraint seems genuine. The same critics cannot understand why in all these works there is no lovemaking, or even kissing. The reason is given by Cervantes: "donde hay mucho amor no suele haber demasiada desenvoltura" (*DQ,* II, 65). The passion is centered rather on a strong mental obsession by the *objet aimé,* as Tancredi is obsessed by the picture of Clorinda, Don Quijote by that of Dulcinea, Phèdre by that of Hippolyte.

Various realistic tendencies failed to alter the program of avoiding indecent words and circumscribing them by "rodeos," i.e., by periphrastic metonymies and "términos limpios," "cubrir honestamente lo que la honestidad quiere . . . que se cubra" (*DQ,* I, 11). If Tasso is a little less restrained than the others, le Père Bouhours has certified: "Après tout, quelque liberté qu'il se donne, il ne s'égare pas . . . comme l'Arioste,"[58] and it is the very exigent Bouhours who wanted, for the sake of *bienséance,* to replace, in the French translation of the Bible, "Abraham engendra Isaac" by "Abraham fut le père d'Isaac." If it was impossible in French *précieuse* society to speak of cows, swine, camels, and asses, Sancho, talking to the noble Duchess, had already felt the same impossibility: "Mi asno . . . por no nombrarle con este nombre le suelo llamar rucio" (*DQ,* II, 33); and he is told by Don Quijote: "La gente curiosa . . . al regoldar dice erutar" (*DQ,* II, 43). French *bienséance,* as a true child of the Counter Reformation in

[57] M. Bataillon, "Honneur et Inquisition," *Bull. Hisp.* XXVII (1925), 5.

[58] Le père Bouhours, *Entretiens d'Ariste et d'Eugène,* 1671, quoted by Chandler B. Beall, *La Fortune du Tasse en France* (Eugene, Ore., 1942), p. 100.

concept and of the Baroque in form, was also known to the Spaniards in connection with the *merveilleux chrétien.* The lingering on in Spain of the mediaeval drama with its miracles did not hinder Francisco Cascales from stating as early as 1598: "Mal hecho es sacar en el teatro a la Virgen María y a Dios." The source of "La Carte de Tendre" has been found by Paul Zumtor in Saint John of the Cross.[59]

Fusion

Going deeper into the process of baroque literary art, we find that Aristotle's famous unities and Wölfflin's two principles, the radical subordination of details to the whole and the intentional lack of clarity in presenting these details, appear fundamentally as the same thing. Both represent a tendency towards fusion. This fusion, as far as literature is concerned, comprises a fusion of motifs into a literary symphony, a fusion of foreground and background characters into a picture of society with considerable depth, a fusion of descriptive elements into vague evocations, a fusion of visual elements into a dim *chiaroscuro,* and a fusion of musical elements into vague, far-reaching echoes.

Radical unification of details was the adamant rule of Aristotle for the plot of any action, epic or dramatic, the integral parts of which, however incidental they might appear, had to be arranged so that, if the slightest part was transposed or removed, the whole arrangement was destroyed;[60] this unification of the single elements, says Aristotle, makes a story or a tragedy a living organism.[61] Ignorance of this, precisely, prevented the Italian *novellieri* from becoming novelists, prevented Ariosto as well as the authors of the rogue novels from giving their episodes a real organic link,[62] prevented Rojas from developing his *acción en prosa* of Calisto and Melibea into a real drama. Now, despite all the baroque *fregi, decoros,* and *ornements,* the fusion of the elements into a unity becomes the supreme law. It is underlined in

[59] *Tablas poéticas del Licenciado Francisco Cascales* (Madrid, Don Antonio de Sancho, Segunda impresión, 1779), p. 11; Paul Zumthor, "La Carte de Tendre et les Précieux," *Trivium,* VI (1948), 263-273.

[60] Aristotle, *Poetics* (Loeb Classical Library), pp. 32-33: ". . . the plot being a representation of a piece of action must represent a single piece of action and the whole of it; and the component incidents must be so arranged that if one of them be transposed or removed, the unity of the whole is dislocated and destroyed. For if the presence or absence of a thing makes no visible difference, then it is not an integral part of the whole."

[61] Aritotle, *Poetics* (Loeb Classical Library), p. 90: ". . . the story must be constructed as in tragedy, dramatically, round a single piece of action, whole and complete in itself, with a beginning, middle and end, so that like a single living organism it may produce its own peculiar form of pleasure."

[62] Cascales, *Tablas poéticas,* p. 39: "Los episodios han de estar tan bien ingeridos con la fábula que sin quedar ella destorcida no se puedan quitar. Este es uno de los mas importantes preceptos de la Poética."

transitions and cross relationships,[63] for example, in the Calderónian résumés as well as in the French *liaison des scènes*, in the reduction of a variegated story to a crisis, with the action patterned closely on models proposed by Aristotle. Vergil, it is true, is sometimes substituted for Homer, if Vicente de los Ríos and Arturo Marasso are right as regards the *Don Quijote*.[64]

The baroque authors themselves are fully aware of their working principle, namely, fusing the elements into an inextricable unity. Thus Tasso speaks of "diversi aspetti in un confusi e misti" (*Ger.*, IV, 5) and writes "Confondea i vari aspetti un solo aspetto" (*Ger.*, XVII, 56). And he illustrates: "Accorre altri alle porte, altri alle mura, Il re va intorno e il *tutto* vede e cura" (*Ger.*, III, 111). Cervantes, through the mouth of the Canon of Toledo, blames the chivalrous Renaissance romances for not forming "un cuerpo de fábula entero con todos sus miembros" (*DQ*, I, 47), whereas he himself has made the strictest unities into which the details merge. "Cada cosa por sí" was absorbed by "todas juntas" (*DQ*, II, 58), thanks to many "enredos" and "intricados laberintos" (*DQ*, II, 44) which it is the great merit of Joaquín Casalduero to have disentangled. He helped to see in *Persiles* the construction of an architect who did not calculate it, as was also said of Correggio.[65] What Racine unifies by rejecting all *action-aventure* is "the multiple wealth of the interior action, the complexity of the sentimental nuances" (J. Segond).[66] In view of his apparently irregular psychological blocks pressed between two peripeties, Racine could well have said, with the Poussin of Fénelon's *Dialogues des morts*: "J'ai fait beaucoup de bâtiments irréguliers, mais ils ne laissent pas de faire un assemblage gracieux."[67]

If the details unified in a whole produce "un beau désordre," "una orden desordenada," the fusion of the details among themselves results in a baroque "forma confusamente clara" (Casalduero), i.e., Wölfflin's "relative and blurred clarity" as opposed to the absolute clarity of the

[63] Leo Spitzer, "The Récit de Théramène," in *Linguistics and Literary History* (Princeton, 1948), p. 103: "In his [Racine's] one-mansion edifices we must focus on many cross relationships existing between the different characters with situations . . . he restricts the field of vision, but he has filled it with manifold parallelograms of forces."

[64] Arturo Marasso, *Cervantes y Virgilio* (Buenos Aires, 1937); enlarged edition: *Cervantes, la invención del Quijote* (Buenos Aires, 1943).

[65] Josef Strzygowski, *Das Werden des Barock bei Raphael und Correggio* (Strasbourg, 1898), pp. 112-113: "Correggio baut wie ein Architekt, der die Konstruktion nicht erwogen hat."

[66] J. Segond, *Psychologie de Jean Racine* (Paris, 1940), p. 36: "Ce que l'on épargne en bannissant l'aventure nodale, c'est la surabondance de l'action extérieure . . . Ce que l'on retient, au contraire, et même que l'on accentue, c'est la richesse multiple de l'action intérieure, la complexité des nuances sentimentales."

[67] Fénelon, *Dialogues des morts* in *Œuvres choisies* (Paris, 1890), pp. 109-110.

Renaissance. In baroque literature things, actions, persons, and landscapes are not described, but only evoked; they blend, their unsharp contours are effaced, they have something indefinite, "un non so che," they are seen "por el rabillo del ojo" (Ortega y Gasset[68]), mirrored in the view of literary personages, not reflected directly in the judgment of the author. Perspectivism, teichoscopy, impressionism represent the most condensed and simple forms. In a prismatic refraction, the aspects envisaged are accompanied by an exciting halo of prolongation and of possibilities. The situations are the same for all literary genera, especially as, for the baroque Aristotelians, tragedy has all the elements of epic poetry.[69]

As far as Tasso is concerned, Spoerri and Toffanin have independently exploited Galileo Galilei's remarks on his art. Galileo, with his decided Renaissance taste, objects to Tasso's stylistically willed lack of clarity, so different from Ariosto's clear details; he scoffs at Tasso's calling all specific matters simply *cose* and at his refusal to describe them.[70] He cannot understand Tasso's view "in scorcio" and his "confusa mescolanza di linee."[71] Galileo is incapable of seeing that simple persons and things evoked by a lyrical character lose their commonplace aspect and become enhanced by the situations, according to baroque taste; e.g., Sofronia's exclamation at the stake: "Mira il ciel com' è bello!" or Erminia's sigh when looking upon the Christian tents and thinking of Tancredi: "O belle agli occhi miei tende latine!" Jerusalem when it first appears to the Crusaders is not described, but apprehended in dimness and distant perspective[72] by their surprise, their pointing to it with their fingers, their greeting it with jubilation (*Ger.*, III, 3). The Saracen sentry on the walls of the Holy City sees by teichoscopy the Christian host first as a cloud of dust, then as flames and lightnings in the dust, finally as horses and men (*Ger.*, III, 9). This technique obviously is the same as that of Cervantes introducing, for instance, the adventure with the sheep; it is also used in other adventures (see *DQ*, I, 2), except that Don Quijote prevents the final clearing up of the first impressions by a foolish interpretation and action. Far-distant silhouettes like Clorinda's upon the hill (*Ger.*, VI, 26) or Cardenio's on the rocky Sierra

[68] José Ortega y Gasset, *op. cit.*, note 17, particularly pp. 113-114.

[69] Aristotle, *Poetics* (Loeb Classical Library), p. 22: ". . . originally the practice was the same in tragedy as in epic poetry."

[70] Spoerri, *Renaissance und Barock bei Ariost und Tasso*, p. 14.

[71] Toffanin, *Il Tasso*, p. 140: "O Signor Tasso . . . voi mettete veramente insieme molte parole, ma non dipingete cosa che vaglia . . . riguardate in scorcio . . . ; le . . . pitture altro non rappresentano che una confusa e inordinata mescolanza di linee e di colori."

[72] Giacomo Grillo, *Poets at the Court of Ferrara: Ariosto, Tasso and Guarini, With a chapter on Michelangelo* (Boston, 1943): "Tasso, the musician, sees things in distant dimness; he is a painter of perspectives: the city of Jerusalem appears dimly to the crusaders (III, 3)."

(*DQ*, I, 23) reveal the common taste which Tasso and Cervantes share with Velásquez.

If the fatally wounded hero is evoked by Tasso with a vague statement, "E fatto è il corpo suo solo una piaga" (*Ger.*, VIII, 22), it is remarkable that the very same is done by Racine: "Tout son corps n'est bientôt qu'une plaie" (*Phèdre*, line 1550). Woman's hair shining behind a veil (*Ger.*, 4, 29), curled by the wind, or suddenly unfolding from under a helmet (Clordina, *Ger.*, III, 21) or a cap (Dorotea, *DQ*, I, 28), woman's limbs covered by gauze or by water (*Ger.*, XV, 59; *DQ*, I, 28), are the strange flashing impressions of merging elements of beauty constantly used by Tasso, Cervantes, and even the Racine of "ces vains ornements et ces voiles" (*Phèdre*, line 158).

In Tasso the cantos flow into one another and leave no room for the patchwork of Ariosto's transitions. In French classic tragedy no act is entitled to be an entity. When the curtain drops, there is left something for the following act, for the *enchaînement*.[73] In Cervantes, as Casalduero has shown, a chapter never contains the end of an action. Cervantes, particularly, is aware of the baroque beauty of blending everything—epic, lyric, tragic, comic—into an epic in prose instead of verse (*DQ*, I, 47). He melts report and action, dialogue and tale, romances quoted and romances lived, fiction and criticism, "le roman" and "le point de vue sur le roman,"[74] the living and the printed Don Quijote.[75] In the same way, the baroque painters blend stucco with color and efface the boundary line. Evocations arise in the reader's imagination almost against his will when he hears Don Quijote's oratory: "¿No oyes el relinchar de los caballos, el tocar de los clarines, el ruido de los atambores?" (*DQ*, I, 18). And this evocation of phantasmata, of "la confusa marcial armonía" (II, 35), is the same which Racine uses when he makes us ponder at the end of *Britannicus* on the crimes to be committed by Nero, and at the end of *Bérénice* on the slow process of her dying from a broken heart. Nothing is more evocative than these "silences générateurs" (M. Cressot).

The constant use of *parecer* (Fichter) in Cervantes, or the prismatic verbs *voir, entendre, daigner* in Racine (Spitzer), together with certain allusions, suppressions, omissions in both authors,[76] have an effect praised by Gustave Flaubert as the power of making the reader see and

[73] Racine, *Mithridate*, ed. G. Rudler (Oxford, 1943), p. xxviii: "Le rideau ne devait pas tomber sur une action finie, cette action fût-elle partielle; les actes devaient s'enchaîner."

[74] M. Bataillon, *Erasme et l'Espagne* (Paris, 1937), p. 822.

[75] A. Castro, *España en su historia* (Buenos Aires, 1948), p. 257.

[76] W. L. Fichter, "Estudios cervantinos recientes (1937-1947)," *Nueva Revista de Filología Hispánica*, II (1948), 100. Leo Spitzer, "Die klassische Dämpfung . . . ," *loc cit.*, and A. Castro, "La palabra escrita y el *Quijote*," *Asomante*, III (1947), 13.

remember things never described. Commonplace statements, in the process of evocation, have the function of a baroque shock. For instance, when Don Quijote and Sancho behold the sea the first time at Barcelona, their reaction is couched in apparently banal words: "Vieron el mar . . . ; parecióles espaciosísimo y largo" (*DQ*, II, 61). It reminds us of Fénelon's "la mer claire et unie" in *Télémaque*. It is the same baroque abstention used by Racine when he mentions "ces paisibles lieux," "ces bords heureux," "ce rivage funeste," "des campagnes désertes." But again these masked and apparently meaningless epithets exhale a whole aura of moods in accord with the situation. Cervantes' bare *compositiones loci* vie with those of Racine: "una alta montaña, un prado tan verde y vicioso, un manso arroyuelo" (*DQ*, I, 25), "sitios de yerba y agua" (I, 5), "una fresca arboleda" (*DQ*, II, 59), "unos sombrosos árboles" (II, 12). What is baroque in this procedure has been formulated by Dámaso Alonso apropos of Góngora: "El objeto suele estar evocado a toda velocidad y sólo por un rasgo distintivo."[77]

Leo Spitzer has clearly paralleled Cervantes' whole prismatic style with that of Racine. He thinks that Racine's method of reflecting actions through persons to whom a hero refers, or through verbs of refraction, or, as he says, through "a multiplication of planes," is comparable to "the baroque 'mirror' technique of Velásquez." Both represent the perspective of "voir . . . à travers un nuage."[78] One may add that Racine even possesses Cervantes' technique of depth perspectivism in fusing reported tales with the main action. He evokes in his expositions and in concentrated sketches the heavy stories of heroic deeds and crimes of love by hanging them on slim verbs of visualization. These verbs dominate and comprise pages digested from Ovid and Catullus, e.g., when Hippolytus recalls his father's eventful life as learned from Théramène with the simple verb: "tu me dépeignois":

> Quand tu me dépeignois ce héros intrépide
> Consolant les mortels de l'absence d'Alcide,
> Les monstres étouffés et les brigands punis . . .
> Et la Crète fumant du sang du Minotaure . . .
> Hélène à ses parents dans Sparte dérobée,
> Salamine témoin des pleurs de Péribée . . .
> Ariane aux rochers contant ses injustices,
> Phèdre enlevée enfin sous de meilleurs auspices
> (*Phèdre*, I, i, 77-90)

By these mental pictures *Phèdre* gains depth just as the *Gerusalemme* derives perspective from the evoked six-years fight for the Holy City and *Don Quijote* from the past of Dorotea and Luscinda, Cardenio and

[77] Dámaso Alonso, *Ensayos sobre literatura española*, p. 53.
[78] Leo Spitzer, *Linguistics and Literary History*, pp. 107, 109.

Fernando, or from the past adventures of the Cautivo. Beyond this, there is a series of pictures of the type, "Phèdre au labyrinthe descendue."[79] The same occurs in *Britannicus* (IV, 2) with Agrippine who, says Brisson, "évoque ses amants, ses réussites d'alcôves, la science et le pouvoir de ses débauches"; and he adds: "C'est très Mansart . . . sans un défaut de perspective."[80] Thus, not only Wölfflin's baroque principle of evocative relative clarity can be proved as existing in literature, but also the principle of perspectivistic depth versus mere Renaissance surface.

With the particular fusion of darkness and light which baroque painting expresses by its *chiaroscuro,* we enter more deeply into the fundamental concepts of the Counter Reformation, where the overflowing of the heavenly light into the darkness of death is the eschatological, metaphysical, moral, and artistic topic *par excellence.* This baroque tendency is different from the romantic tendency to stress the night as such. Michelangelo, like Rembrandt, is permeated by this motif:

> So weak is Night that if our hand extend
> A glimmering torch, her shadow disappear.[81]

It is with the play of light and shade, the shining of the moon and the sparkling stars in the darkness, that Tasso develops a high moonlight poetry and makes of it the very atmosphere of his song.[82] He speaks of the veil of night tinged by red vapors (*Ger.,* IX, 15), and of its turbid brown light (XVIII, 13), its starred veil and luminous rays (VI, 103); he shows the corpse of Sveno in the light of the "nocturnal sun": "Ch'ogni sua piaga sfavilla e splende" (VIII, 32).

The *claro-obscuro* is also the obsession of the Spanish Baroque. It is not only Góngora who shows the reflection of torches in water at night:

> Fanal es del arroyo cada onda,
> Luz el reflejo, la agua vidriera.
> (*Soledad primera,* 675-676)

Cervantes, too, delights in showing at Altisidora's mock-resurrection "el patio alrededor nel cual ardían casi cien hachas . . . de modo que a pesar de la noche . . . algo escura, no se echaba de ver la falta del día" (*DQ,* II, 69). The night of the hunt with the ducal party is "una noche . . . no tan clara . . . , pero un cierto claroescuro . . . trujo consigo" (II, 34). When Don Quijote entered El Toboso "era la noche entreclara" (II, 9). Cervantes, furthermore, enjoys showing dark rooms suddenly entered by people with lights (I, 16; II, 47), or "mon-

[79] Leo Spitzer, "Die klassische Dämpfung," *loc. cit.,* p. 267.
[80] Pierre Brisson, *Les deux visages de Racine* (Paris, 1944), p. 62.
[81] G. Grillo, *Poets at the Court of Ferrara,* p. 128.
[82] T. Spoerri, *op. cit.,* pp. 20-21.

jes encamisados" as white spots in the dark, lighted by torches (I, 19). The beauty of Luscinda is enhanced when she is seen "una noche a la luz de una vela por una ventana" (I, 24). This Rembrandtesque impression causes Fernando to fall desperately in love with her, although she is engaged to his friend. Exactly the same occurs with Racine's *Junie* whom Nero first sees in

> Cette nuit . . .
> . . . . . levant au ciel ses yeux mouillés de larmes
> Qui brillaient au travers des flambeaux et des armes.
> (*Brit.*, II, 2:386-88)

Racine, in fact, shares with Corneille his foible for

> Cette obscure clarté qui tombe des étoiles.

He therefore shows Pyrrhus entering the Trojan palace by night, wading in blood under the reflection of the burning houses—a decisive remembrance that makes Andromaque's love for him impossible (*Andr.*, III, 8:997-1000). On the other hand, he shows Titus in a nocturnal parade with torches, the Roman eagles, the fasces, piles of arms, during "cette nuit enflammée" which made Bérénice fall definitively in love with the grandeur and splendor of the Roman Emperor (*Bér.*, I, 5:301-317). To Marcel Chicoteau goes the credit of having seen that in *Phèdre* a symbolic *clair-obscur*, as he says literally, even makes the equilibrium of the drama, because Phèdre, between the sun of grace and the infernal night of sin, can only have recourse to the *demi-jour* of repentance.[83]

To the fusion of light corresponds acoustically the fusion of sounds in echoes. The great baroque works being based on the musical principle of a motivistic and symphonic structure[84] of well-sounding elements, the echo is a logical recurrent stylistic element, a parallel to the murmuring of cascades and the artificially arranged echoes in the baroque gardens. Wölfflin said, indeed, that a fundamental baroque element is the roaring of waters and the rustling of trees. He calls it in German "das Rauschen."

If, then, the traditional figures of speech called anaphora, figura etymologica, word play, annominatio, parechesis, paronomasia, paronymia enjoy something like a second springtime after having been the great style of the hymns and sequences of the Middle Ages, it is certainly because of their echo-like character. Tasso has many lines like these:

[83] Marcel Chicoteau, "Phèdre et les poisons: un thème de médiation tiré d'Euripide," to be published in a forthcoming issue of *Comparative Literature*.

[84] For Cervantes, see H. Hatzfeld, *Don Quijote als Wortkunstwerk* (Leipzig, 1927); for Tasso, T. Spoerri, *Renaissance und Barock*; for Racine, L. Spitzer, *Linguistics*, p. 94 and p. 126, note 3.

Pianger ben merti ognor, s'*ora* non *piangi* (*Ger.*, III, 8)
Percosso il cavalier non *ripercote* (III, 24)
Ahi! Tanto *amò* la non *amante amata* (II, 28)
Ch'io preghi . . . come *amante amante* deve (XVI, 43)
E scoprir la mia *tema* anco *temea* (IV, 51)
Ma il suo *voler* più nel *voler* s'infiamma
Del suo signor (I, 18).

The last line looks almost like the pattern of Malherbe's famous:

Vouloir ce que Dieu *veut* est la seule science . . .[85]

In Spain, Dámaso Alonso alludes to the baroque echo style with this qualification: "repetición, repetición constante, constante variación."[86] Juan Díaz Rengifo, in his typically baroque *Arte poética española con . . . un divino estímulo de el Amor de Dios,* recommends every kind of poetry "con ecos" or even "en ecos." He recommends very drastic ones such as:

. . . piedad, Musa,
Usa, y mi ignorante estilo,
I lo [hilo] por tan larga calle
Halle.[87]

This is the justification for Cervantes' humorous echo style: *"acabar* su libro con . . . la *inacabable* aventura" (*DQ*, I, 1). "Le *dejaron* de *tirar* y él *dejó retirar* a los heridos" (I, 3). "La voz . . . *canta* que *encanta"* (I, 6). "Pro*curar* la *cura* de su *locura"* (I, 46). "Des*valijando* a la *valija"* (I, 23). "Algún *caminante* des*caminado"* (I, 23).

In France, Malherbe's echoes of the above-mentioned type,

Rose elle a vécu ce que vivent les *roses,*

attain fine shadings in Racine's particularly musical sensibility;[88] this has been made evident by Maurice Grammont's analyses of lines like these:

Une femme *mourante* et qui cherche à *mourir* (*Phèdre*)
Tu *vis* mon désespoir et tu m'as *vu* depuis (*Mithridate.*)

The word echo becomes here a syllable echo, as is the case in the [u]: [y] echoes of the well-known:

Ariane, ma sœur, de quel *amour* blessée
Vous mourûtes aux bords *où vous fûtes* laissée! (*Phèdre*)

[85] "Malherbe . . . a peut-être appris dans le Tasse une partie de l'harmonie et de la grâce de ses vers" (Vianey), quoted by Chandler B. Beall, *op. cit.*, p. 75.
[86] Dámaso Alonso, *Ensayos*, p. 64.
[87] Juan Díaz Rengifo, *Arte poética española con una fertilísima sylva de consonantes comunes, proprios, esdrúxulos, y reflexos, y un divino estímulo de el Amor de Dios* (Barcelona, María Angela Martí, Viuda, 1759), p. 61.
[88] Brisson, *op. cit.*, p. 49.

This echo style is baroque virtuosity at its highest. There is in Racine, according to Jacques G. Krafft, "un écho préformé et subconscient" foreshadowing Phèdre's fate, "un écho vocalique dont les vers résonnent," and "un écho du réel dans l'éternel" which announces to Frenchmen that what once happened in Greece will happen in France and everywhere.[89]

These echo interpretations, convincing though they are, find their strongest support in the echo-consciousness of the baroque authors themselves. Life is actually for Tasso what it is for Calderón:

> Un'eco, un sogno, anzi del sogno un'ombra.[90]

His enjoyment is the sound of the military trumpet re-echoed by surrounding nature, which he expresses onomapoetically:

> Quando a cantar la mattutina tromba
> Comincia: A l'arme; A l'arme, il ciel rimbomba (*Ger.*, XI, 19).

He is delighted by the hymns of a procession re-echoed from mountains and caverns (IV, 1), so that

> Si chiaramente replicar s'udia
> Or di Cristo il gran nome, or di Maria (*Ger.*, XI, 11).

Cervantes tells us that "la dolorosa y húmida Eco" (*DQ*, I, 26) reflects Dorotea's complaint of unrequited love:

> Y sus males ¿quién los cura?
> Locura. (I, 27).

And so it happens to the imaginative shepherd whose lady love, Leandra, forsook him: "El eco repite el nombre de Leandra dondequiera que pueda formarse: 'Leandra' resuenan los montes, 'Leandra' murmuran los arroyos, y Leandra nos tiene a todos suspensos" (*DQ*, I, 51). Sancho has an interest *sui generis* in the echo: "En rebuznando yo, rebuznaron todos los asnos del pueblo y . . . comenzó a rebuznar tan reciamente que todos los cercanos valles retumbaron" (*DQ*, II, 27). Together with these echoes the *Don Quijote* reflects directly Wölfflin's "Rauschen," the "confuso estruendo de árboles" and the "ruido de agua" (I, 20).

Racine's echo is on a higher psychological level, but it is present as *retentissement*. Hippolyte fallen in love is blamed by Théramène for abandoning his athletic activities; these are evoked by the echoes of shouts:

> Les forêts de nos cris moins souvent retentissent . . . (I, 2)

---

[89] Jacques G. Krafft, *La Forme et l'idée en poésie* (Paris, 1944), pp. 110-112. See also the profound chapter, "L'Echo," in J.-G. Cahen, *Le Vocabulaire de Racine* (Paris, 1946), pp. 176-192 (=*RLR*, XVI, 1940-45, 1-249).

[90] Spoerri, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

and Hippolyte complains:

> Mes seuls gémissements font retentir les bois (II, 2).

The Paradox

Baroque literature is dominated also by a supreme fusion of the rational and the irrational. Its forms of expression are paradox and oxymoron. Whereas the Renaissance, as typified by Ariosto, indulged in a spotless rational clarity, the Counter Reformation stood for the divine paradox of mystery and faith as being superior to human rationalizing. The whole inquietude of the Christian striving for a balance between faith and reason is reflected in a style which Schmarsow characterizes as the contrast between endeavor and fulfillment, below and above, outside and inside.[91] The paradox creates characters like Rinaldo, a pious hero who nevertheless becomes ensnared in the love nets of Armida; or a good, reasonable man like Alonso Quijano, who becomes the victim of his foolish reading; or a decent woman like Phèdre struggling with all her power against evil, yet becoming in her heart adulterous, incestuous, jealous, and a homicide. The creation of such characters was certainly stimulated also by Aristotle's remark on the consistently inconsistent literary types of persons,[92] who arouse to the highest degree "fear and pity."[93] But Aristotle would not have conceived of a character like Tasso's Silvia, who flees from Aminta, the man she most ardently wishes to possess, even at the moment when he has saved her from the clutches of a satyr, only in order to preserve her proud virginity. This is baroque sensibility of contradictory mixed feelings, which come also to the fore in language, through expressions like *onesta baldanza* (*Ger.*, II, 20), *magnanima menzogna* (II, 22), *dura quiete* (III, 45), *lieto pianto* (XII, 10), *libertate amara, dolci martiri*, etc. Many things and events are called wondrous, strange, *strano, peregrino* (I, 77), with reference to their paradoxical character.

The paradox of the *cuerdo-loco* Don Quijote is underscored by Cervantes himself: "Lo que hablaba era concertado, elegante y bien dicho, y lo que hacía disparatado, temerario y tonto" (*DQ*, II, 17). Everyone is therefore amazed at his *concertados disparates* (I, 50). Marcel Bataillon has demonstrated how Cervantes' concept of paradox is reflected in his love for Don Quijote's oratorical speeches which, however impressive they may be, are ridiculed by a short finale of *desengaño*. It is a paradox that the humorous liberty of Cervantes himself remains entirely compatible with the severe morals of his Puritan-like devout humanism and his sincere orthodoxy.[94] Cervantes also, contrary to

[91] August Schmarsow, *Barock und Rokoko* (Leipzig, 1897), pp. 52, 123.
[92] Aristotle, *Poetics* (Loeb Classical Library), ch. 14, p. 64.
[93] *Ibid.*, ch. 13, p. 48.
[94] Marcel Bataillon, *Erasme et l'Espagne* (Paris, 1937), pp. 823, 838.

statements of many of his commentators, finds everything mysterious, paradoxical, and strange: *estraño gusto* (I,1), *peregrina historia* (I,2), *extraña visión* (I, 19), *extraño caso* (II, 47; II, 63), *extraña aventura* (I, 23), *extraño rodeo* (II, 63), *la extrañeza de su grande locura* (I, 49).

We are still better informed on the paradox in Racine. Pierre Brisson has presented the unquiet Racine as "le chrétien dominé par l'implacable Dieu,"[95] Theophil Spoerri the spiritual Racine paradoxically split between *vivre et régner*,[96] Pierre Guéguen another contradictory Racine who loves the passions which he tries to cure.[97] Henri Bremond[98] and Miss Freudemann[99] have drawn up beautiful lists of oxymora as the expression of Racine's paradoxy with terms such as *perfide bonté, faveurs meurtrières, orgueilleuse faiblesse, veuve sans avoir eu d'epoux;* and sentences of the type:

> Présente je vous fuis, absente je vous trouve (*Phèdre*)
> Toujours prête à partir, et demeurant toujours (*Andr.*)
> Dans une longue enfance ils l'auraient fait vieillir (*Brit.*)

Leo Spitzer, finally, has X-rayed all the paradoxes of *Phèdre*, which he calls the ideal type of "a baroque tragedy of *desengaño*," filled with "deliberate ambiguity," wherein the gods persecute those they seem to protect. Even the paradox of the unnatural in nature is expressed paradoxically (by terms like *montagne humide* for a great wave); and the antagonistic forces of the senses and intellect, anarchy and order, find a linguistic means for the maintenance of a poised balance. Phèdre, "an oxymoron incarnate," the "fille de Minos et de Pasiphaé," is revealed in her speeches as "disharmony conquered by the harmony of form,"[100] or, as Krafft has expressed it conversely, "une ombre portée du fini sur l'infini."[101] This Racinian, metaphysical paradox was present at the beginning of the Baroque when Santa Teresa sighed: "Que muero porque no muero."

Majesty and Magnificence

In the age of Counter Reformation and absolutism God was called *su divina majestad* by the same Santa Teresa. God and kings were seen alike as majesties and surrounded by a gorgeous court style. The same

---

[95] Brisson, *op. cit.*, p. 9.
[96] Theophil Spoerri, "Trieb und Geist bei Racine," *Archiv für das Studium der neueren Sprachen* (1933), pp. 60-80.
[97] Pierre Guéguen, *Poésie de Racine: Les tragédies nautiques: Les Passions* (Paris, 1946).
[98] H. Bremond, *Racine et Valéry* (Paris, 1926).
[99] Erika Ruth Freudemann, *Das Adjektiv und seine Ausdruckswerte im Stil Racines* (Berlin, 1941).
[100] Leo Spitzer, *Linguistics* (Princeton, 1948), particularly pp. 88-90.
[101] Krafft, *op. cit.*, p. 112.

men who felt like poor puppets in the hands of God developed a sentiment of grandeur and splendor, of magnificence and pompousness, which is based on the inner convictions of a creature dependent on higher eternal powers, on something that Karl Vossler once called the "majesty of conscience."[102] There is in the Baroque therefore a certain pathos which enraptures the whole of society[103] and, *a fortiori,* the authors long for fit occasions to show it. Here there is no bad taste of a possible literary *churriguerismo*; and Boileau, when speaking of the alleged "clinquant du Tasse" (*Sat.,* IX, 176), did not know what René Bray has discovered today, that it was Tasso who contributed most to the formation of the classical doctrine in France.[104] From Tasso to Racine there is a feeling for the greatness of display and pageant, of palaces and banquets, of processions and parades; but there is particularly a feeling for the inner greatness possible of attainment in the individual, called magnanimity.

This baroque attitude of majesty, as Spoerri has pointed out,[105] finds one form of expression in Tasso's superlative epithets in the *Gerusalemme*: *gran, eccelso, smisurato, inusitato, enfiato, tumido, gravissimo.* One could add others like *nobilissimo* (I, 60), *magnanimo* (V, 2), *estremo* (V, 12), *glorioso* (I, 1), *augusto* (I, 22), *alto* (I, 43), *intrepido* (I, 45), *solenne* (I, 20), etc., which gain momentum when characterizing impressive personalities. For example:

> Armida ... sublime in un gran carro assisa (*Ger.,* XVII, 33),
> Meravigliosa ... d'abito, di maniere e di sembiante (XVII, 36).

Rinaldo riding in the military parade is seen:

> Dolcemente feroce alzar la regal fronte (I, 58).

Goffredo at the generals' meeting appears:

> Augusto in volto ed in sermon sonoro (I,20).

Argante, the dangerous adversary, is called:

> Per gran cor, per gran corpo e per gran posse
> Superbo e minaccevole in sembiante (V, 23).

A moderate hyperbaton of the type:

> Penetrar sin dove
> Fuor d' incognito fonte il Nilo move (V, 52),

and closed expressions of the Latin type:

---

[102] Karl Vossler, *Die Antike und die Bühnendichtung der Romanen* (Vorträge der Bibl. Warburg, VII), p. 19.

[103] Emil Staiger, *Grundbegriffe der Poetik* (Zürich, 1946), pp. 168-169.

[104] R. Bray, *La Formation de la doctrine classique en France* (Lausanne, 1931); and Chandler Beall, *op. cit.,* p. 82.

[105] Spoerri, *op. cit.,* pp. 22-32.

Queste sacre ed al ciel dilette mura (IV, 69),

represent a solemn periphrase and enhance still more the baroque magnificence of style. The metonymic paraphrase by itself in any form whatsoever heightens the grandeur. Therefore the enemy is called "il ferro ostile" (IV, 40), the body "il mortal velo" (IV, 44), a daring hero "l'uomo a fere imprese avvezzo" (I, 67).

Without doubt, Tasso's baroque practice corresponds exactly to Cervantes' rules: "Procurar que . . . con palabras significativas, honestas y bien colocadas salga vuestra oración y período sonoro y festivo" (*DQ*, I, Pról.). With all its humor the *Don Quijote* is meant also in a euphonically serious way to be "una historia . . . grandílocua, alta, insigne, magnífica" (II, 3), "gravísima, altisonante" (I, 22). This feeling is in Cervantes *malgré lui*. Like Tasso, Cervantes is fond of describing *magnificently* everything "magnífico y grande" (II, 13), "grandezas y extrañezas" (I, 20), "el grandísimo aparate de guerra" (I, 38), "solemnísimas justas" (II, 4) reflected in the aggrandizing vision of the majestic "quieto y sosegado" (II, 15) hidalgo, called with the most pompous phrasing "el jamás como se debe alabado Don Quijote de la Mancha" (I, 11), who does not want "que la grandeza de los grandes se mida con . . . estrecheza" (II, 31).

Humor does not mask sufficiently Cervantes' own indulgence in this periphrastic-metonymic, baroque style, when he and not Don Quijote says, after a tiring experience, "Al polvo y al cansancio socorrió una fuente clara" (II, 59), or of the lack of rain in a dry summer: "Aquel año habían las nubes negado su rocío a la tierra" (I, 52). But Don Quijote vies with Tasso's most rhythmical and melodious phrases, when he praises "las casas sobre rústicas estacas sustentadas" (I, 11), with a vibrating vowel echo reminiscent of place names like Guadalajara; or when he believes he discovers enemies on the plain like "el nunca medroso Brandabarbarán de Boliche" and "el siempre vencedor y jamás vencido Timonel de Carcajona" (I, 18). He imitates here, as Cervantes says, the language of the chivalrous novels (I, 2), but in a baroque majestic cast which is not in the *Amadises*. His dignified superlatives are no less mitigated, to use Spitzer's terminology, than the Racinian ones, when he speaks of: "un *tan* valiente y *tan* nombrado caballero" (I, 9), or "estos *tan* calamitosos tiempos" (I, 9). As in Racine, majestic dignity, albeit mock-heroic, inheres in his imposing imperatives expressed by rare, urbane, smooth subjunctive forms: "No quiero otra cosa sino que volváis al Toboso y que . . . os presentéis ante esta señora . . . y le digáis lo que . . . he fecho" (I, 8).

The same baroque majesty prevails in Racine. With him also "la pompe d'école," to use the terminology of Brisson, turns out to be "cadences qui . . . prolongent au-delà de l'explicable l'écho d'un sen-

timent."[106] This echo, as Miss Freudemann has shown,[107] is due also to the scores of epithets, majestic in both form and content, such as:

généreux	étincelant	divin	fier
précieux	vaillant	céleste	magnanime
dédaigneux	puissant	altier	parfait
pompeux	royal	solennel	inflexible
majestueux	austère	immortel	haut
magnifique	insigne	rare	grand
formidable	riche	immense	sublime
terrible	célèbre	extrême	souverain
redoutable	illustre	noble	absolu
brillant	intrépide	superbe	suprême
éclatant	unique	sacré	

These epithets gain value from their contexts. Substantives expressing the same magnificence alternate with them. As in Cervantes, even when recognized in their partial vainglory—a temptation concerning which the new, reformed Catholic society is always on the alert—these nouns and adjectives still shine like gold, jewels, and bright, baroque color, e.g., in Agamemnon's words:

> Charmé de mon pouvoir et plein de ma grandeur
> Ces noms de roi des rois et de chef de la Grèce
> Chatouillaient de mon cœur l'orgueilleuse faiblesse.
> (*Iphigénie*, I, 1, 82).

When this same Agamemnon tries to keep Clytemnestra from the Greek camp, she answers in words of no less fascinating sublimity, though uncouth in their egotism:

> Dans quel palais superbe et plein de ma grandeur
> Puis-je jamais paraitre avec plus de splendeur?
> (*Iphigénie*, III, 1, 807-8).

To prove how deeply this majesty and heroic grandeur is anchored in the soul of the baroque generations, we may quote Bossuet's words at the bier of the great Condé: "Montrons dans un prince admiré . . . ce qui porte la gloire du monde jusqu'au comble, valeur, magnanimité . . . , grandeur et sublimité du génie" (*Oraison funèbre du Grand Condé*).

The moderate Racine shares with Tasso and Cervantes those images which overstress the metaphorical implications and which Dámaso Alonso, apropos of Góngora, has called *imágenes agotadoras*. Spitzer defines them, with the definition of preciosity: "une métaphore suivie jusqu'au bout" and quotes:

> Le flot qui l'apporta, recule, épouvanté.[108]

---

[106] Brisson, *op. cit.*, pp. 50-51.
[107] E. R. Freudemann, *op. cit.*, pp. 59, 69, 121.
[108] L. Spitzer, *op. cit.*, p. 115.

G. Rohlfs has shown that, like Tasso and Cervantes in their Homeric catalogues, Racine also is fond of the orchestration produced by unusual, high-sounding names like:

> Daces, Pannoniens, la fière Germanie (*Mithridate*),[109]
> Procruste, Cercyon, Scirron et Sinaïs (*Phédre* I, 1),

not to forget:

> La fille de Minos et de Pasiphaé.

Individual Dignity in the Struggle between Virtue and Passion

In this climate of majesty and magnificence we find those Aristotelian heroes who are neither entirely good nor entirely bad. They can be neither sinners nor saints. In the atmosphere of the Counter Reformation, however, the humanistic *aurea mediocritas* gives way to a virtuous upward trend towards the realm of renunciation and nobility of soul. This unique tension between Aristotle and the Tridentine spirit of reform seems responsible for the unstable baroque balance between virtue and weakness, where virtue seems the norm and sin the exception—a situation which makes for the dignity of baroque romance in the Romance Baroque. This much-debated problem may be illustrated by some of Tasso's, Cervantes' and Racine's feminine characters who look like daughters of the same family. What links Tasso's Clorinda, Erminia, Sofronia, or Gildippe to Cervantes' Dorotea, Doña Clara, Zoraïda, or Ana Félix and to Racine's Bérénice, Monime, Atalide, or Esther is a dignity and a purity which sometimes, according to Victor Cousin, even amount to weakness.[110] For them to succumb is a momentary lessening of an habitual extreme vigilance. These characters, an "essaim d'innocentes beautés" (*Esther*), illustrate, as Cervantes has it, "la vergüenza y recato de las doncellas" (*DQ*, II, 57), or "une pudique ardeur" (*Phèdre*, I, 1), as Racine says, or "une grandeur simple . . . qui a sa source dans le cœur," according to La Bruyére (*Caractères*).

These women, with all their self-respect, chastity, sense of duty, and honor, energetically follow their just interests, the brave Clorinda with Tancredi, the shrewd Dorotea with Fernando, the diplomatic Andromaque with Pyrrhus. They are beautiful, but not too conscious of their beauty, like Sofronia "Vergin [che] sua beltà non cura, O tanto sol quant'onestà sen fregi" (*Ger.*, II, 14), or Bérénice with her "soin de plaire sans art" (*Bér.*, II, 2), or even the imaginary Dulcinea with her unconscious, eternally feminine gesture: "levanta la mano al cabello para componerle aunque no esté desordenado" (*DQ*, II, 10).

The sense of sacrifice, proverbial for Corneille's Pauline and Chimène

[109] Rohlfs, *op. cit.*, p. 210.
[110] Freudemann, *op. cit.*, p. 293.

or the Princesse de Clèves, is not the exception but the norm. Therefore the impassioned Erminia attends the wounded Tancredi without even avowing her love to him; the apparently ruthless Moorish girl, Zoraida, sacrifices country, family, language, customs to become the wife of a Christian; in the sweet Monime, who tells her beloved Xipharès that her duty would bind her not to him but to his old father (*Mithridate*, II, 6),[111] appears the same "victime obéissante" as in Racine's Iphigénie. Such an attitude extends even to male characters like Vicente Torellos (*DQ*, II, 60), dying gladly from the mad jealousy of his sweetheart, or Oreste (*Andromaque*) who "sait aimer du moins et même sans qu'on l'aime." The feminine victims are religiously informed, so that Sofronia, Zoraïda, or Esther turns out, literally, "une douce et tendre enfant de Marie."[112]

The genuine femininity of all these heroines is guaranteed by the streams of tears coming from their suffering, and reaches from the child-like love of Doña Clara (*DQ*, I, 43) and Atalide (*Bajazet*) to the conjugal *pietas* of Odoardo's young wife, Gildippe, and the exemplary mother and widow, Andromaque.

Those who fall into the snares of sin recover their human dignity either by repentance and abandonment, as is the case with Armida, or by a hard struggle before the fall, as is so evident in Cervantes' Camila, "perseguida Penélope (*DQ*, I, 34), or Dorotea (I, 28) struggling between *ciega afición* and *verdadero amor*. As for Phèdre, Brisson points out that her tremendous effort toward renunciation, which seems to have kept her body pure, is still insufficient to purify her poisoned mind, so that

> De l'austère pudeur les bornes sont passées.[113]

All these baroque heroines, whether they rise or whether they fall, always have God present in their minds and hearts. Also, without the drastic means of the Spanish comedia, they are surrounded by mystery as figures of that *gran teatro del mundo*, the strings of which are in the hands of One who loves virtue and hates sin. This Counterreformatory consciousness makes these serious woman characters particularly baroque and so different from the perhaps more charming but less problematic Nausicaas, Ophelias, Cordelias, and Portias.

Conclusion

These general features of the Romance literary Baroque do not preclude national differences; on the contrary, they presuppose them. The

[111] Rohlfs, *op. cit.*, p. 203.
[112] Brisson, *op. cit.*, pp. 201-202.
[113] *Ibid.*, pp. 134-145.

possible extension of some of the Romance features to the whole of Europe may be investigated by others. If certain characteristics of the Baroque in the Germanic and Protestant countries are found to correspond to Romance traits, they may be secondary imitations or adaptations of the southern Catholic Baroque. In the Romance countries, however, literary Baroque is, as we have seen, a living style informed by Aristotelian humanism which itself was sponsored by the Council of Trent; the new moralistic tendencies made writers more keenly aware of problems like catharsis and of the importance of refined and decent language. These tendencies expand into an entirely new sentiment of art, new in conception and in representation. The representation, at least, may be described as tending toward fusion instead of sharp contours in literary structure and style, the most typical features being *chiaroscuro* and echoes. This again is in complete harmony with the paradox of the light of "dark" faith, another vital element of the new metaphysical *homme ouvert* as opposed to the rational clarity of the earthbound *homme clos* of the Renaissance. The *homme ouvert,* full of the dignity of the divine, must employ representative forms of majesty and magnificence, which again are stylistically analyzable. His conscious obligation to walk in the presence of God, as the seventeenth-century language has it, in the unstable balance between virtue and passion, affords a definite chance for virtue, a fact which comes convincingly to the fore in the feminine literary characters. All these inner and outer features together form a spontaneous, original, and logical constellation which is unique in history. This configuration of traits constitutes, beyond the shadow of a doubt, a *style,* the baroque style of the Romance and Catholic countries of Europe during the seventeenth century.[114]

Catholic University

[114] Emile Simon, "L'Esprit du Baroque," *Mercure de France* (Nov. 1, 1948), p. 484, note 3, extends the baroque style of the arts of design to the whole of civilization: "Nous voyons naitre . . . une forme d'*Etat baroque*: c'est la monarchie absolue et chrétienne . . . , une *politique baroque*: c'est pour parler comme Bossuet la 'Politique tirée de l'Ecriture Sainte,'. . . *un ordre religieux baroque*: c'est la congrégation des Jésuites . . . une *morale baroque*: celle-là même contre laquelle s'indignait si violemment Pascal; un *style de vie baroque*: celui des princes de l'Eglise et des grands seigneurs chrétiens . . . pour rendre sensible, disent-ils, la magnificence de Dieu sur la terre . . . ; une *littérature baroque* dont les meilleurs modèles sont . . . Calderon, Lope, Tirso . . . , le Tasse, Shakespeare, Milton, et même . . . Corneille et Bossuet . . . ; un *costume baroque*: c'est celui qui, au lieu de chercher à mettre en valeur les lignes de l'architecture humaine, les camoufle sous toutes sortes d'ornements." E. Simon's statements support our analysis, except for his erroneous identification of the excesses of casuistry with the *morale baroque.*

THE BYRONISM OF LERMONTOV'S *A HERO OF OUR TIME*

W. J. ENTWISTLE

THAT Lermontov modelled his conduct and verses on those of Byron has been said to satiety both by critics and by the Russian poet himself. He had indeed created presuppositions about his own work among his contemporaries which he felt bound to make an effort to dispel. He was, he asserted, not merely a Russian Byron, but someone different. But what Lermontov might be was still unrevealed[1] in 1832, and this Russian writer of Hebrew melodies, ballads, romances, and album-pieces for ladies and gentlemen continued to sustain formal comparison with his model until the year 1836.

In that year his poetic Byronism culminated in the splendid *Dying Gladiator*. The piece is introduced by a line from *Childe Harold*. It shows us Lermontov in complete command of his own style, but there is still a causal relationship between the two writers. Had Byron not thrilled Europe with his verses on the dying gladiator (*Childe Harold*, IV, 140-141) he saw in Rome, had he not mentioned the Danube (though Dacia proved to have no interest for the Russian poet), and had he not made the sight the text for the protest against the cost of empire in tears and blood, there would have been neither cause nor sentiment for Lermontov's poem.

After 1836, however, Lermontov drew away from Byron into the freer exercise of his own special talents. In his novel he employed the medium of prose, which was never Byron's. Lermontov was intimately acquainted with the Caucasus, and its inspiration could not be kept out of his poems. *A Hero of Our Time* is thus an expression of Lermontov's proper genius. There is no causal relationship between it and any of Byron's works, and yet there is parallelism in many respects. These resemblances are not fortuitous or imitative, but due to permanent conditions either of Lermontov's genius or of Russian nature. They are, for that reason, I think, the more significant for the student of comparative

[1] "No Byron I, but yet unknown
A chosen vessel set apart;
A stranger by the world reviled
Like him, but Russian in my heart."
Ya net Bayron.

literature; for they take us out of the regions of "influences," "models," and even "analogues," so assiduously pursued by some scholars, though so often trivial or superficial in effect. We are able to compare Lermontov as Lermontov with Byron, and there is heightened significance given by the greatness of the novel, which is so true to certain aspects of Russia, for it brings into evidence the similarities between the genius of Byron and that of a whole people.

The romantics had motives for requiring from novelists and poets the spice of the exotic, and this was given in abundant measure by Byron. But what he revealed to Europe was not the artificially contrived marvels of the Gothic revival nor the antiquarianism of Sir Walter Scott. Scott dipped just over the horizon in time, but Byron did so in space. His Aegean world was just inaccessible to his readers, but it was directly observed and real in matters of detail, though deliciously covered with the Byronic patina. Without departing from the natural, Byron increased the bounds of imagination and experience. The customs and sentiments he interpreted were basically those of his Western readers, but they were more dramatic, more colorful, and more flaunted. He offered guarantees of good faith to many nations: Don Juan to Spain, the Colosseum to Rome, Bonnivard to the Swiss, Mazeppa to the Ukrainians; but his fancy chiefly haunted the Aegean, with its uncouth and ferocious denizens, corsairs, giaours, arnauts, and the like.

Byron's world extended as far as the Caucasus, which he approached from the side of Armenia. In *The Giaour* he described the central defiles in these terms:

> The foremost Tartar's in the gap
> Conspicuous by his yellow cap;
> The rest in lengthening line the while
> Wind slowly through the long defile;
> Above, the mountain rears a peak,
> Where vultures whet the thirsty beak,
> And theirs may be a feast tonight,
> Shall tempt them down ere morrow's light;
> Beneath, a river's wintry stream
> Has shrunk before the summer's beam,
> And left a channel bleak and bare,
> Save shrubs that spring to perish there;
> Each side the midnight path there lay
> Small broken crags of granite gray,
> By time, or mountain lightning, riven
> From summits clad in mists of heaven;
> For where is he that hath beheld
> The peak of Liakura unveiled?

Apart from the single name, this is no doubt a set piece of description, which might apply to any mountains, if the poet set himself to exagger-

ate the elements of height and peril. Sir Walter Scott and Richard Blackmore have by this art converted innocent waterslides into objects of terror. But there is justification for each of Byron's terms in Lermontovs' description of the ascent of Gud-gora, which must have been supremely exciting for dwellers upon the endless Russian plains. He mentions the storm clouds that smoke around the peaks, and the sudden and devastating onset of the tempest, and the bitter winds that cut down through the gorges. Lermontov's characters approach from the south side of the range, as Byron did, under the guidance of Ossetian drivers. The novelist insists that this world of his imagination is Asia, not Russia. The difference is palpable whenever a scene includes the solid, prosaic, and irremediably Russian Maksim Maksimych, who is the more Russian for the incongruity of his Kabarda pipe with silver mountings and hairy Cherkassian hat. His skin is bronzed by Transcaucasian suns and his mouth is full of imprecations against "these dreadful beasts of Asiatics"; he serves as a mid-point of reference by which we realize the strangeness of the Ossetian drivers, Tatar horse rustlers, Georgians, Cossack adventurers, Chechen and Cherkassian barbarians in the Caucasian hive of nations, around the fringe of which the Russian elegants (*franty* and *kokety*) flirt and drink the waters, though a dead body a few hundred yards from the end of the boulevard causes no surprise. It is this same Maksim Maksimych who serves as point of reference for the exotic passions of the novel. He is tenderly affectionate towards the luckless Bela, though not comprehending either her simple loving-kindness or Pechorin's sultry passion. He is convinced that human kindness has a value everywhere, and is hurt when his generous hand is brushed aside by the hero. He is so much a part of fate that he is unconscious of its workings, and he turns a story of the workings of destiny into a dissertation on the bad priming of Cherkassian guns. Byron has no Maksim Maksimych, and his portraits are the less permanent for lack of him, but the rest of Lermontov's people have their place in Byron's world.

It might, on the surface, seem that Byron had done Lermontov a poor service by inducing him to conceive romantically a region which he knew so well in prosaic fact; but there are considerations which diminish the reproach. The art of the novel is such as to demand both truth to experience and consciousness of invention. It is not enough to "hold the mirror up to nature." It is a primary necessity to convince the reader that something extraordinary is about to occur. This is so important that for many millennia the criteria of factual veracity did not enter into the writer's calculations. Even at this day, romance can be enjoyed with an uncritical pleasure which Cervantes would censure but himself appreciate. Like other novels, those of Russia take their beginning from

the strange and surprising, and they constantly recur to this inspiration. One may cite the Orenburg steppes in Pushkin's *Captain's Daughter* (with the figure of Pugachev), the Cossack epic in Gogol's *Taras Bul'ba,* and the Caucasus of Tolstoy's *Prisoner of the Caucasus.* It is true that Levin in *Anna Karenina* and Raskol'nikov in *Crime and Punishment* are remarkable figures, but their sort arise when the norm is much better identified. In an earlier stage of development, the novelistic art employs the frankly abnormal. Pechorin, according to the second captain, was a distinguished youth, but somewhat strange, and the novel is designed to prove his strangeness. He could be otherwise viewed as a vulgarian, a poseur, and a philanderer without merit or excuse, and a later novelist of the school of Flaubert might have laid bare his squalid soul with a psychological scalpel. That was not possible in Lermontov's time, but the exotic setting saves his hero. It is nothing out of the way for a young man to seduce an innocent girl. But it is remarkable to carry off a Cherkassian princess and to make love across the barriers of language and habits, and it is extraordinary that a philanderer should enter a boat for his own vulgar ends but find he has to fight for his life against a female smuggler. The four-cornered intrigue labelled "Princess Meri" might have occurred wherever lazy and fashionable folk gather to kill their boredom, and it might lead to a duel—but not to such a duel as Lermontov describes upon a little triangular platform overhanging an immense ravine, and against the magnificent back cloth of the Caucasian range.

The technique of story telling employed by Lermontov is also Byronic. He was acquainted with Scott and others, but he chose the fragmentary manner of, say, *The Giaour,* and welcomed the opportunity of putting long passages in the words of his hero. The chief glory of Byron may well be that he is the best story teller in English verse after Chaucer. The art is almost a lost one now, but it has had a great history. Byron's skill was generously recognized by Sir Walter Scott. "James," he said to Ballantyne, "Byron hits the mark where I don't even pretend to fledge my arrow." Lockhart sought to trim the balance by a reproach against Byron. "Byron owed at least half his success to the imitation of Scott, and no trivial share of the rest to the lavish use of materials which Scott never employed, only because his genius was under the guidance of high feelings of moral rectitude." Peace be upon all such bickerings! These great men were masters in their different spheres. Scott, the prose novelist, sustained no comparison with Byron; Byron as the verse story teller did not diverge, like Scott, into tracts of versified prose. His less elevated passages are ingeniously glossed by his style, by his apparently negligent air, his brilliant rhymes, and barbed allusions. Episodic construction enabled him to pass over unsaid a great

deal that would have made flat verse, and it is this episodic construction that Lermontov, a poet, was quick to copy.

For this technique, outside Byron, I see no models in the books with which Lermontov was familiar. He mentions *Werther, Old Mortality,* the works of Balzac, and *Undine,* but they would have led him in the paths of the articulated story. Connecting links are absent from *A Hero of Our Time.* The episode entitled "Maksim Maksimych" may be described as such a link, if its purpose is to explain how Pechorin's papers came into his editor's hands. But that, surely, is not the purpose of the episode. It gives the reader his only direct glimpse of Pechorin, hurtling through the Caucasus to Persia under the goad of his conscience, brushing aside the offers of his old friend, and chilling him with unkindness. The reader learns by, as it were, personal experience that this is one "at whose birth it was written that extraordinary things should happen to him." In the other episodes there is a veil between reader and personage, due to the uncomprehending report by the second captain and the speciousness of Pechorin's memoirs. If, then, we take this passage to be an episode and not a link, it follows that the novel is compounded of episodes corresponding to the moments of highest passion, and that their linkage is left to the imagination of the reader. It is a Byronic procedure and one congenital to the lyrical poet in Lermontov.

All Byronic heroes are one hero and his face is Byron's. Whatever other persons get into Byron's verse are statically described and never lived. A burr that stuck to Lermontov was the insinuation that his Pechorin was no other than himself. He is a character in a sense not shared by Bela, Princess Meri, or the young fop Grushnickij. Vera has a great space for action and no character to act with. Even Maksim Maksimych, though admiraby outlined, is statically described and does not enjoy that degree of the author's sympathy which would make him a living person. This leaves only Pechorin alive through some fellow feeling of his creator's. No doubt Pechorin was unlike the actual Lermontov, who says he describes him ironically. Successful irony is usually provided with a key, but there is no such key in the novel. The opening pages set a distance between the author and Maksim Maksimych, who might otherwise, in his normality, have stood for the author's reason. In the matter of English poses, Maksim, who ignores them, is as far from the author's standpoint as Pechorin, who exaggerates them. But between Pechorin and Lermontov there is the kind of relation that exists between Lara and Byron, Don Quixote and Cervantes, Hamlet and Shakespeare, Levin and Tolstoy, and to that extent, allowing for artistic remodelling and despite the testimony of the poet, we must say that Pechorin *is* Lermontov. Pechorin as a diarist shares a quality with Lermontov as a novelist and with Byron as a Don Juan, namely, incapacity for under-

standing the character of women; but Lermontov in Bela and Byron in Haidée draw attractive pictures of innocence—a negative quality.

Peculiar to Byron was the internal contradiction of his nature and education. Sir Walter Scott noticed it upon their first acquaintance, and is reported by Lockhart as saying:

> He was certainly proud of his rank and ancient family, and in that respect, as much an aristocrat as was consistent with good sense and good breeding. Some disgusts, how adopted I know not, seemed to me to have given this peculiar and (as it appeared to me) contradictory cast of mind; but, at heart, I would have termed Byron a patrician on principle.

His mother contributed to his disequilibrium by petting and neglecting him outrageously. His birth and presence promised high rewards of which his physical defects balked him. But the most characteristic symptom was the discomfort of his conscience due to the teachings of his nurse. "To his Scottish upbringing [says the *Encyclopaedia Brittanica*, s. v. 'Byron,' 11th ed.] he owed his love of mountains, his love and knowledge of the Bible, and too much Calvinism for faith or unfaith in Christianity." His conflicts with society were external manifestations of the conflict within himself. The two sides of his nature held apart, and he could not solder them. He put now one, now the other, on paper in an agony of self-analysis out of which no synthesis arose.

Thus Byron, as a "conscience-stricken aristocrat," was a figure destined to become familiar in the history of Russia in the nineteenth century, and his torturing self-analysis to offer a precedent for much Russian literature. There was the "flaw" which Aristotle demands as the seed of tragedy. Byron's works are full of noble souls irretrievably ruined, charging Fate with their unhappiness but, secretly aware that the fault lies within themselves, condemning their own black villanies with the vocabulary of the severest morality. They exemplify the anarchy of a whole nature, by which good turns to evil, though evil never silences good; and the intensity of suffering is a mark of ineradicable remnants of virtue. Good impulses pave the way to crime. The subject's bewilderment is a cause of endless self-analysis, but there is no solution. The situation repeats itself in Russian literature. Before Lermontov wrote, Pushkin had shown this sort of conflict in the Grigori Mnishchek of *Boris Godunov* and the Pugachëv of *The Captain's Daughter*, and it reaches it height in Dostoevsky's work. Its sign is the monologue: the need to disburden the heart at great length, and indifference to anyone selected to hear the confession. A considerable number of great Russian novels have this character of protracted monologues, which is also that of Byron's dramas and Lermontov's *Hero of Our Time*. Pechorin endeavors three times to account for himself: his narcissism, his hankering after women, and his repulsion from marriage. It is a leading merit of

the novel that there should be this probing of the soul, and even in its details it is Byronic. The first cause, with Pechorin as with Byron, was a faulty education, whereby pampering had undermined the moral standards. Then like the Corsair, Pechorin, independent but still too young to control his passions, is represented as the victim of a violent attachment to an impossible she, accompanied by a cold aversion for all other women:

> Yes, it was love—unchangeable—unchanged,
> Felt but for one from whom he never ranged;
> Though fairest captives daily met his eye,
> He shunned, nor sought, but coldly passed them by;
> Though many a beauty drooped in prison bower,
> None ever soothed his most unguarded hour.

At least we must suppose, from the half-confidences to Grushnickij, that this was the history of Pechorin and Vera, but the latter's character is so hazy—she weeps near a fountain, shows spiteful jealousy, arranges a crude intrigue, and at last blabs to her old husband—that the situation is far from clear; but in Bela and Princess Meri we have the equivalents of the "drooping captives" of the Corsair.

The Byronic temperament, and I think the Russian, is one of extremes with no middle. Dickens is said to share with Byron in Russia the repute of a standard for England. The novels of Dickens, taken *au pied de la lettre*, are accepted as objective descriptions of English society. There was, under Tsarist rule, nothing in Russia like the intelligent and organized English middle class or its counterpart in France, and the middle order supplied only material for official comedy such as one finds in Gogol's *Dead Souls*. The extremes of aristocracy and the proletariat were much more characteristic, and give the typical Russian creations of Tolstoy and Dostoevsky. In the West the novel seems to have an almost irremediable tendency to become identified with the middle class of persons who are wealthy enough to have some initiative, but not so wealthy as to evade the penalties of their errors. The patrician novel is often a kind of escape from this too close succession of causes and effects while the proletarian novel is a conscious descent into an abyss. These psychological and social conditions belong to an age later than that of Byron's upbringing, in the amoral aristocratic times of the Regency bucks. Cause and effect operated, but on a different plane, and it is on this plane that the Russo-Scot Lermontov sets his Pechorin. He suffers none of those immediate economic and social penalties which attend similar exhibitions of petulance in a *bourgeoisie*, but only the aristocratic puishment of self-condemnation by the division of the mind against itself, unable to resolve its own evil.

Oxford

THE CONCEPT OF "ROMANTICISM" IN LITERARY HISTORY

René Wellek

II. The Unity of European Romanticism

IF WE examine the characteristics of the actual literature which called itself or was called "romantic" all over the continent, we find throughout Europe the same conceptions of poetry and of the workings and nature of poetic imagination, the same conception of nature and its relation to man, and basically the same poetic style, with a use of imagery, symbolism, and myth which is clearly distinct from that of eighteenth-century neoclassicism. This conclusion might be strengthened or modified by attention to other frequently discussed elements: subjectivism, mediaevalism, folklore, etc. But the following three criteria should be particularly convincing, since each is central for one aspect of the practice of literature: imagination for the view of poetry, nature for the view of the world, and symbol and myth for poetic style.

German literature is the clearest case; in both so-called romantic schools we find a view of poetry as knowledge of the deepest reality, of nature as a living whole, and of poetry as primarily myth and symbolism. This would hardly need to be argued with anyone who had read only Novalis. But it is impossible to accept the common German view that romanticism is the creation of the Schlegels, Tieck, Novalis, and Wackenroder. If one looks at the history of German literature between the date of Klopstock's *Messiah* (1748) and the death of Goethe (1832), one can hardly deny the unity and coherence of the whole movement which, in European terms, would have to be called "romantic." Some German scholars, such as H. A. Korff,[1] recognize this and speak of "Goethezeit" or "deutsche Bewegung," terms which, however, obscure the international character of the changes.

One must, of course, grant distinctions between the different stages of the development. There was the "Storm and Stress" movement in the seventies which exactly parallels what today is elsewhere called "preromanticism." It was more radical and violent than anything corresponding in England or France, but it must be recognized as substan-

[1] *Geist der Goethezeit: Versuch einer ideellen Entwicklung der klassisch-romantischen Literaturgeschichte* (Leipzig, 1923-40), 3 vols.

tially the same movement, if we realize that the most important single influence was that of Rousseau and understand the extraordinary extent to which the ideas of Herder were prepared by the English and Scottish critics of the eighteenth century. The usual German terminology, "die Klassiker," is grossly misleading, since the authors grouped together as the German "classics" form two quite distinct groups; Lessing and Wieland belong to neoclassicism, while Herder was an extremely irrationalistic preromanticist, as were the early Goethe and Schiller. Only these last two authors went through a phase of "classicism," and that for the most part only in their theories. It is hard to find anything classical in Schiller's practice. The nostalgic hymn, "Die Götter Griechenlands," is rather a typical romantic dream. Goethe, while under the impression of his trip to Italy, for a time expounded a classical creed, especially in his writings on the plastic arts; and he wrote some works which must be considered in any history of neoclassicism: *Iphigenie*, *Römische Elegien*, *Achilleis*, possibly *Helena*. Still, however successfully their classical spirit could be defended, Goethe's greatest works are the subjective lyrics, *Faust*, the very influential *Meister*, and of course, *Werther*. It seems a strange preconception of many Germans to judge their greatest writer only according to one stage in his development and in accordance with his quite derivative and conventional taste in the fine arts. All the artistic power of Goethe is in the lyrics, in *Faust*, and in the novels, where there is scarcely any trace of classicism. If we examine Goethe's views of nature, it is obvious that he was an enemy of the Newtonian cosmology, the eighteenth-century world machine, and that he not only defended poetically a dynamic, organic view of nature, but also attempted to buttress it by scientific experiments and speculations (the *Theory of Colors*, the *Metamorphosis of Plants*) and by the use of concepts such as teleology, polarity, and so forth. Goethe's views are not identical with those of Schelling, but they are not easy to distinguish from them, and Schelling was the father of German *Naturphilosophie*. Goethe was also a symbolist and mythologist both in theory and practice. He interpreted language as a system of symbols and images. All philosophizing about nature was to him only anthropomorphism.[2] Goethe was apparently the first to draw clearly the distinction between symbol and allegory.[3] He attempted to create new myths, such as the Mothers in the second part of *Faust*, and tried to define poetically the relation of "Gott und Welt." One could use as a commentary to these poems the Neoplatonic cosmo-

[2] To Riemer, *Gespräche*, ed. F. Biedermann (Leipzig, 1909), I, 505. See *Farbenlehre*, Didaktischer Teil, sec. 751.

[3] Curt Richard Müller, *Die geschichtlichen Vorraussetzungen des Symbolbegriffs in Goethes Kunstanschauung* (Leipzig, 1937).

logy Goethe claimed was his own at the age of twenty-one.[4] Goethe's one abstractly philosophical paper clearly formulates what even in 1812 he declared to have been "der Grund seiner ganzen Existenz," i.e., to see God in nature and nature in God.[5] Thus, Goethe perfectly fits into the European romantic movement which he, as much as any single writer, helped to create.

There was, one must admit, a pronounced stage of Hellenism in the German movement; its roots are in Winckelmann, an ardent student of Shaftesbury, and this Hellenic enthusiasm early became extremely fervid in Germany. Its main documents are Schiller's *Götter Griechenlands,* Hölderlin's *Hyperion* and *Archipelagus,* some of the writings of Wilhelm von Humboldt, Goethe's *Winckelmann und sein Jahrhundert,* and the early writings of Friedrich Schlegel. Still, one need not speak of a "Tyranny of Greece over Germany."[6] There was, after all, a comparable Hellenic enthusiasm in France and England. It seems a mistake to underrate these parallel developments because they did not find such embodiment as in Germany's Goethe. French neo-Hellenism has at least one great poet, André Chénier. One cannot ignore the Hellenic enthusiasms and interests of even Chateaubriand and Lamartine, or the "Dionysiac" conception of Greek mythology charmingly expressed by Maurice de Guérin. We must not forget the Greek revival in painting and sculpture: Canova, Thorwaldsen, Ingres, Flaxman, none of whom were Germans.

In England, the role of romantic Hellenism has been studied only recently;[7] it was widespread in the eighteenth century and finds poetic expression of great power in Byron, Shelley, and Keats. The whole of neo-Hellenism, German, English, and French, is not necessarily contradictory of romanticism. Homer was interpreted as a primitive poet. Leopardi, arguing against romanticism, appealed to a pastoral, romanticized, primitive Greece.[8] Surprisingly early the "Orphic," orgiastic side of Greek civilization was recognized: by Friedrich Schlegel, by Schelling, by Maurice de Guérin.[9] The conception of antiquity emerg-

[4] *Dichtung und Wahrheit,* end of Book 8, Jubiläumsausgabe, XXIII, 163ff. Suggested by Arnold's *Kirchen- und Ketzergeschichte.*

[5] The so-called "Philosophische Studie," written in 1784-85, published in 1891. See *Sämtliche Werke,* Jubiläumsausgabe, ed. Eduard von der Hellen, XXXIX, 6-9. See also Korff, *op. cit.,* II, 35-36.

[6] The title of Miss E. M. Butler's book, Cambridge, 1935.

[7] See Harry Levin, *The Broken Column, a Study in Romantic Hellenism* (Cambridge, Mass., 1931), and Bernard H. Stern, *The Rise of Romantic Hellenism in English Literature, 1732-86* (Menasha, Wis., 1940).

[8] "Discorso di un Italiano intorno alla poesia romantica" (1818). First published in Leopardi, *Scritti vari inediti* (1906).

[9] See, especially, Walther Rehm, *Griechentum und Goethezeit: Geschichte eines Glaubens* (Leipzig, 1936). On French developments, see Henri Peyre, *L'Influence des littératures antiques sur la littérature française moderne: État des travaux* (New Haven, 1941), especially p. 63 and references there given.

ing from Keats' *Hyperion* is far removed from any eighteenth-century neoclassicism.

If this view that a large part of Hellenism is romantic is justified, it will be possible to minimize the excessive stress the Germans have traditionally put on the supposed conflict between their "classicism" and "romanticism." This conflict was in part purely personal, as a detailed history of the relations between Goethe and Schiller and the Schlegels shows,[10] and in part it expressed a return of the so-called romantics to the ideals of the *Sturm und Drang* which Goethe and Schiller had attempted, somewhat too strenuously, to repudiate. Still, there is a fundamental unity in the whole of German literature from roughly the middle of the eighteenth century to the death of Goethe. It is an attempt to create a new art different from that of the French seventeenth century; it is an attempt at a new philosophy which is neither orthodox Christianity nor the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century. This new view emphasizes the totality of man's forces, not reason alone, nor sentiment alone, but rather intuition, "intellectual intuition," imagination. It is a revival of Neoplatonism, a pantheism (whatever its consessions to orthodoxy), a monism which arrived at identification of God and the world, soul and body, subject and object. The propounders of these ideas were always conscious of the precariousness and difficulty of these views, which frequently appeared to them only as distant ideals; hence the "unending desire" of the German romantics, the stress on evolution, on art as a groping towards the ideal. Exoticism of many kinds is part of the reaction against the eighteenth century and its self-complacency; the suppressed forces of the soul seek their analogies and models in prehistory, in the Orient, in the Middle Ages, and finally in India, as well as in the unconscious and in dreams.

The German romantic writers are the contemporaries of the flowering of German music: of Beethoven, Schubert, Schumann, Weber, and others, many of whom used German poetry of the age as texts for their songs or, like Beethoven, as inspiration for their symphonies. The fact of this collaboration is significant but hardly sufficient to make it the distinguishing characteristic of all romanticism.[11] Such an emphasis obscures the international character of the movement, since the collaboration with music was practically nonexistent in England and fairly late and slight in France. It points to the undeniable fact that romanticism in Germany was far more pervasive than in the other countries and that it affected all human endeavors—philosophy, politics, philology, history, science, and all the other arts—there much more thoroughly than elsewhere. But in this respect also the difference between

[10] See Josef Körner, *Romantiker und Klassiker: Die Brüder Schlegel in ihren Beziehungen zu Schiller und Goethe* (Berlin, 1924).

[11] As in Richard Benz, *Deutsche Romantik* (Leipzig, 1937).

Germany and the other countries is only relative. There was a romantic philosophy, philology, history, politics, and even science, not to speak of painting and music, in other countries, especially in France (Delacroix, Berlioz, Michelet, Cousin). The apparent isolation of Germany is exaggerated by German writers who see in romanticism a purely German style, and by antiromantics and recently by anti-Hitler propagandists who want to prove that all the ills of the last two centuries came from Germany. The only view which takes account of all factors holds that romanticism is a general movement in European thought and art and that it has native roots in every major country. Cultural revolutions of such profound significance are not accomplished by mere importations.

Romanticism was more completely victorious in Germany than elsewhere for very obvious historical reasons. The German Enlightenment was weak and of short duration. The Industrial Revolution was late in coming. There was no leading rationalistic bourgeoisie. Both the derivative, unoriginal Enlightenment and the peculiarly rigid religious orthodoxies seemed unsatisfactory. Thus social and intellectual causes opened the way for a literature which was created mostly by unattached intellectuals, tutors, army surgeons, salt-mine officials, court clerks, and the like, who revolted against both feudalism and middle-class ideals. German romanticism, more so than English and French, was the movement of an intelligentsia which had loosened its class ties and hence was particularly apt to create a literature remote from ordinary reality and social concerns. Still, the aestheticism and lack of social "engagement" of writers such as Goethe has been very much exaggerated. One hears too much about the "Olympian" Goethe. It is not realized that the quotation "ein garstig Lied, pfui, ein politisch Lied!" is the dramatic pronouncement of a student in "Auerbachs Keller."

While it would be absurd to deny the special features of the German romantic age (we may pause to reflect that every age has its special features), almost all its views and techniques can be paralleled elsewhere. It is no denial of originality to see that the great German writers drew freely on foreign sources (Rousseau, English preromanticism) or on sources in the remote past, both foreign and native, which had been available to the other European nations: Neoplatonism, Giordano Bruno, Böhme, a reinterpreted Spinoza, Leibniz. The Germans, in turn, influenced other countries; but their influence, for obvious chronological reasons, comes too late to make them the only source of the turn towards the ideas and poetic myths usually called romantic. In England, Böhme was important for Blake, Schelling and August Wilhelm Schlegel for Coleridge, Bürger and Goethe for Scott (though hardly centrally so), Goethe and Jean Paul for Carlyle. But the Ger-

man influence on Wordsworth, Shelley, Keats, and even Byron is negligible. In France, German influences came much later; A. W. Schlegel, we have shown, was very important for the introduction of the new critical terminology. German interests are strong in Nodier, in Gérard de Nerval, and in Quinet, who studied Herder and Creuzer. Some argument can be made for the importance of the German song (*Lied*) for the French romantic lyric;[12] but certainly the central figures, Chateaubriand, Lamartine, Vigny, Hugo, Balzac, have few German affinities, and similarities must be explained by identical antecedents in England and an analogous literary and cultural situation.

As for France, our view is blurred by the official insistence on beginning the romantic movement with the triumph of *Hernani* (1830), a minor event in a later perspective, which obscures the fact that, outside of the drama or rather the Parisian official stage, a profound change had come over French literature many years before. This has been widely recognized in France, even though the centenary of romanticism was celebrated in 1927. The very first historian of romanticism in France, F. R. de Toreinx, says that romanticism was born in 1801, that Chateaubriand was its father, Madame de Staël its godmother (he is silent about the mother). In 1824, *La Muse Française* noticed the decisive role of Rousseau and Bernardin de St. Pierre; Alfred Michiels, in his *Histoire des idées littéraires en France* (1842), was of the opinion that the whole of romanticism can be found in Sébastien Mercier.[13] Some have tried to find the ancestors of romanticism even further back in the past; Faguet interpreted French poetry around 1630 with reference to Lamartine, and Brunetière claimed to see the germs of melodrama in *Phèdre*.[14] But more sober views have prevailed. The romantic elements in French eighteenth-century literature have been investigated quite systematically and, on the whole, convincingly; there is today some very fine work by Paul Trahard and André Monglond[15] on the history of sentimentalism, usually traced back at least as far as Prévost. Daniel Mornet has studied the reawakening of the feeling for nature and Gilbert Chinard has devoted much attention to French exoticism and primitivism.[16] Auguste Viatte

[12] See Gertrud Sattler, *Das deutsche Lied in der französischen Romantik* (Bern, 1932).

[13] See André Monglond, *Le Préromantisme français* (Grenoble, 1930), I, x.

[14] See Émile Faguet, *Histoire de la poésie française de la Renaissance au Romantisme* (Paris, n.d.), II, 145, 171ff.; III, 185. See also *Petite Histoire de la littérature française* (Paris, n.d.), pp. 100-101; Ferdinand Brunetière, *Conférences de l'Odéon. Les Époques du théâtre français* (Paris, 1901), p. 179.

[15] Pierre Trahard, *Les Maîtres de la sensibilité française au XVIII^e siècle* (Paris, 1931-33), 4 vols., and Monglond, *op. cit.*

[16] Daniel Mornet, *Le Sentiment de la nature en France de J.-J. Rousseau à Bernardin de St. Pierre* (Paris, 1907); Gilbert Chinard, *L'Amérique et le rêve exotique* (Paris, 1911).

has shown, most impressively, the large undercurrent of illuminism and theosophy in eighteenth-century France.[17] Saint Martin assumes a large role not only for France (De Maistre, Ballanche), but also for Germany (Hamann, Baader, even Goethe, Novalis). Rousseau, of course, has never ceased to attract attention; he has even been made the wellspring of all romanticism, by friends like J. J. Texte or by enemies who try to reduce romanticism to Rousseauism.[18] But Rousseau is unduly overrated if he is made the originator of attitudes which he helped popularize but did not invent. Still, all these scattered French studies show isolated anticipations of romantic attitudes, ideas, sentiments, rather than a real romantic literature in eighteenth-century France. That such a literature existed has best been demonstrated by Kurt Wais,[19] who has shown that there was a whole group of French writers who attacked the *philosophes* and the neoclassical tradition, stressed primitivism, thought that there is cultural decay rather than progress, attacked science, felt well inclined toward religion and even toward superstition and the marvelous. Many of the authors quoted are very minor and even minimal; Ramond de Carbonnières' *Les dernières aventures du jeune d'Olban* (1781) is only a mediocre imitation of *Werther*. But Wais has established that there was a widespread "irrationalism" in writers like Mercier, Chassaignon, Loaisel de Tréogate, and others, which can be compared with the German *Sturm und Drang*.

This French preromantic movement received a temporary setback through the Revolution, which fostered classicism and rationalism, and by the Empire, which also had its official classicism. But among the *émigrés* romanticism flourished. Madame de Staël was the propagandist of the German romantics. Chateaubriand cannot be made out a classicist, whatever his interests in classical antiquity and his reservations against Shakespeare or against many of his contemporaries. *Le Génie du Christianisme* (1802) is a romantic poetics. If we apply our tests, it is obvious that Chateaubriand expounds an organic symbolic order of nature, that he is a mythologist and symbolist *par excellence*. But Madame de Staël and Chateaubriand were by no means alone in their time; even Chénier conceived the idea of a new mythic poetry, especially in the fragment *Hermès*.[20] In Sénancour's *Obermann* (1804) we

[17] *Les Sources occultes du romantisme* (Paris, 1928), 2 vols.

[18] *J.-J. Rousseau et les origines du cosmopolitisme littéraire* (Paris, 1895); and the books by Irving Babbitt, Pierre Lasserre, and the Baron Seillière.

[19] *Das antiphilosophische Weltbild des französischen Sturm und Drang (1760-89)* (Berlin, 1894).

[20] "Il faut magnifiquement représenter la terre sous l'emblème métaphorique d'un grand animal qui vit, se meut, est sujet à des changements, des révolutions, des fièvres, des dérangements dans la circulation de son sang." In *Œuvres* (ed. Henri Clouard (Paris, 1927), I, 161-162.

find the romantic view of nature in full bloom. "La nature sentie n'est que dans les rapports humains, et l'éloquence des choses n'est rien que l'éloquence de l'homme. La terre féconde, les cieux immenses, les eaux passagères ne sont qu'une expression des rapports que nos cœurs produisent et contiennent."[21] Obermann constantly finds in external things analogies which give us the feeling of a universal order. Even flowers, a sound, a smell, a gleam of light become the "materials which an external idea arranges like figures of an invisible thing." The states of mind described by Sénancour are extraordinarily similar to Wordsworth's, but unlike Wordsworth (not to speak of Novalis' "magic" idealism) Sénancour experiences them almost as a curse. He complains bitterly that fate has condemned him to have only a "dream of his existence."[22] His art is rather that of passive *rêverie*.

In Charles Nodier also we find the whole repertory of romantic themes and ideas. Nodier was a quite technical entomologist who mythologized the world of insects. He sees in nature an alphabet which needs deciphering. In the world of insects and infusoria, he finds a grotesque parallel to the forms of human art, and in the universe a process of "*syngénésie*," a fantastic evolution toward a human Utopia. Nodier knew Swedenborg and Saint-Martin, and used the work of an Italian physiologist, Malpighi. He wrote romantic fairy tales (*La Fée aux Miettes*) and fantasies such as *Lydie ou la Résurrection* (1839), which has obvious affinities with Novalis' *Hymnen an die Nacht*.[23]

Lamartine's *Harmonies poétiques et religieuses* (1830) ties completely into our scheme; one could hardly find a more precise expression of the romantic view of nature as a language, as a concert of harmonies. The whole universe is conceived of as a system of symbols, correspondences, emblems, which at the same time is alive and pulsates rhythmically. The task of the poet is not only to read this alphabet, but to vibrate with it, to sense and reproduce its rhythm. *La Chute d'un Ange* (1838) has a mythological conception of the epic similar to Ballanche; there is the scale of being, there is the concept of the transformation of each atom and element into thought and sentiment.[24]

Vigny is different. He does not accept the romantic concept of nature, but embraces a dualism of man and nature, a pessimistic titanism which is a continuous protest against the order of nature. Nature is dead, silent, and even hostile to man. But this sharp ethical dualism of man ver-

[21] Ed. G. Michaut (Paris, 1911), I, 132, Lettre 36.

[22] See Albert Béguin, *L'Âme romantique et le rêve* (Paris, 1946), pp. 332-333.

[23] See Walter Mönch, *Charles Nodier und die deutsche und englische Literatur* (Berlin, 1931).

[24] Pierre Maurice Masson, in *Œuvres et Maîtres* (Paris, 1923), traces Lamartine's slow growth towards romantic symbolism. Albert J. George, *Lamartine and Romantic Unanimism* (New York, 1940), studies, under this anachronistic term, evidence for his monism, pantheism, etc.

sus nature is, in Vigny, combined with a totally romantic symbolism: "The men of greatest genius are those who made the justest comparisons. They are the branches to which we can cling in the void which surrounds us . . . Each man is nothing but an image of an idea of the general mind."[25] Many of Vigny's poems are organized around such symbols as *Le Cor, La Neige, La Bouteille à la mer.* Vigny's preoccupation with myth is obvious; he planned a most ambitious series which was to include a Last Judgment and "Satan Sauvé." Only *Eloa,* a "mystery," and *Le Déluge* were carried out.

Victor Hugo, later in his life, became the most ambitious mythologist, symbolist, prophet of a new religion, of all the romantics. His fame has declined in the twentieth century, but recently several attempts have been made to rescue these late works—parts of the *Légende des Siècles, La Fin de Satan, Dieu.* These attempts emanate not only from academic scholars, but also from surrealist poets.[26] They stress the mythic, eerie, grand, and sometimes absurd late Hugo. He fits into our scheme beautifully, whatever we may think of the quality of the poetry. Historians of ideas "have marvelled at the unperturbed serenity of a synthesis which does not flinch before self-contradiction, which, at once pantheist and deist, shows God disseminated in the universe and yet transcendent and personal; which draws from all sources, from the modern Platonists and Pythagoreans . . . Swedenborg, Ballanche, from the contemporary Illuminati, from Cabbalists, but persists in wresting originality out of a many-sided indebtedness." Hugo expounds a panpsychism of nature; a conviction of omnisentience (e.g., *Le Sacre de la Femme*), of the "victory of unity over diversity, of All over the ephemeral, the victory of universal and palpitating life over all that limits, curtails, frustrates, and denies."[27] In *Le Satyre* the satyr is haled before the gods and asked to sing in order to amuse the contemptuous Olympians. "Le satyre chanta la terre monstrueuse." His stature increases in singing, he becomes an incarnation of nature and life. The faun declares himself in the concluding line:

Place à tout! Je suis Pan, Jupiter, à genoux!

In *La Fin de Satan,* Satan is pardoned and dies in a surprising conclusion, God saying:

Satan est mort! renais, o Lucifer céleste!

Evil is reabsorbed because Satan actually loved God, was himself a part of the providential scheme. In *Dieu,* Hugo passes in review the

[25] *Journal d'un poète,* ed. F. Baldensperger (London, 1928), pp. 17, 136.

[26] *La Bouche d'ombre,* ed. Henri Parisot, Préface de Léon-Paul Lafargue (Paris, 1947).

[27] Quoted from Herbert J. Hunt, *The Epic in Nineteenth Century France* (London, 1941), pp. 282, 293.

different philosophies he rejects or ridicules: atheism, scepticism, dualism, Greek polytheism, the Hebrew Jehovah. A spiritual pantheism is expounded by an angel:

> Tous les êtres sont Dieu; tous les flots sont la mer.

The poem concludes in a hymn to God, who is conceived as a bewildering series of contradictions, a dazzling light which is, at the same time, darkness.

> Rien n'existe que Lui; le flamboiement profond.

In Hugo, then, all the romantic convictions and themes are summarized: organic, evolving nature, the view of poetry as prophecy, the view that symbol and myth are the instruments of poetry. In Hugo the reconciliation of opposites, the stress on the grotesque and evil ultimately absorbed in the harmony of the universe, is particularly clear and was clear even in his early aesthetic theories, as in the preface to *Cromwell.* His prophetic fervor, intensity, and grandiose gestures may have become pretentious and absurd to generations who have lost this view of poetry. But Hugo marshalled all the possible arguments for the romantic view of nature, for man's continuity with nature, the great scale of nature, and the final perfection of man.

Balzac is not usually considered a romantic and he may not be one in many aspects of his stupendous work. But E. R. Curtius[28] has rightly stressed an aspect which must have struck every reader of the *Human Comedy*—Balzac's interest in magic and the occult. A study of Balzac's religious views reveals that he declared himself a Swedenborgian many times. In *Louis Lambert,* which contains much that is autobiography, there is an exposition of a system which must be substantially Balzac's and exuberant praise of Swedenborg as the "Buddha of the North." *Seraphita* also is full of Swedenborgianism, a theosophical and pantheistic philosophy of immanence, which Balzac must have considered compatible with Catholicism and his specific endorsement of political Catholicism. Whatever Balzac's exact religious views, he certainly held this organic view of nature which he calls *magisme.* He was deeply impressed by contemporary biology, especially by Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire and his view that there is only *one* animal. He was absorbed and taken in by all forms of magnetism, mesmerism, and phrenology, all of which uphold the "unity of nature." Like the romantics, Balzac had a theory of intuition, to which he applies the queer term, *spécialité,* distinguishing it from instinct and abstraction.[29] He was also an ardent mythologist, giving a symbolic interpretation to all rites, cults, myths, mysteries of religion, and creations of art. "Today hieroglyphics are not

[28] *Balzac* (Bonn, 1923).
[29] *Louis Lambert,* fragment XVI.

any more impressed in Egyptian marble, but in mythologies which are unified worlds." Balzac said of *La Peau de Chagrin,* "tout y est mythe et figure."[30] He himself constantly gave symbolic interpretations; e.g., *La Vieille fille* contains a strange symbolic use of *Orlando Furioso.* Though wide stretches of Balzac's work may not show it, he was inspired by a peculiar type of romantic metaphysics, physics, or energetics, with its supposed laws of compensations, polarities, fluids, etc.

Among the authors less well known today many fit in with our criteria. Pierre-Simon Ballanche had a mystical, Pythagorean conception of nature and the harmony of the spheres (the seven numbers produce an endless concert); an apocalypse is presented in which matter will be spiritualized by a new magnetism, and the animals disappear as their life, by assimilation, becomes the life of man. Ballanche was not only a mythologist and fantastic philosopher of nature but also a symbolist who, long before Mallarmé, conceived the unity of the senses.[31]

Edgar Quinet is related to Ballanche and, of course, to the Germans. To him, religion was the business of the poet; the poet destroys the fixed symbols of dogma in order to renew them. Quinet believed also in some future universal epic which will "reconcile all legends by fusing them into one".[31a]

Maurice de Guérin also fits into our scheme. He shows the major points of agreement: the views of the substantial unity of nature, the continuity in the chain of creation, the primacy of the intuitive faculty in man, which is especially active in poets, whose role is to decipher the "flottant appareil de symboles qu'on appelle l'univers." His sense of identity with nature is finely expressed in his journal. "Se laisser pénétrer à la nature . . . s'identifier au printemps . . . aspirer en soi toute la vie . . . se sentir à la fois fleur, verdure, oiseau, chant, fraîcheur, élasticité, volupté, sérénité." Guérin wants to "sentir presque physiquement que l'on vit de Dieu et en Dieu." He aspired to create neopagan myths, like *Le Centaure,* and to spiritualize nature, as in the *Méditation sur la mort de Marie;* he had the romantic thirst to ascend to the origins of mankind and of himself as a child, to find the "point de départ de la vie universelle."[32]

Gérard de Nerval is the most mystical, "supernatural," of the French romantics, the nearest to the most fantastic Germans whom he knew and loved. The symbolists have recognized him as their precursor. *Au-*

---

[30] Curtius, *op. cit.,* pp. 69-70.

[31] "Tous les sens se réveillent réciproquement l'un l'autre. Il y aurait là, en quelque sorte, des onomatopées de couleurs, tant tout est harmonie dans l'homme et dans l'univers." Hunt, *op. cit.,* p. 99. From *Visions des Expiations.*

[31a] "Concilier toutes les légendes en les ramenant à une seule," from Avant-propos to *Merlin,* quoted in Hunt, *op. cit.,* p. 137.

[32] Journal, Dec. 10, 1834; March 25, 1833; March 21, 1833, in *Œuvres,* ed. H. Clouard (Paris, 1930), I, 253, 167, 147.

rélia, especially, is a series of visions and dreams which attempt to change the whole life of the author himself into a myth. Nerval, exactly like Keats, believed in the literal truth of anything imagination has invented. The whole of Nerval's work is a world of dream symbols and myths. He is full of Swedenborgianism and other occult beliefs; nature is emblematic through and through. He speaks of "a vast conspiracy of all animate beings to re-establish the world in its first harmony":

> How can I have existed so long, I said to myself, outside Nature without identifying myself with her? Everything lives, everything acts, everything corresponds; the magnetic rays emanating from myself or others traverse unimpeded the infinite chain of created things; it is a transparent network which covers the world, and its fine threads communicate from one to another to the planets and the stars. I am now a captive on the earth, but I converse with choiring stars, who share my joys and sorrows![33]

I have already suggested some of the sources of French romanticism —Swedenborg, St. Martin, the Germans. But we must realize that in all phases of French thought there was a considerable parallel activity. In history Michelet propounded a "historical symbolism." The numerous neo-Catholic French thinkers shared many of the main romantic tenets and motifs. There is "striking similarity between the doctrines of Hegel and Bonald."[34] Joseph de Maistre, in his youth at least, was steeped in the mythical, Masonic, and Illuminati ideas of the time, and they left strong traces on his mature thought. A letter to Bonald states that "the physical world is nothing but an image or, if you prefer, the formula, a repetition of the spiritual world." Matter does not exist independently of mind. Catholicism does not totally reject polytheism; it rather explains and corrects the Graeco-Roman mythology. "The name of God, no doubt, is exclusive and incommunicable; still, there are many gods in heaven and earth. There are intelligences, better natures, deified men. The gods of Christianity are the saints."[35]

The whole eclectic movement, fed as it is in part from German sources, especially Schelling, fits into our scheme, and much in the French science of the time, particularly biology, helps to re-create the whole mental "climate" in which French romanticism flourished.

Turning to England, we can see a complete agreement with the French and the Germans on all essential points. The great poets of the English romantic movement constitute a fairly coherent group, with the same view of poetry and the same conception of imagination, the same view of nature and mind. They share also a poetic style, a use of imagery, symbolism, and myth, which is quite distinct from anything

[33] *Aurélia,* translated by Richard Aldington (London, 1932), pp. 51-52.

[34] See George Boas, *French Philosophies of the Romantic Period* (Baltimore, 1925), p. 73.

[35] *Le Pape,* in *Œuvres,* IV, 541, quoted by Viatte, *op. cit.,* in note 17, pp. 79-80.

that had been practiced by the eighteenth century, and which was felt by their contemporaries to be obscure and almost unintelligible.

The affinity of the concepts of imagination among the English romantic poets scarcely needs demonstration. Blake considers all nature to be "imagination itself." Our highest aim is:

> To see a world in a grain of sand:
> And a Heaven in a Wild Flower,
> Hold Infinity in the palm of your hand
> And Eternity in an hour.[36]

Thus imagination is not merely the power of visualization, somewhere in between sense and reason, which it had been to Aristotle or Addison, nor even the inventive power of the poet, which by Hume and many other eighteenth-century theorists was conceived of as a "combination of innate sensibility, the power of association, and the faculty of conception,"[37] but a creative power by which the mind "gains insight into reality, reads nature as a symbol of something behind or within nature not ordinarily perceived."[38] Thus imagination is the basis of Blake's rejection of the mechanistic world picture, the basis of an idealistic epistemology—

> The Sun's Light, when he unfolds it
> Depends on the Organ that beholds it;[39]

and, of course, the basis of an aesthetics, the justification of art and his own peculiar kind of art. This conception of imagination sufficiently justifies the necessity of myth and of metaphor and symbol as its vehicle.

The concept of the imagination in Wordsworth is fundamentally the same, though Wordsworth draws more heavily on eighteenth-century theories and compromises with naturalism. Still, Wordsworth cannot be explained entirely in Hartley's terms;[40] imagination is for him "creative," an insight into the nature of reality and hence the basic justification of art. The poet becomes a living soul who "sees into the life of things." Imagination is thus an organ of knowledge which transforms objects, sees through them, even if they are only the "meanest flower" or the humble ass, an idiot boy, or simply a child: "mighty prophet, seer blest."

The whole of the *Prelude* is a history of the poet's imagination which, in a central passage of the last book, is called

---

[36] "Auguries of Innocence," *Poetry and Prose of William Blake*, ed. Geoffrey Keynes (New York, 1927), p. 118.

[37] Walter J. Bate's description in *From Classic to Romantic* (Cambridge, Mass., 1946), p. 113.

[38] I. A. Richards, *Coleridge on Imagination* (London, 1935), p. 145.

[39] "For the Sexes: The Gates of Paradise," *op. cit.*, p. 752.

[40] As Arthur Beatty attempted in *William Wordsworth: His Doctrine and Art in Their Historical Relations*, 2nd ed. (Madison, 1927).

> Another name for absolute power
> And clearest insight, amplitude of mind,
> And Reason in her most exalted mood.[41]

In a letter to Landor, Wordsworth tells him that "in poetry it is the imaginative only, i.e., that which is conversant or turns upon Infinity, that powerfully affects me." "All great poets are in this view powerful Religionists."[42]

It is hardly necessary to explain what a central role the imagination plays in Coleridge's theory and practice. There is a book by I. A. Richards, *Coleridge on Imagination*, and recently R. P. Warren has carefully related the theory to the *Rime of the Ancient Mariner*.[43] The key passage in *Biographia Literaria* on primary and secondary imagination is too well known to need quoting.[44] It is Schellingian in its formulation—on the whole, Coleridge's theory is closely dependent on the Germans. His term for "imagination," the "esemplastic power," is a translation of "Einbildungskraft," based on a fanciful etymology of the German.[45] But, when Coleridge ignores his technical jargon, as in the ode *Dejection* (1802), he still speaks of the "shaping spirit of the imagination," of imagination as a "dim analogue of creation, not all that we believe, but all that we can conceive of creation."[46] If Coleridge had not known the Germans, he would have been able to expound a Neoplatonic theory, just as Shelley did in his *Defense of Poetry*.

Shelley's *Defense of Poetry* is almost identical, in general conception, with Coleridge's theory. Imagination is the "principle of synthesis." Poetry may be defined as the "expression of the imagination." A poet "participates in the eternal, the infinite, and the one." Poetry lifts the veil from the "hidden beauty of the world, and makes familiar objects be as if they were not familiar." "Poetry redeems from decay the visitations of the divinity in man." To Shelley imagination is creative, and the poet's imagination is an instrument of knowledge of the real. Shelley, more sharply than any other English poet with the exception of Blake, states that the poetic moment is the moment of vision; that the words are but a "feeble shadow," that the mind in composition is a

---

[41] *Prelude*, XIV, 190ff.

[42] Jan. 21, 1824. In *Letters: Later Years*, ed. E. de Selincourt (Oxford), I, 134-135.

[43] *The Rime of the Ancient Mariner: With an Essay by Robert Penn Warren*, (New York, 1946).

[44] *Biographia Literaria*, ed. J. Shawcross (Oxford, 1907), II, 12. T. S. Eliot quoted it in "Andrew Marvell" (1921), reprinted in *Selected Essays* (London, 1932), p. 284; also I. A. Richards, in *Principles of Literary Criticism* (London, 1924), p. 242. It has since been repeated ad nauseam.

[45] "Einbildungskraft" is interpreted by Coleridge as "In-eins-Bildung." But the prefix "ein" has nothing to do with "in-eins."

[46] *Letters*, ed. E. H. Coleridge (London, 1890), II, 450.

"fading coal."[47] In Shelley we find the most radical divorce between the poetic faculty and will and consciousness.

The affinities and fundamental identities of Keats' views are obvious, though Keats (under the influence of Hazlitt) has more of the sensationalist vocabulary than either Coleridge or Shelley. But he also says: "What the Imagination seizes as Beauty must be Truth whether it existed before or not."[48] Clarence D. Thorpe, in analyzing all of Keats' relevant scattered pronouncements, concludes: "Such is the power of creative imagination, a seeing, reconciling, combining force that seizes the old, penetrates beneath its surface, disengages the truth slumbering there, and, building afresh, bodies forth anew a reconstructed universe in fair forms of artistic power and beauty."[49] This could be a summary of the theories of imagination of all the romantic poets.

Clearly, such a theory implies a theory of reality and, especially, of nature. There are individual differences among the great romantic poets concerning the conception of nature. But all of them share a common objection to the mechanistic universe of the eighteenth century—even though Wordsworth admires Newton and accepts him, at least in the orthodox interpretation. All romantic poets conceived of nature as an organic whole, on the analogue of man rather than a concourse of atoms—a nature that is not divided from aesthetic values, which are just as real (or rather more real) than the abstractions of science.

Blake stands somewhat apart. He violently objects to the eighteenth-century cosmology, personified by Newton.

> May God us keep
> From Single Vision and Newton's sleep![50]

Blake's writings are also full of condemnations of Locke and Bacon, atomism, deism, natural religion, and so forth. But he does not share the romantic deification of nature; he comments expressly on Wordsworth's preface to the *Excursion*: "You shall not bring me down to believe such fitting and fitted."[51] To Blake nature is everywhere fallen. It fell with man; the fall of man and the creation of the physical world were the same event. In the Golden Age to come, nature will (with man) be restored to her pristine glory. Man and nature are, in Blake, not only continuous, but emblematic of each other:

---

[47] Shelley's *Literary and Philosophical Criticism*, ed. J. Shawcross (London, 1909), pp. 131, 155, 153.

[48] Letter to B. Bailey, Nov. 22, 1817, in *Letters*, ed. S. Colvin (London, 1928), p. 41.

[49] *The Mind of John Keats* (Oxford, 1926), p. 126.

[50] Letter to T. Butts, Nov. 22, 1802, *op. cit.*, p. 1068.

[51] Written in 1826. *Ibid.*, p. 1026.

Each grain of Sand,
Every Stone on the Land,
Each rock and each hill,
Each fountain and rill,
Each herb and each tree,
Mountain, hill, earth, and sea,
Cloud, Meteor, and Star
Are Men Seen Afar.[52]

In *Milton* especially, nature appears as man's body turned inside out. The ridges of mountains across the world are Albion's fractured spine. Nothing exists outside Albion; sun, moon, stars, the center of the earth, and the depth of the sea were all within his mind and body. Time even is a pulsation of the artery, and space a globule of blood. The crabbed symbolism, the strident tone have kept these later poems from being widely read; but the books by Damon, Percival, Schorer, and Frye[53] have shown the subtlety and coherence of Blake's speculations which set him in the great tradition of *Naturphilosophie* as it comes down from Plato's *Timaeus* to Paracelsus, Böhme, and Swedenborg.

In Wordsworth's conception of nature there is a shift from something like animistic pantheism to a conception reconcilable with traditional Christianity. Nature is animated, alive, filled with God or the Spirit of the World; it is mysteriously present, it gives a discipline of fear and ministry of pleasure.[54] Nature is also a language, a system of symbols. The rocks, the crags, the streams on Simplon Pass

Were all like workings of one mind, the features
Of the same face, blossoms upon one tree;
Characters of the great Apocalypse
The types and symbols of Eternity.[55]

We would misunderstand idealistic epistemology if we questioned the "objectivity" which Wordsworth ascribes to these conceptions. It is a dialectical relation, not a mere subjectivist imposition, in spite of such passages as

. . . from thyself it comes that thou must give,
Else never canst receive.[56]

---

[52] Letter to T. Butts, Oct. 2, 1800, *op. cit.* p. 1052.

[53] S. Foster Damon, *William Blake* (Boston, 1924); William C. Percival, *William Blake's "Circle of Destiny"* (New York, 1938); Mark Schorer, *William Blake* (New York, 1946); Northrop Frye, *Fearful Symmetry: A Study of William Blake* (Princeton, 1947).

[54] Excellent discussions in J. W. Beach, *The Concept of Nature in Nineteenth-Century English Poetry* (New York, 1936), and in R. D. Havens, *The Mind of a Poet* (Baltimore, 1941).

[55] *Prelude*, VI, 636 ff.

[56] *Ibid.*, XII, 276-277.

The mind must collaborate and it is its very nature that it should be so.

> . . . my voice proclaims
> How exquisitely the individual mind . . .
> to the external world
> Is fitted:—and how exquisitely too . . .
> The external world is fitted to the Mind
> And the creation (by no lower name
> Can it be called) which they with blended might
> Accomplish.[57]

The ancestry of these ideas in Cudworth, Shaftesbury, Berkeley, and others is obvious; there are certain poetic anticipations in Akenside and Collins; but, in Wordsworth, a natural philosophy, a metaphysical concept of nature, enters poetry and finds a highly individual expression—the brooding presence of the hills, of the firm, eternal forms of nature, combined with a vivid sense of the almost dreamlike unreality of the world.

The general concept of nature he shares with his friend Coleridge. We could easily match all the fundamental concepts of Wordsworth in Coleridge; probably their phrasing is due to the influence of Coleridge, who early was a student of the Cambridge Platonists and of Berkeley.

> The one Life within us and abroad . . .
> And what if all of animated nature . . .
> Plastic and vast, one intellectual breeze.
> At once the Soul of each, and God of all . . .

the "eternal language, which thy God utters . . ."

> Symbolical, one mighty alphabet,

and the conception of subject-object relation:

> We receive but what we give
> And in our life alone does Nature live![58]

—these are quotations from the early poetry. The later Coleridge developed an elaborate philosophy of nature which leans heavily on Schelling's and Steffens' *Naturphilosophie*.[59] Nature is consistently interpreted by analogy with the progress of man to self-consciousness, and Coleridge indulges in all the contemporary speculative chemistry and

[57] Preface to *Excursion*.

[58] From "The Eolian Harp," "Frost at Midnight," "The Destiny of Nations," and "Dejection." *The Poems*, ed. by E. H. Coleridge (Oxford, 1912), pp. 101-102, 132, 242, 365.

[59] *The Theory of Life* is nothing but a patchwork of translated passages. See Henri Nidecker, "Praeliminarium zur Neuausgabe der Abhandlung über Lebenstheorie (*Theory of Life*) von Samuel Taylor Coleridge," *Bericht der philosophisch-historischen Fakultät der Universität Basel*, 5. Heft (Basel, 1927), pp. 7-12.

physics (electricity, magnetism) to buttress a position which is near to vitalism or panpsychism.

Echoes of this contemporary science also permeate Shelley's conceptions and even images. There are many allusions in his poetry to chemical, electrical, and magnetic theories—to theories expounded by Erasmus Darwin, and Humphrey Davy.[60] But, in general terms, Shelley mainly echoes Wordsworth and Coleridge on the "spirit of nature." There is the same concept of the vitality of nature, its continuity with man, its emblematic language. There is also the concept of the cooperation and interrelation of subject and object, as in the beginning of *Mont Blanc*:

> The everlasting universe of things
> Flows through the mind, and rolls its rapid waves,
> Now dark—now glittering—now reflecting gloom—
> Now lending splendor, where from secret springs
> The source of human thought its tribute brings
> Of waters,—with a sound but half its own.

This seems to say: There is nothing outside the mind of man, but the receptive function of the stream of consciousness is very much larger than the tiny active principle in the mind.

> My own, my human mind, which passively
> Now renders and receives fast influencings,
> Holding an unremitting interchange
> With the clear universe of things around.

Here we have, in spite of the stress on the passivity of the mind, a clear conception of a give and take, of an interchange between its creative and purely receptive principles. Shelley conceives of nature as one phenomenal flux; he sings of clouds, wind, and water rather than, like Wordsworth, of the mountains or the "soul of lonely places." But he does not, of course, stop with nature, but seeks the higher unity behind it:

> Life, like a dome of many-colored glass,
> Stains the white radiance of Eternity.[61]

In the highest ecstasy, all individuality and particularly are abolished by the great harmony of the world. But in Shelley, in contrast to Blake or Wordsworth who calmly look into the life of things, the ideal itself dissolves; his voice falters; the highest exaltation becomes a total loss of personality, an instrument of death and annihilation.

In Keats, the romantic conception of nature occurs, but only in attenuated form, though it would be hard to deny the poet of *Endymion* or the *Ode to a Nightingale* an intimate relation to nature and to the

[60] Much evidence in C. Grabo, *A Newton among Poets: Shelley's Use of Science in Prometheus Unbound* (Chapel Hill, 1930).

[61] *Adonais*, lines 462-463.

nature mythology of the ancients. *Hyperion* (1820) obscurely hints at an optimistic evolutionism, as in the speech of Oceanos to his fellow Titans:

> We fall by course of Nature's laws,
> Not force....
> As thou wast not the first of powers
> So art thou not the last...
> So on our heels a fresh perfection treads.
> ...for 'tis the eternal law
> That first in beauty should be first in might.[61a]

But Keats, possibly because he was a doctor, was least affected by the romantic conception of nature.

This conception occurs, though only fitfully, in Byron, who does *not* share the romantic conception of imagination. It is present especially in the third canto of *Childe Harold* (1818), written in Geneva when Shelley was his constant companion:

> I live not in myself, but I become
> Portion of that around me; and to me
> High mountains are a feeling.

Byron mentions:

> ...the feeling infinite, so felt
> In solitude where we are least alone;
> A truth which through our being then doth melt
> And purifies from self.[62]

But generally Byron is rather a deist who believes in the Newtonian world machine and constantly contrasts man's passion and unhappiness with the serene and indifferent beauty of nature. Byron knows the horror of man's isolation, the terrors of the empty spaces, and does not share the fundamental rejection of the eighteenth-century cosmology nor the feeling of continuity and basic at-homeness in the universe of the great romantic poets.

This conception of the nature of poetic imagination and of the universe has obvious consequences for poetic practice. All the great romantic poets are mythopoeic, are symbolists whose practice must be understood in terms of their attempt to give a total mythic interpretation of the world to which the poet holds the key. The contemporaries of Blake began this revival of mythic poetry—which can be seen even in their interest in Spenser, in *Midsummer Night's Dream* and *The Tempest*, in the devils and witches of Burns, in the interest of Collins in Highland superstitions and their value for the poet, in the pseudo-Norse mythology of Gray, and in the antiquarian researches of Jacob Bryant

[61a] Book II, lines 181-182, 189, 212, 228-229.
[62] *Childe Harold*, canto III, stanzas lxxii and xc.

and Edward Davies. But the first English poet to create a new mythology on a grand scale was Blake.

Blake's mythology is neither classical nor Christian, though it incorporates many Biblical and Miltonic elements. It draws vaguely on some Celtic (Druidical) mythology or rather names, but essentially it is an original (possibly a too original) creation which tries to give both a cosmogony and an apocalypse: a philosophy of history, a psychology, and (as has been recently stressed) a vision of politics and morals. Even the simplest of the *Songs of Innocence* and *Songs of Experience* are permeated by Blake's symbols. His last poems, such as *Jerusalem,* require an effort of interpretation which may not be commensurate to the aesthetic rewards we get; but Northrop Frye has certainly shown convincingly that Blake was an extraordinarily original thinker who had ideas on cycles of culture, metaphysical theories of time, speculations about the universal diffusion throughout primitive society of archetypal myths and rituals—which may be frequently confused and dilettantish, but which should not prove incomprehensible to an age which has acclaimed Toynbee, or Dunne on time, or has developed modern anthropology.

Wordsworth, at first sight, is the romantic poet farthest removed from symbolism and mythology. Josephine Miles in her study, *Wordsworth and the Vocabulary of Emotion,*[63] has taken him as the prime example of the poet who states emotions, names them specifically. But Wordsworth does stress imagery in his theory and is by no means indifferent to mythology. He plays an important part in the new interest in Greek mythology interpreted in terms of animism. There is the sonnet, "The World is too much with us," and there is a passage in the fourth book of the *Excursion* (1814) which celebrates the dim inklings of immortality that the Greek sacrificing a lock in a stream may have had. There is the later turning to classical mythology, *Laodamia* and the *Ode to Lycoris,* poems which Wordsworth defended also for their material "which may ally itself with real sentiment."

But, most important, his poetry is not without pervading symbols. Cleanth Brooks has shown convincingly how the *Ode on Intimations* is based on a double, contradictory metaphor of light and how even the sonnet, "Upon Westminster Bridge," conceals an all-pervasive figure.[64] *The White Doe of Rylstone* may be really allegorical, in an almost mediaeval sense (the Doe is like an animal in a Bestiary), but even this late piece shows Wordsworth's endeavor to go beyond the anecdotal or the descriptive, beyond the naming and analyzing of emotions and states of mind.

[63] Berkeley, 1942.
[64] *The Well Wrought Urn* (New York, 1947).

In Coleridge a theory of symbolism is central; the artist discourses to us by symbols, and nature is a symbolic language. The distinction between symbol and allegory is, in Coleridge, related to that between imagination and fancy (which, in some ways, can be described as a theory of imagery), genius and talent, reason and understanding. In a late discussion he says that an allegory is but a translation of abstract notions into a picture language, which is itself nothing but an abstraction from objects of sense. On the other hand, a symbol is characterized by a translucence of the special in the individual, or of the general in the special, or of the universal in the general; above all, a symbol is characterized by the translucence of the eternal through and in the temporal. The faculty of symbols is the imagination. Coleridge condemned classical as distinct from Christian mythology in many early pronouncements; but later he became interested in a symbolically reinterpreted Greek mythology and wrote a queer piece "On the *Prometheus* of Aeschylus" (1825), which is closely dependent on Schelling's treatise, *Über die Gottheiten von Samothrace* (1815).[65]

The early great poetry of Coleridge is certainly symbolic throughout. R. P. Warren has recently given an interpretation of the *Ancient Mariner*, which may go too far in detail, but is convincing in the general thesis—the whole poem implies a concept of "sacramentalism," of the holiness of nature and all natural beings, and is organized on symbols of moonlight and sunlight, wind and rain.[66]

That Shelley is a symbolist and mythologist needs no argument. Not only is Shelley's poetry metaphorical through and through, but he aspires to create a new myth of the redemption of the earth which uses classical materials very freely, e.g., in *Prometheus Unbound* (1820), in the *Witch of Atlas*, and in *Adonais* (1821). This last poem can be easily misinterpreted if it is seen merely as a pastoral elegy in the tradition of Bion and Moschus. Through Shelley's poetry runs a fairly consistent system of recurrent symbols: the eagle and the serpent (which has Gnostic antecedents), temples, towers, the boat, the stream, the cave, and, of course, the veil, the cupola of stained glass, and the white radiance of eternity.[67]

> Death is the veil which those who live call life:
> They sleep and it is lifted.[68]

In Shelley the ecstasy takes on a hectic, falsetto tone, the voice breaks

[65] *The Statesman's Manual*, in *Complete Works*, ed. Shedd (New York, 1853), I, 437-438; W. K. Pfeiler, "Coleridge and Schelling's *Treatise on the Samothracian Deities*," *Modern Language Notes*, LII (1937), 162-165.

[66] *Op. cit.* in note 43.

[67] On Shelley's symbols, see A. T. Strong, *Three Studies in Shelley* (London, 1921), and W. B. Yeats' essay in *Ideas of Good and Evil* (1903).

[68] *Prometheus Unbound*, III, scene 3, lines 113-114.

at the highest points; he swoons, "I faint, I fail!" "I fall upon the thorns of life! I bleed."[69] Shelley would like us to transcend the boundaries of individuality, to be absorbed into some Nirvana. This craving for unity explains also one pervading characteristic of his style; synaesthesia and the fusing of the spheres of the different senses in Shelley is paralleled in his rapid transitions and fusions of the emotions, from pleasure to pain, from sorrow to joy.

Keats is a mythologist, too. *Endymion* and *Hyperion* are eloquent witnesses. There is in Keats the recurrent symbolism of moon and sleep, temple and nightingale. The great odes are not merely a series of pictures, but symbolic constructions in which the poet tries to state the conflict of artist and society, time and eternity.

Byron also—as Wilson Knight has shown extravagantly in *The Burning Oracle*[70]—can be interpreted in these terms: *Manfred* (1817), *Cain, Heaven and Earth,* and even *Sardanapalus* (1821). The great poets are not alone in their time. Southey wrote his epics, *Thalaba, Madoc* (1805), *The Curse of Kehama* (1810), on mythological themes from ancient Wales and India. Thomas Moore gained fame with the Oriental pseudosplendor of *Lalla Rookh* (1817), Mrs. Tighe's *Psyche* influenced Keats. Finally, in 1821, Carlyle published *Sartor Resartus,* with its philosophy of clothes. Whatever the level of penetration, there is a widespread return to the mythic conception of poetry which had been all but forgotten in the eighteenth century. Pope at most could conceive of burlesque machines such as the Sylphs in the *Rape of the Lock* or the grandiose, semiserious last yawn of Night at the conclusion of the *Dunciad*.[70a]

It could be argued that these romantic attitudes, beliefs, and techniques were confined to a small group of great poets and that, on the whole, the England of the early nineteenth century shared many points of view with the Age of Reason. One may grant that the English romantic movement was never as self-conscious or, possibly, as radical as the German or French movements, that eighteenth-century attitudes were far more influential and widespread than on the continent, e.g., in philosophy where utilitarianism and Scottish common-sense philosophy held sway, and that the English romantic theory of poetry is a curious amalgamation of sensualism and associationism, inherited from the eighteenth century and the new or old Platonic idealism. The only major writer who propounded a coherent "idealistic" system was Cole-

[69] "The Indian Serenade," "Ode to the West Wind."

[70] London, 1939.

[70a] D. K. Wimsatt's excellent "The Structure of Romantic Nature Imagery," in *The Age of Johnson: Essays Presented to C. B. Tinker* (New Haven, 1949), pp. 291-303, was published too late for consideration in the text. It certainly supports my argument.

ridge, and his "system" or plan for a system was largely an importation from Germany. But there is a good deal of evidence among the minor writers also that the intellectual atmosphere was changing in England. Some of the minor proponents of Kant, such as the curious jeweler, Thomas Wirgman, may be cited.[71] There was much romantic science, biology, and chemistry in England, of which we know very little today. If we examine the literary ideas and scholarship of the time, we can trace the changes which occurred somewhat earlier on the continent. The romantic conception of folklore can be found, e.g., in the very curious preface to the second edition of Thomas Warton's *History of English Poetry*, by Richard Price (1824); Price knew the Schlegels, the Brothers Grimm, and even Creuzer's *Symbolik*.[72] In 1827, William Motherwell, the first faithful editor of the Scottish ballads, spoke of popular poetry as "that body of poetry which has inwoven itself with the feelings and passions of the people, and which shadows forth as it were an actual embodiment of their Universal mind, and its intellectual and moral tendencies."[73] Much research in minor writers and periodicals would be needed to substantiate this fully, but enough evidence has been produced to show that England also underwent the change of intellectual atmosphere which was general in Europe.

Much space would be needed to examine all the other European literatures adequately from this point of view. Italy has sometimes been considered an exception; it has even been denied that it had any "real" romanticism.[74] But, while one may grant the strong survivals of neoclassicism, the peculiarly vehement political orientation, and the absence of some themes of the Northern romantic literatures, Italy cannot be considered to deviate from the pattern. Leopardi certainly is in profound agreement with his great contemporaries across the Alps, even though his literary theories have many neoclassical traits. For his romantic concept of nature, the early poem *L'infinito* (1819) is evidence,[75] as well as his speculations on the great poetic harmony, the "effetto poetico" of the totality of nature. Foscolo and Manzoni, both as critics and as artists, are part and parcel of the European romantic movement. Gioberti expounded an aesthetics similar to Schelling's.

Allison Peers has argued that Spanish romanticism was of very short

[71] See my *Kant in England* (Princeton, 1931).
[72] W. C. Hazlitt's ed. (London, 1871), pp. 11, 27n.
[73] *Minstrelsy: Ancient and Modern* (Glasgow, 1827), p. v.
[74] E.g., Gina Martegiani, *Il Romanticismo italiano non esiste* (Firenze, 1908).
[75] The poem ends thus:

> . . . così tra questa
> Immensità s'annega il pensier mio,
> E il naufragar m'è dolce in questo mare.

On Leopardi's myth, see K. Vossler, *Leopardi* (Munich, 1923), p. 192.

duration, and disintegrated very soon after its triumph in 1838.[76] This may be true of romanticism as a "school," but hardly of romantic Spanish literature of the nineteenth century. Espronceda, especially, seems to fit our pattern very closely.

In the Scandinavian countries, German romanticism, especially Schelling, was most influential. Among the Swedes a whole group of critics viewed the work of art as a symbol of the universe.[77] *Naturphilosophie* was widely accepted, and mythologizing was at the very center of the whole Nordic revival.

The Slavic romantic movements present special features and special problems. The Russians drew heavily on the Germans, especially on Schelling and Hegel.[78] Lermontov fits into our pattern as does, of course, Vladimir Odoevsky, whose stories of artists, such as "Johann Sebastian Bach," are full of the theory of correspondences, the view of art as a mediator between man and nature.[79] Pushkin, to a certain extent, is an exception; his clear form seems neoclassical, and recent Russian literary scholarship excludes him from the romantic movement.[80] But this is hardly warranted if one considers not only the usually quoted affinities with Byron, but recognizes also Pushkin's nature symbolism, which has been studied, possibly oversubtly, by Gershenzon, or if one considers his myth of the destructive statue, in the *Stone Guest*, the *Bronze Horseman*, and the *Tale of the Golden Cockerel*.[81]

Polish romantic literature is the most romantic of all minor literatures: Mickiewicz and Slowacki share fully the romantic view of nature, the romantic concept of the imagination and the use of symbol and mythology, and express them even extravagantly. So do such Polish romantic thinkers as Hoene-Wronski. The Czech romantic movement has at least one great poet, Karel Hynek Mácha, who shares the concept of nature, of imagination, and of symbol with his German and Polish contemporaries.[82] One important argument for the coherence and unity of the European romantic movement emerges from an investigation of the minor literatures—the "predictability" of their general character. If we had never heard anything about the Czech ro-

[76] *A History of the Romantic Movement in Spain* (Cambridge, 1940), 2 vols.

[77] See especially Albert Nilsson, *Svensk Romantik. Den Platonske Strömingen. Kellgren—Franzén—Elgström—Hammersköld—Atterborn—Stagnelius—Tegnér—Rydberg* (Lund, 1916).

[78] See Thomas G. Masaryk, *The Spirit of Russia* (London, 1919), 2 vols; Dimitri Chizhevsky, *Gegel' v Rossii* [Hegel in Russia] (Paris, 1939).

[79] *Romanticheskie povesti* [Romantic stories] (Leningrad, 1929).

[80] Viktor Zhirmunsky, *Valeri Bryusov i nasledie Pushkina* [V. B. and Pushkin's Heritage] (Petrograd, 1922); and Borish Eikhenbaum, "Problemy poetiki Pushkina" [Problems of Pushkin's Poetics], in *Skvoz' Literaturu* (Leningrad, 1924).

[81] Mikhael O. Gershenzon, *Mudrost' Pushkina* [Pushkin's Wisdom] (Moscow, 1919); Roman Jakobson, "Socha v symbolice Puškinově [The Statue in Pushkin's Symbolism], *Slovo a slovesnost*, III (Prague, 1937), 2-24.

[82] See my "Mácha and Byron," *Slavonic Review*, XV (1937), 400-412.

mantic movement, it would still be possible, within limits, to assert the presence and absence of certain themes, views, and techniques.

My conclusion concerning the unity of the romantic movement may be distressingly orthodox and even conventional. But it seems necessary to reassert it, especially in view of Lovejoy's famous attack. "On the Discrimination of Romanticisms" proves, it seems to me, only that Joseph Warton was an early naturalistic preromanticist, that Friedrich Schlegel was a highly sophisticated, self-conscious intellectual, and that Chateaubriand held many classicist views on literary criticism and on Shakespeare. The fact that Chateaubriand was conservative and Hugo ended in liberalism does not disrupt the continuity of French romanticism as a literary movement. On the whole, political criteria seem grossly overrated as a basis for judging a man's basic view of the world and artistic allegiance.

I do not, of course, deny differences between the various romantic movements, differences of emphasis and distribution of elements, differences in the pace of development, in the individualities of the great writers. I am perfectly aware that the three groups of ideas I have selected have their historical ancestry before the age of Enlightenment and in undercurrents during the eighteenth century. The view of an organic nature descends from Neoplatonism through Giordano Bruno, Böhme, the Cambridge Platonists, and some passages in Shaftesbury. The view of imagination as creative and of poetry as prophecy has a similar ancestry. A symbolist, and even mythic, conception of poetry is frequent in history, e.g., in the baroque age with its emblematic art, its view of nature as hieroglyphics which man ad especially the poet is destined to read. In a sense, romanticism is the revival of something old, but it is a revival with a difference; these ideas were translated into terms acceptable to men who had undergone the experience of the Enlightenment. It may be difficult to distinguish clearly between a romantic and a baroque symbol, the romantic and the Böhmian view of nature and imagination. But for our problem we need only know that there is a difference between the symbol in Pope and in Shelley. This can be described; the change from the type of imagery and symbolism used by Pope to that used by Shelley is an empirical fact of history. It seems difficult to deny that we are confronted with substantially the same fact in noting the difference between Lessing and Novalis or Voltaire and Victor Hugo.

Lovejoy has argued that the "new ideas of the period were in large part heterogeneous, logically independent and sometimes essentially antithetic to one another in their implications."[83] If we look back on our argument, it will be obvious that this view must be mistaken. There is,

[83] "The Meaning of Romanticism for the Historian of Ideas," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, II (1941), 261.

on the contrary, a profound coherence and mutual implication between the romantic views of nature, imagination, and symbol. Without such a view of nature we could not believe in the significance of symbol and myth. Without symbol and myth the poet would lack the tools for the insight into reality which he claimed, and without such an epistemology, which believes in the creativity of the human mind, there would not be a living nature and a true symbolism. We may not accept this view of the world for ourselves—few of us can accept it literally today—but we should grant that it is coherent and integrated and, as I hope I have shown, all-pervasive in Europe.

We can then go on speaking of romanticism as one European movement, whose slow rise through the eighteenth century we can describe and examine and even call, if we want to, preromanticism. Clearly there are periods of the dominance of a system of ideas and poetic practices; and clearly they have their anticipations and their survivals. To give up these problems because of the difficulties of terminology seems to me tantamount to giving up the central task of literary history. If literary history is not to be content to remain the usual odd mixture of biography, bibliography, anthology, and disconnected emotive criticism, it has to study the total process of literature. This can be done only by tracing the sequence of periods, the rise, dominance, and disintegration of conventions and norms. The term "romanticism" posits all these questions, and that, to my mind, is its best defense.[84]

Yale University

[84] In Part I of this study, *supra*, pp. 1-23, the following misprints should be corrected: p. 5, line 10, read *"romantisch"*; p. 11, line 22, read *1822*; p. 12, line 19, read *"romantický"*; line 29, read *"Romantyczność"*; line 32, read *year* for *war*; p. 13, note 46a, read *Syn otechestva*; p. 15, line 6, read *taste*; p. 17, line 35, read *trace*; p. 20, line 7, read *1844*—EDITOR'S NOTE.

ORTHODOXY AND AESTHETIC METHOD IN *PARADISE LOST* AND THE *DIVINE COMEDY*

WILLIAM J. GRACE

A WORK of art has its own validity as something that has been fashioned and created; one of the main functions of criticism at all times is to state and rediscover what the work of art actually is. But a work of art not only has this type of validity—it also serves as a touchstone of intellectual and cultural history. It both influences the course of cultural history and serves to mark, through the changing aspects of criticism it undergoes, the new elements and changes in that history.[1]

Paradise Lost has permanently influenced the course of cultural history, and serves as a touchstone of the changing directions and eddies of subsequent history. From the viewpoint of the orthodox-minded critic (one who believes that there exists a permanent core of ascertainable truth guaranteed not only by reason but also by revelation), *Paradise Lost* undergoes a radically different evaluation than from the viewpoint of a more secular-minded critic who does not regard the material that Milton presents as having any connection with *factual history* at all. The second critic regards the material that Milton presents as a myth that, for historical reasons outside the question of the authenticity of the story altogether, once had a sacred character. From the viewpoint of such scholarship the ideal way to handle *Paradise Lost* is not to commit oneself to the truth or falsehood of the historical material that Milton handles. This procedure requires a certain delicacy and discrimination because, while the prevailing temper of our time is agnostic and positivist, there are considerable vestigial groups, both Protestant and Catholic, who actually believe that Milton is treating

[1] The fact of this changing criticism is well established in Dr. Maurice Kelley's *This Great Argument* (Princeton, 1941), ch. 8. Dr. Kelley makes a powerful argument for historicity in criticism as against "critical mysticism." "Poetry, according to the exponents of this approach, is the expression of personality; and in reading it, the critic communes so intimately with the poet's real self that nothing outside of the poetry can be allowed to intrude or modify the critic's intuitive discoveries." Obviously scholarship cannot support an extreme subjectivity of this sort. On the other hand, we can carry historicity too far, because a creative work involves both transcendent and unconscious forces which are not necessarily limited to a historical relationship.

a subject matter that is *historical* as well as *aesthetic*. In this respect, the fact that Milton himself thought he was writing history under the guidance of the Holy Spirit is of some relevance.[2]

In this paper we assume that the main events with which Milton deals actually happened; that Milton's presentation of them, therefore, bears responsibility to history and to religion; and, moreover, that Milton himself believed that *Paradise Lost* was a work of history rather than of fiction. Milton actually believed that he was adding historic details to the Scriptures. It is a touchstone of the degree to which our civilization has departed from orthodox tradition that it is now regarded as a singularity to assume that the theological thought of Milton or Dante should be taken seriously, though in Milton's own time, and well up into the nineteenth century, it would have been extraordinary to have thought otherwise. It is the thesis of this paper that Milton's special difficulties and achievements in *Paradise Lost* depend upon the fact that Milton is dealing with *theological history* and is attempting to present the facts of history at first hand, and not, as in the case of Dante, through the more veiled and indirect allegorical method and by means of a personal and symbolic travelogue. Milton's "theory of accommodation" does not basically alter the fact that he believed he was beholding and revealing special truth. His allegory of Sin and Death belongs to myth, for example, but in the main Milton assumes that only the limitations of human thought and language stand between his audience and the directions of the Spirit.[3]

---

[2] Milton's calling upon the Spirit to illumine him at the beginning of the *Paradise Lost* is to be taken at its face value. There is no historical reason for assuming that such an invocation is merely conventional. Milton, it is likewise to be remembered, is nearer in point of time than the modern critic to the strong Aristotelian distinction between creative writing and history, though, in his period, this distinction is beginning to be confused. The Spirit is, of course, the "indwelling of God" in the heart of the true believer, not the Holy Ghost.

[3] "This idea, the so-called 'theory of accommodation,' fitted well with Milton's Platonism and lent support to his confidence in the authenticity of his own inspiration. He had early conceived of himself as a revealer of truth in the Platonic sense. Poetic myth was the only possible way of representing the 'ideas' to human apprehension and only the poet-seer who had looked on the face of truth unveiled could so represent them." J. H. Hanford, *A Milton Handbook* (New York, 1946), p. 227.

It might be asked, what is the position of a reader who does not share the theological position of a poet? T. S. Eliot in speaking of Dante in *Selected Essays* states without hesitation: "I deny, in short, that the reader must share the beliefs of the poet in order to enjoy the poetry fully. I have also asserted that we can distinguish between Dante's beliefs as a man and his beliefs as a poet." Yvor Winters in "T. S. Eliot or The Illusion of Reaction," *The Anatomy of Reaction* (Norfolk, Conn., 1934), quarrels with Eliot's stand. Winters says: "The non-Christian, however, might easily share a wide community of belief with Dante. The portraits of the damned are portraits of human beings, represented in Hell as they might be seen in life, suffering for sins most of which are acknowledged to be sins by intelligent men, whether Christian or not. As we pro-

I

Macaulay, with all his shortcomings as a critic, had one merit—he had a sense of perspective and really saw a sound basis for the comparison of Milton with Dante, especially in his emphasis on the *Divine Comedy* as a personal narrative, extraordinarily concrete in tone and method, in contrast to the more abstract technique of Milton. Macaulay's essay, of course, will not bear minute critical examination, as W. J. Courthope has so well and amusingly pointed out in his paper, "A Consideration of Macaulay's Comparison of Dante and Milton."[4] Nevertheless, the possibility of the comparison always remains stimulating, for Dante is pre-eminently a poet of orthodoxy, and may serve as a standard of orthodoxy for Milton in *Paradise Lost*. Actually, orthodoxy in the handling of theological material has a close relationship to aesthetic method. One point that Macaulay observed he did not sufficiently penetrate. It is true that Dante's aesthetic method is more concrete; but, curiously enough, the sense of mystery is deeper in Dante than in Milton. Milton, emphasizing rational and discursive approaches, tends toward a rationalistic absence of mystery; but Dante, following the method of representative symbolism rather than of explanation, leaves mystery unimpaired.

C. S. Lewis maintains that, regardless of the orthodoxy of Milton's position in his other works, his thought in *Paradise Lost*, with one or two minor and insignificant exceptions, is orthodox:

> In so far as *Paradise Lost* is Augustinian and hierarchical it is also Catholic in the sense of basing its poetry on conceptions that have been held "always and everywhere and by all." This Catholic quality is so predominant that it is the first impression that any unbiased reader would receive. Heretical elements are in it, but are only discoverable by search: any criticism which forces them into the foreground is mistaken, and ignores the fact that this poem was accepted as orthodox by many generations of acute readers well grounded in theology.[5]

Lewis, in contrast to Hilaire Belloc in his *Milton*, gives a thorough and documented support to this thesis, and convinces the orthodox reader that Milton is an outstanding poet comparable to Dante. Belloc discovers that Milton's views in *The Christian Doctrine* are heretical and opposed to the Protestant, as well as the Catholic, position, and tends to find the same subversive ideas in everything that Milton wrote; we are presented with a caricature of Milton that seems to make him only significant as an extraordinarily gifted craftsman. C.

---

ceed, however, toward the final vision of beatitude, we find ourselves dealing with concepts which are more and more purely Christian, and it is more than likely that only the convinced Christian can feel the poetry at something like its full value . . . "

[4] Published in *Proceedings of the British Academy*, 1907-08.

[5] *Preface to Paradise Lost* (Oxford, 1942), p. 81.

S. Lewis is more penetrating and more sympathetic than Belloc, but he also seems to stretch certain points, and overlooks the degree to which Milton's actual aesthetic method leads him at least to *heterodox effects*. It is well to remember that an artist does not always succeed in placing his concept of form on matter; the matter may be so recalcitrant and difficult that it will alter the artist's formal intention. In this sense, a case may be presented to show that *Paradise Lost* actually influenced Milton's own theology. In the examination of Milton's aesthetic method we may find a useful critique of what can and cannot be successfully done to convey theological truth through art.

Up to and including the Renaissance, the distinction between history and such arts as, for example, tragedy, was clearly understood. History dealt with factual truth, literature with imaginative truth. Forms such as those of the mediaeval religious drama, or the "true histories" of Shakespeare, intended to abide by scientific authenticity.[6] An artist, especially in dealing with Scripture, was literal and exact. He did not feel free to add to, or even to interpret, what was literally set forth in the Scripture. Probably Milton himself would not have felt free in this sense if he had not sincerely believed that truth was available to the elect in the light of right reason and that, under the guidance of the Spirit, one might come to know God's secret will and secret truth, as well as His will and truth clearly expressed to all.[7] Milton does not hesitate to put into the mouth of the Deity speeches for which there is no Scriptural warrant, but which Milton considers suitable for Him. The Spirit, instructing the "upright heart and pure," is the divine inspiration which Milton sincerely believed guided him to utter new truths, Scriptural and historical truths, not merely imaginative truths. *Paradise Lost* is a work of illumination in the late Augustinian and Averroistic sense.[8] From the viewpoint of the observer who does not

[6] Lily B. Campbell gives an interesting account of Renaissance theories of history in her *Shakespeare's "Histories"—Mirrors of Elizabethan Policy* (San Marino, Cal., 1947).

[7] Milton assumes that there is a reservoir of truth, perfectly consistent with the truth that God has made known to man, but as yet unrevealed. In this assumption lies Milton's nearest approach to the Catholic concept of mystery. Milton believes that certain privileged beings may come to know this reserved truth through special inspiration. In *Paradise Lost* (Books XI and XII) Michael, for example, communicates truths to Adam which are not suitable for Eve to know.

[8] Arthur Sewell in *A Study in Milton's Christian Doctrine* (Oxford, 1939) stresses the fact that Milton, in connecting "reason" with "true liberty," has in mind "supernatural" reason as distinct from "unregenerate" natural reason, which is merely negative or utilitarian. "True Liberty, true value in conduct can only be grounded in a knowledge of spiritual things, in faith in God. This knowledge is not given to man by the natural reason; no amount of argument will discover it for him. The true illumination of the mind comes from those supernatural faculties which are infused into the regenerate from above . . . The effect of regeneration is an utterly new state of mind in which man is able to make his own judg-

believe that Milton's theology is altogether sound, Milton appears, on the other hand, to have confused history and imaginative interpretation,

---

ment of what is the Will of God, simply because through faith he knows something of the nature of God" (pp. 187-188).

A historical note is relevant here in regard to the theological difficulty of reconciling the claims of reason with the claims of grace and of "illumination," which is organically allied with the idea of grace. Christopher Dawson in *Medieval Religion* (New York, 1934), pp. 77-78, states: "The theory of the human intelligence is the essential doctrine of Thomism and is the keynote of the Christian Aristotelian thesis. Hitherto both the Averroist and the Christian Platonist had regarded the spiritual principle of intelligence as something superhuman and divine. It was not in man as part of his personality; it was a power which illuminated his mind from the outside, whether it is regarded with the Christian Platonists as the ray of Divine Light which illuminates the immortal soul, or whether, as Averroes taught, it was the power of universal intelligence actuating the successive, transitory and mortal minds of men. For St. Thomas, on the other hand, the active intelligence is the very essence of the soul and the root of human responsibility and liberty. 'For if,' he writes, 'the active intelligence is a substance outside man, the whole of man's activity depends on an extrinsic principle. Man then will not be a free agent but will be acted upon by another, and so he will not be the master of his own acts nor deserve praise or blame; and the whole of moral science and of social science will perish . . .'"

Recent scholarship indicates that Milton's theology is at once more complex and more indeterminate than that found in the main stream of Calvinist orthodoxy. On the matter of divine illumination, however, Milton follows the late Augustinian and Christian Platonist concepts, though he rejects some of their pessimistic implications.

For Milton as for Calvin "natural" reason is not impressive. The actual basis for this view is the evaluation of man in terms of original sin. The origin of the late Augustinian, Lutheran, and Calvinist views is to be found in the unsettled relations between two main Christian traditions in the Middle Ages. The one tradition derives from St. Augustine, who regards all Christian wisdom, whether gained through reason or revelation, as one. No attempt is made by him to differentiate clearly the realms of reason and of faith. Man's *nature* for St. Augustine means everything that man is—essentially and substantially. If *what is* is altered by the Fall, nature is altered, and we find St. Augustine using phrases like "the corruption of nature." The whole man, his full nature for St. Augustine, before the Fall was everything man was, including all the graces that God freely gave him. Since the Fall resulted in the loss of grace, what man is, after the Fall, is therefore a changed, a damaged, nature.

For St. Thomas, on the other hand, there is a world of stable, unchangeable essences. The nature of man is for St. Thomas what man is *essentially*. This nature cannot be changed without the production of a new being. In other words, any change of nature means a change in what makes man man. The nature of man is for St. Thomas, therefore, the same after the Fall as before.

St. Augustine wrote rather rhetorically and used words like "essence" and "nature" in a loosely defined and nontechnical sense. For St. Thomas philosophy was the science of reason, involving a strictly defined and highly technical vocabulary. If the definitions of these key words, as they are used in St. Thomas, are read into the writings of St. Augustine or St. Paul, the result must be a view of nature and of man similar to that held by Luther or Calvin. If, when we read in St. Augustine that the nature of man is damaged (that is, changed for the worse) by the Fall, we give the word "nature" the meaning it has for St. Thomas, we must conclude that the essence of man has been altered. Commentators on St. Augustine did apply the semantics of St. Thomas in this way. In this light, "natural" man could not be highly esteemed.

Whatever the semantic confusions, the ultimate effect is a tradition of theo-

and, accordingly, Milton's God seems to have passed from Scriptural history into a work of creative imagination.

II

Both Dante and Milton attempted a comprehensive picture of the universe and of the relationship between Creator and created according to their respective cultural and theological traditions. The *Divine Comedy* and *Paradise Lost* have colored two respective social and political traditions. They cover a great deal of mutual ground, and such is the flux of modern thought that Milton's work, viewed in retrospect from our prevailing culture, seems much more to approach Dante in orthodoxy rather than to depart from him. Milton is emphasized more in the role of humanist and of Christian than as a radical Protestant who was not even consistently orthodox with respect to the seventeenth-century Puritan body.[9]

Though polarities of interpretation continue to exist regarding the orthodox element in *Paradise Lost* (for example, Lewis and Bush, on the one hand—Belloc and Saurat, on the other), it is important to restate the orthodox ground on which Milton stands and which he shares in common with Dante. Both believe in God and in the demonstrable justice of God. Both believe that God has transcendent and immanent aspects. Both, attempting to penetrate the meaning of evil, accept the experience of evil as an objective fact in the created world. Both believe in free will, although their theological and philosophical approaches to this subject differ considerably. Both believe that the world of present existence offers a decisive cosmic struggle upon which the salvation of man depends.

Not every critic would be disposed to grant so wide a common area. Arthur O. Lovejoy in his invaluable book (more especially for the questions it raises rather than for its answers), *The Great Chain of Being* (Cambridge, Mass., 1942), believes that Milton is inconsistent in the *Treatise of Christian Doctrine* in deciding whether God is bound by necessity insofar as He always acts right. According to Lovejoy,

logical pessimism. St. Augustine himself frequently expresses what Etienne Gilson calls "the eulogy of fallen nature." He thinks of man in terms of loss of grace, but he does not subscribe to intrinsic corruption. Late Augustinian tradition, however, viewing man as intrinsically corrupt, makes man completely dependent on grace and illumination. Actually Milton rebels against the extreme pessimism of this thesis. As Sewell points out, "regeneration is possible, to those who know nothing of Christ, whether they be Jews or Gentiles" (*op. cit.*, p. 188).

[9] Thus Douglas Bush in *The Renaissance and English Humanism* (Toronto, 1939), p. 110, states: "He belongs to that great tradition which stretches back through Spenser and Dante to the writers of Greece and Rome, the tradition of the poet who is an active citizen and a leader of his age." Bush particularly dispels the nineteenth-century view of Milton that was influenced by romanticism, and makes an excellent apology for Milton as a humanist.

Milton's ultimate position emphasizes divine self-sufficiency to such an extent that the Deity's exercise of his creative power seems motiveless. "His 'goodness was free to act or not.' "[10] Such points, however, when applied to *Paradise Lost* itself are somewhat out of focus and merely imply that Milton is not an exact theologian and did not always appreciate the *finesse* of the problem that he rationalizes.

A more considerable area of difference between the two poets arises from the fact that, in some ways, Milton attempted a more difficult task than Dante. Dante viewed the cosmic universe and its problems retrospectively from a vantage point that is simultaneously that of a chronicler and of a traveler. Dante is reporting something that has been done, whereas Milton is in the position of the narrator who has to tell us of what is to be. Milton looks at the creation from the viewpoint of anterior time. Milton has to explain and motivate the fall of the angels; he foresees the history of man as something taking place in the future as a result of the original Satanic temptation. Dante begins from a posterior vantage point and thus avoids the difficulty entailed in presenting the fall of the angels and the problem of original sin. For Dante, the orthodox order is already established, and his consequent emphasis is upon a cosmic struggle from the viewpoint of one human being (Dante himself) in a definite, emphatically concrete setting. Dante's point of departure for his epic is a well-known historical world. Milton, on the other hand, presents a world of vast spaces, of undetermined chaos, a cosmos largely unpeopled and in a state of comparative flux. Milton's theme is civil war; and not only the angels, but Milton's God Himself, tend to indulge in long discourses regarding freedom and justification.[11] Dante, on the other hand, starts with a specific Hell in which specific human beings are categorized according to their crimes, not only in the light of Dante's humanistic studies, but

[10] Lovejoy, *op cit.*, p. 160. Lovejoy is preoccupied throughout the work by the apparent contradiction between the idea of God, conceived as self-sufficient transcendence, and the idea of God, conceived as the plenitude of goodness. In Christian thought, the mystery of the Incarnation bridges this gap; but the understanding of these relationships is not so easily to be secured by a rationalistic approach as by mystical experience (too little value is placed in our intellectual investigations on what Christian mysticism and the mystical way has to teach us). Lovejoy refers to *Paradise Lost*, VII, 171-172; VIII, 415f., 427ff. From these passages he infers that "there appeared to be in the nature of things not only no reason why any world of imperfect creatures should exist, but every reason why it should not exist . . . a self-absorbed and unproductive God would not be less, but, if possible more divine, and that there is no necessity and, indeed, no reason for the existence of any creature." It is quite possible that Milton, as Lovejoy himself suggests, in his insistence on avoiding determinism, may fall into a careless and excessive conception of free will. But it is important to emphasize Milton's antagonism in this respect to the prevailing dogma of Calvinism. Bush, *op. cit.*, p. 114, states, "when we survey Milton's whole body of writing in prose and verse, we see that his various ideas and principles start from a passionate belief in the freedom of the will."

[11] Cf. *Paradise Lost*, II, 557ff.; III, 185ff., 290ff.; VI, 175ff.

in terms of Dante's direct experience and knowledge of contemporary men.

It would not be quite accurate to say that one of the main contrasts between Milton and Dante is that of abstractness, on the one hand, and of concreteness, on the other—of the universal, in Milton's case, gradually manifesting itself in the particular, and of the particular, in Dante's case, reaching carefully through stages to the symbol of universality. But there is a rough exactitude in this statement. Milton, of course, has his points of concreteness, and Dante, working more gingerly in the light of his knowledge of philosophy and theology, expresses the universal. It is also roughly true to say that these differences have their analogies in the respectively Catholic and Protestant viewpoints of the two poets. Protestantism, stemming from the late Augustinian, Lutheran, and Calvinist traditions and, in a certain sense, from original Neoplatonic and Platonic sources, tends to overemphasize (at least from the Thomistic viewpoint) the universal value and to minimize the individuated and concrete object.

The word "spiritual," loosely used, has come to imply certain values of philosophical idealism, of late Augustinian "illuminism," and is, therefore, sometimes associated with an antimaterial bias. In this usage of the word (sometimes also associated with an exaggerated statement of the Pauline position regarding flesh and spirit), the approach of Milton might be called more "spiritual" than that of Dante. Dante is nearer than Milton to the Thomistic emphasis on the individuated as well as the universal, on the body as well as the soul. Dante's type of concreteness has not escaped the suspicion of vulgarity from the viewpoint of Protestant tradition. The doctrines of the Real Presence, of sacramentalism generally, the dogma of Hell, veneration for relics—these are elements involving a close connection with the material that usually cause the most embarrassment for an educated Protestant attempting to see Catholicism objectively.[12] Milton does not have any concrete Hell in the sense that Dante presents it to us.[13] Milton's Hell is a chiaroscuro place of indefinite dimensions and amorphous shapes, in which the leading devils can form strategic plans and evaluate their metaphysical position. It is not a place where concrete individuals known to Milton are punished for concrete transgressions.

Another area in which the two poets diverge most significantly is in their aesthetic approaches to the concept of God. Milton does not hesitate to portray the Creator directly as a person, and, in so doing,

[12] C. S. Lewis in his *Preface to Paradise Lost* does not agree with Saurat *(Milton: Man and Thinker)* that Milton subscribes in his epic to the principle that matter is uncreated and eternal. Milton, in his belief that at death the whole man dies, departs from orthodoxy, but, in his insistence that the body is not a mere container of the soul, he is nearer to the Thomistic than to the Calvinist tradition.

[13] *Paradise Lost,* IV, 76. "Which way I fly is Hell: myself am Hell . . ."

he becomes much more anthropomorphic in his references to the Creator than Dante. His difficulty is the greater in that he emphasizes God the Father; and, in the presentation of God the Father, Milton, lacking sufficient Scriptural resources, cannot merely speak with the voice of history—he is obliged to proceed in the manner of a speculative theologian and an apologist. He is also driven by his particular aesthetic method, by the way in which he knits together his epic, to emphasize a debate and a conflict between God and *an adversary*. In the maintenance of such a conflict, the adversary may easily be built up beyond his proper philosophical and theological dimensions. Probably realizing the intellectual dangers into which he was running by creating the type of conflict that makes for an interesting story but not for theological accuracy, Milton often indirectly or directly reproaches the fallen angels for their attempt to defeat the impossible.[14] Though Milton never in theory or principle approaches the Manichaean position of considering good and evil as opposed positive forces locked in eternal struggle, yet, in the actual telling of his story, in order to create the suspense of a conflict in an imaginative and aesthetic sense, Milton's God seems at times merely to be a stronger principle than his opponent, not a distinctly different being on an altogether different level. The fact that Milton's God argues so frequently does not suggest in Him an amplitude of power worthy of an omnipotent creator.

Dante's artistic method was eminently more successful in avoiding such theological pitfalls. Dante's aesthetic method is more consistent with man's state of limited knowledge. Quite deliberately Dante keeps a real and reverent distance from mystery, whereas Milton tends toward a somewhat presumptuous rationalism when he attempts to explain too much. Dante, by referring to God only under terms of careful symbolism, and, particularly, by a very graduated approach to mystery through the agency of such characters as Beatrice, St. Thomas Aquinas, and St. Bernard, avoids placing himself in such a false position. The value of symbolism, in contrast to rationalistic explanation, in dealing with theological mystery is abundantly proved in Dante's work. A symbol points to truth, is representative of truth, but it in no way attempts an exposition or justification of truth. Throughout the *Divine Comedy* we have a very vivid sense of the love and intelligence of the Creator touching all aspects of his creation; but His presence is artistically presented in terms of reflection, with frequent use of the mirror itself as a metaphor. [15] The more beautiful, the more intelligent,

[14] *Paradise Lost*, II, 557; IV, 60ff.

[15] Cf. *Paradise*, Canto XXVIII. Dante succeeds in giving the reader a sense of *joy* in regard to the Creator, a sense not sufficiently present in Milton. Here again aesthetic method is involved. Milton associates majesty and glory with the Deity, but joy is more specifically stressed in the Garden of Eden where God is not immediately present, whereas Dante's poem reaches an emotional climax in the Beatific Vision.

and the more loving the various characters are, the nearer seems their ascent to the Creator. But Dante always veils the Creator Himself in mystery. By this aesthetic method he skillfully avoids the anthropomorphism which, for the orthodox reader, must at times reduce the majesty of Milton's poem.

III

Involved with these different aesthetic methods is another area of difference between these two poems that touches the very subject of mystery. Dante adheres to the mediaeval viewpoint that, while reason is the natural instrument man must use in most instances to arrive at truth, reason in itself cannot penetrate everything; there is the world of mystery, too, an intelligible mystery that is consistent with reason but which we cannot hope, merely through the passage of time or through the power of thought only, to penetrate. Milton does not have this peculiar respect for mystery. Milton is neither shy nor reluctant to explain the Creator (with the view, of course, of justifying Him). Milton does not doubt but that the muse of heavenly grace will inspire him to reach the height of his great argument. But, in his emphasis on justification—which also implies rationalistic demonstration —he seems to expect that grace will be entirely contained by reason. He overlooks the possibility that grace does not always argue. Dante, on the other hand, even when he obtains a glimpse of the Beatific Vision, sees that vision in terms of eternal light, dwelling only within itself and "sole understood." He tells of the Beatific Vision in terms of mathematics, only to emphasize the shortcomings of the intellect in the face of mystery. There are flights beyond Dante's wing, though a flash penetrates his mind, the type of intuition frequently connected with the mystical experience. But Dante does not attempt to convey mystical experience—he merely indicates what was understood in mediaeval theology and philosophy in terms of the will rolling onward "by the love impelled that moves the sun in heaven and all the stars."

In Milton, on the other hand, God is directly presented. Milton's God the Father may be considered as a stage director within the cosmic drama. We see Milton's God as an active agent, and his activities may be viewed in the light of a strategic chess game in which the victory is assured and one-sided. In reading Milton one looks at the cosmic universe from the point of view of the power that affects it, not, as in Dante, from the point of view of those who are affected.

Once again it would seem that Dante has chosen the easier and more human approach to the cosmic theme. Milton's choice was the more difficult; and in his lack of veneration for mystery, and in his aesthetic method, he fell into the dangers of rationalism and anthropomorphism.

IV

One of the major contrasts in the two poets lies in their presentation of evil. Dante, in dramatizing evil in the *Divine Comedy,* presents an evil that is under *control,* that has its static place of confinement, that is itself under obedience.[16] Milton, on the other hand, attempts to present the dimensions of a conflict anterior to the Fall of Man—and the evil is still fluid and unspecified in its effects.

Milton, in *Paradise Lost,* is involved in two problems—that of freedom and that of justice. On the main points of both these problems he seems to be basically orthodox. A certain misunderstanding of his presentation of both problems arises from overlooking the strongly dramatic tradition which enters *Paradise Lost. Comus* and *Samson Agonistes* are written in dramatic form, and Milton, deeply influenced by Elizabethan tradition, has a scarcely less strong inclination toward this form in the epic. It is to the credit of a dramatist to present a character with strict reference to the character himself and not to the personal evaluations of the dramatist. Obviously in *Paradise Lost* the viewpoints and expositions of Satan cannot be taken at their face value. By the same criterion, the thesis of Milton's conscious or unconscious sympathy with Satan must be held suspect. It might be argued in a similar way that Shakespeare is sympathetic toward Macbeth; but sympathy, in this sense, the penetration of the author into the mind of a character, is quite a different thing from moral and intellectual approval. To understand in this sense is not necessarily to forgive. Satan is intensely dramatic—and in dramatic sense Milton is distinctly superior to Dante, although it is also true to say that Dante's allegorical method was not meant to be, and need not be, dramatic.

Satan wins our sympathy in the same sense that any tragic character, of whose morality we do not approve, may win our sympathy; but this aesthetic sympathy in no way blinds the careful reader to the realization that Satan consistently deceives theologically. The rather obnoxiously complacent and tyrannical picture of the Deity that Satan draws is, of course, part of his strategy of deceit.

Actually Milton follows the mediaeval hierarchic concept no less than Dante. Milton believes that there is a natural hierarchy of being in which the superior should exercise authority over the inferior according to criteria that make for the freedom and welfare of all. To

[16] Dante is remarkable in locating evil in its true causes. No one has inveighed against corruption in the existential Church more than he; no one has pointed out more concretely sin and evil. But Dante, as an artist and a Christian humanist, gives so inclusive an understanding of his values that the reader aesthetically realizes that the evil portrayed is a concrete deviation from truths permanent and triumphant. Dante's sense of glory and of joy enables him to assimilate the presentation of evil.

attempt to destroy such a hierarchy is not to achieve freedom but to deny the facts of both temporal and supernatural life. This is the point of Abdiel's speech in Book V of *Paradise Lost*. For Abdiel there is no loss of liberty in obeying a power that is *de jure* and *de facto* established, a power that is at the same time good and provident:

> . . . shalt thou dispute
> With Him the points of liberty, who made
> Thee what thou art, and formed the Powers of Heaven
> Such as he pleased, and circumscribed their being?
> Yet, by experience taught, we know how good,
> And of our good and of our dignity
> How provident he is . . .
>
> (V, 822-828)

In Book VI Abdiel takes up the argument again and finds that freedom lies in the observance of rightful authority. To attempt to evade this rightful authority is to create a new kind of tyranny, the tyranny of self which replaces the freedom of a true objective order. Milton would provide cold comfort for the romantics:

> Unjustly thou deprav'st it with the name
> Of servitude, to serve whom God ordains,
> Or nature. God and nature bid the same,
> When he who rules is worthiest, and excels
> Them whom he governs. This is servitude,
> To serve the unwise or him who hath rebelled
> Against his worthier, as thine now serves thee,
> Thyself not free, but to thyself inthralled . . .
>
> (VI, 174-181)

To observe this hierarchy is simple justice, and justice is freedom. Whatever may be the shortcomings of Milton as an intellectual, one great intuition and one great proposition rings through all his works—that "virtue alone is free."

Milton rejects the Calvinist concept of predestination and the philosophical necessity implicit in it. In following the doctrines of Arminius on grace, he tends to recover the original orthodox position; for on this particular subject Arminius represents a reaction toward orthodoxy in the face of contemporary Calvinism.[17] Milton departs from Calvin in stating that God calls others to salvation beside the elect:

> The rest shall hear me call, and oft be warned
> Their sinful state, and to appease betimes
> The incensed Deity, while offered grace
> Invites . . .
>
> (III, 185-188)

[17] Cf. J. H. Hanford, *A Milton Handbook* (New York, 1946), p. 229. Father M. C. D'Arcy, S. J., presents an interesting thesis, stressing the distinction between *animus* and *anima* in relation to the Fall and to grace, in *The Mind and*

To these the Deity will give sufficient grace and within them is placed the umpire, conscience.

The degree of Lutheran doctrine present in the *Paradise Lost* is difficult to ascertain. God the Father, in speaking to the Son, says:

> . . . Thy merit,
> Imputed, shall absolve them who renounce
> Their own both righteous and unrighteous deeds,
> And live in thee transplanted, and from thee
> Receive new life.
>
> (III, 290-295)

This statement could be narrowly interpreted to imply the Lutheran doctrine of imputed righteousness; but, on the other hand, all Christians would agree that virtue is universal and free and does not constitute a personal possession. A Christian in a certain sense must give up his righteousness, and thus acquire a detachment from his own perfectibility, and even perfection.

V

Milton thought long and earnestly (and to a degree, confusedly) on religious questions. He certainly is not a representative Puritan—though it also should be emphasized that the Puritan movement was not a homogeneous and well-disciplined movement but rather contained within itself the seed of many differences. Implicit at the very beginning of the Puritan movement is that dilemma which is always attached to religious determinism—the dilemma between the assumption that religion should attempt to change things and the assumption that nothing can really be changed. Strict adherence to Calvinist dogma meant that certain souls were written in the Book of Life, and that all those omitted from this cosmic list were consigned to eternal damnation. Unfortunately this theological position did not give any intellectual foundation for the work of the Puritan preacher. From a practical viewpoint, the preacher's pulpit eloquence was largely wasted on those already destined for salvation, and, according to strict Calvinism, he could do nothing good for those already lost.[18] What then, it might be asked, was his purpose? In unconsciously or consciously finding a suitable purpose, quite a few Puritan preachers moved in the direction

Heart of Love (New York, 1947), p. 191. The Fall is interpreted in the sacrifice of *anima*, self-effacing love, to *animus*, egocentric love. "The point of the story of the Fall is that God had given to the first human beings an integrity such that the *animus* and the *anima* were in perfect accord . . . If we wish for an example of this accord in a great and sinless nature, we can take the biblical account of the Fall of Lucifer and the sin of Adam so majestically portrayed in Milton."

[18] The most complete and authoritative book on historical Puritanism is that of William Haller, *The Rise of Puritanism* (New York, 1938). This work explains in detail the aspirations and dilemmas of the Puritan preachers.

of Arminianism and of Milton's position that others beside the elect could be saved.

Milton shared in another confusion faced by Puritan thinkers. In one direction, he wished to enforce a godly concept of society, and, in common with a large number of Puritans, moved in the direction of a theocracy. In the literature of Puritanism there is a confusion between freedom in the sense of the freedom of the sons of God—the freedom of the true believer who has gone through the cycle of election, justification, and sanctification—and freedom in a nonreligious, specifically political sense.[19] Politically, it was discovered (as mediaeval Lollardy would have shown) that it is impractical to restrict political rights to the elect or those who are in a state of grace. Cromwell, in organizing his army, dispensed with any requirements of sectarian rectitude. Actually, of course, the state of a man's soul is not in the power of other men to determine with any accuracy. Strictly according to the Calvinists, the only man who is truly free is the man who belongs to the elect; but it was soon found impossible to define such a group within the political order. Milton is sufficiently discreet to think of man in the universal sense as more or less sharing in liberty, but he believed that such liberty should be modified or qualified by an elite both in the spiritual and intellectual sense.

For the practical business of finding such leadership neither Milton nor Puritanism could offer a solution. Dante's solution was the mediaeval one of honoring the office according to accepted law and tradition, of praying for a good incumbent, bearing with—and hoping that vengeance would overtake—the unworthy incumbent.[20] Milton in the *Animadversions* states that the Holy Bible contains every rule and instrument of knowledge, everything necessary for the life of man and for the duties of human society. He repeats in various ways and in various contexts his thesis that "that which is most necessary to be known is most easy" and that "the very essence of truth is plainness and brightness.[21] Milton was probably too optimistic about man's facility for seeking the truth without reference to institutional guidance, and overlooked, in common with Puritan society generally, the subjective and psychological element of error that stands between the observer's viewpoint and the objective truth that lies before him. Mil-

[19] Haller states in *The Rise of Puritanism*, p. 93, that "election-vocation-justification-sanctification-glorification was more than an abstract formula. It became the pattern of the most profound experience of men through many generations."

[20] Gerald G. Walsh, S. J., in *Dante Alighieri, Citizen of Christendom* (Milwaukee, 1946), particularly stresses the social and political conscience of Dante in reference to mediaeval institutional life. Dante berates leaders who do not lead, not overlooking bishops and popes, but with the end in view that the institutions themselves may flourish more effectively.

[21] Quoted from *Of Reformation in England* in Frank Allen Patterson, *The Student's Milton* (New York, 1934), p. 452.

ton failed, as did Puritanism generally, to guard against this subjective element. In the political field, the difficulty became evident at once. The Puritans had either to modify their viewpoint or to realize that, by their arbitrary dismissal of the institutional aspects of church and state, they were moving toward anarchy.[22] Institutions are recognizable by men, whereas the key to a pattern of natural hierarchic excellence is not readily available.

VI

In conclusion it may be said that Milton in *Paradise Lost* more closely abides by orthodox tradition than in any of his other work. But his aesthetic method encourages a departure from, rather than a support of, orthodox tradition. He veers from orthodoxy in following merely the surface pattern of theological history, while in reality he is creating an imaginative work with an independence and an originality that Scripture does not warrant. Dante, on the other hand, starting with human experience, undertook no such responsibilty to history. Confusing, probably unintentionally, the Aristotelian forms of history and creative art, Milton moves dangerously in the direction of anthropomorphism and of rationalism, particularly in view of his rashness in dealing with mystery. Aristotle argued that poetry is something more philosophic and of graver import than history, since its statements are of the nature rather of universals, whereas those of history are singulars.[23] But Aristotle could not forsee the theological postulates of Christianity, wherein the facts of the Creation and the Incarnation comprise all possibilities—all that is, has been, and may be. These mysteries are at once singular and universal. In dealing with them the artist cannot evade his responsibility to history without compromising orthodoxy. The conclusion seems inescapable that Dante's method, which does not deal primarily with Scriptural history, but which is basically one of symbolism, permits that truth which is veiled in mystery to be indicated without exposition or presumption, and is, therefore, the method best adapted to a penetration of the inclusive truth of religion.

Fordham University

[22] The rapid deterioration of Puritan political power after initial success was partly related to this internal contradiction.

[23] *Poetics*, ch. 9.

KARL VOSSLER (1872-1949)

HELMUT HATZFELD

ONE of the greatest figures, ranking with Friedrich Diez and Heinrich Morf, has left the field of Romance languages and literatures forever. Karl Vossler died in Munich on May 19, 1949. He was the last to influence equally the linguistic and the literary sectors. He was the first who attempted to link both domains closely together by his aesthetic concept of language and his idea that language at its highest reveals itself only in great literature. Thus he became the founder of modern stylistics and one of the few contemporary modern philologists actually to found a school. Vossler's own students, such as Eugen Lerch and Hans Rheinfelder, carry forward what they inherited from him. He has also inspired all other modern investigators of style, even if they came from masters in quite different fields, for example, Leo Spitzer, Amado Alonso, and Theophil Spoerri, trained by Meyer-Lübke, Menéndez Pidal, and Jules Gilliéron, respectively.

The views of Karl Vossler were decisively orientated by his older friend, Benedetto Croce, but only in the revolutionary concept of language as living creation versus language as evolution. In the field of literature he was his own master. He was the first to propagate the ergocentric study of works of art, literary or otherwise, scoffing majestically at those who studied Goethe as a philosopher or Rembrandt as an educator. A long friendship with Heinrich Wölfflin confirmed his conceptions.

Vossler was a comparatist *sui generis*. Having spent many years of his youth in Italy, he felt first attracted by the influence of Italian literary forms on Germany (*Das deutsche Madrigal*), by the dependence of the *Dolce Stil Nuovo* on the Troubadours (*Die philosophischen Grundlagen des süssen neuen Stils*), and particularly by the *Divine Comedy*, to which he devoted a four-volume study, a standard work translated into many languages. Later a biography of *Leopardi* was added to the Italian studies. The mature Vossler concentrated on France, and stirred the scholarly world with his theory of the parallel development of all cultural phenomena throughout history, culminating in the literary language *(Frankreichs Kultur im Spiegel seiner Sprachentwicklung)*. This pivotal work was followed by two appreciations of classical poets, *La Fontaine* and *Racine*. The same period (1912-1925) produced many writings on linguistic philosophy.

The love of the later Vossler belonged exclusively to Spain. A standard work on *Lope de Vega*, smaller studies on *Calderón*, *Sor Juana Inez de la Cruz*, the *Siglo de Oro*, and lecture tours in Spain and Latin America made him a kind of hero in the Hispanic world. During the Hitler period his type of scholarly creation was not appreciated, of course, and in his intellectual loneliness he wrote, as an echo of his own mood, a melancholy study on the *Poetry of Solitude in Spain* (*Die Poesie der Einsamkeit in Spanien*). His last studies concern Luis de León, in whom he sees a spirit akin to his own, and St. Isidor of Seville who, salvaging what he could of ancient wisdom in the Dark Ages, seemed to Vossler a symbol of the German scholar during and after World War II.

During the Italian, French, and Spanish periods of Vossler's activity, there appeared comprehensive articles concerning the whole of Romania, dealing with the theater, the novel, and the poetry of the Romance nations. These articles have been collected in many volumes.

Vossler approached all these topics with a surprising originality and intuition, with the decided tendency to give the general educated public a share in the work of the scholar, and therefore with an elegance of presentation and an attempt at adequate metrical translations which has become extremely rare. Being one of those humanists who still were grounded in idealistic German philosophy, Vossler was a man who believed in the educational value of scholarship, a point he never failed to stress on the many occasions when he spoke to students, particularly while rector of the University of Munich. Politically, he sincerely believed in democracy, a fact which made him clash sensationally with the opposite trends in Germany during his first rectorship in 1926 and which, twenty years later, caused the Americans to entrust him again with this post and with the reorganization of the university.

A whole concept of life, of academic morals, and of humane and learned search for truth disappears with this balanced, humorous, wise, and great scholar.

Catholic University

BOOK REVIEW

A Critical Bibliography of French Literature. D. C. Cabeen, General Editor. Vol. I. The Mediaeval Period. Edited by Urban T. Holmes, Jr. Syracuse, N. Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1947. xii, 256 p.

Students of French literature can be assured of the quality, scope, and thoroughness of *A Critical Bibliography of French Literature* (under the general editorship of Professor D. C. Cabeen) if the first volume, on *The Mediaeval Period,* is indicative of the workmanship of the six additional volumes that are to follow. The volume on mediaeval literature, compiled by a staff of twenty-nine specialists under the direction of Professor U. T. Holmes, fills an especially urgent need, since Lanson's *Manuel bibliographique* begins with the Renaissance and since sundry German sources of bibliographical information (in Voretzsch, the *Zeitschrift für romanische Philologie* and the *Literaturblatt für germanische und romanische Philologie*) have long needed to be completed and coordinated into a coherent picture.

The arrangement of material within each of the seventeen chapters (the last chapter concerns Provençal literature) is very clear and logical. Eschewing the chronological or alphabetical order of presentation, each bibliographer first gives general references, then lists the outstanding works (editions and secondary references), and concludes with miscellaneous items of lesser importance, thus making it possible for every reader "to comprehend almost at a glance what is most significant for his study of the topic which interests him." The *Bibliography* is both critical and selective; it does not aim at completeness and it adds a few significant words about the value, the mediocrity, or the controversial character of each book or article. Short references to the chief reviews of each book provide sources for further evaluation of the contributions. The items are numbered, from 1 to 2,588. However, the volume does not really contain 2,588 different items, since several basic works (e.g., Creizenach, pp. 188-189) are repeated very often. A thorough index of literary figures, titles, and modern scholars enhances the value of this excellent work.

Two rather unfavorable impressions may strike the reader: first, the often rather excessive enumeration of text editions and a corresponding relative lack of data on critical works bearing on a particular topic (this one-sidedness, which possibly could not be helped, holds true especially in chapters 2, 4, and 5 on "Saints' Lives," "Scientific Works," and "Didactic Literature"); and, second, the uneven treatment of the comparative aspects of Old French literature. Professor Holmes, in his two chapters on the "Roman de la Rose" and "Fourteenth Century Lyric," and Professor A. H. Krappe, in his chapter on "Fabliau, Fable, Roman de Renart, and Tale," have been most gratifyingly international in their outlook; the former indeed has small subdivisions on influences and imitators of the *Roman de la Rose* (from which I miss a reference to Luquiens' study on its influence in Castile) and on Chaucer's relation to Machaut, Deschamps, and Froissart. But other chapters are less satisfactory in this respect; in connection with the *Song of Roland* and *Alexander* we find no reference to their German translators, the priests Konrad and Lamprecht, respectively; the chapter on the "Matière de Bretagne" does not

refer to such German imitators as Hartmann von Aue or Wolfram von Eschenbach; in connection with the Carolingian Cycle, there is no reference to studies (e.g., by Rajna, Crescini, Morf, or Voigt) of Boiardo's and Ariosto's use of French epic material; nothing is cited on Jean de Mandeville's later fame; the early influence of the Italian Renaissance has been ignored (e.g., in the items on Christine de Pisan, Charles d'Orléans, Jean Lemaire de Belges, Clément Marot, and Octovien de Saint-Gelays); no mention at all is made of Laurent de Premierfait, the important translator of Boccaccio; the brief references to Griseldis contain no special item pointing to its Italian source.

Other shortcomings noted by the reviewer are of minor importance. One may wonder why the treatment of François Villon should be so long and detailed (sixty-six items, compared with only four items on Jeanne d'Arc and eight items on Charles d'Orléans), or one may point to misprints in items 674, 1609, 1811, 2299, 2561 (in addition to those listed on the errata sheet) and in the Lists of Abbreviations—but all this is picayune pickings, unworthy of a reader who has learned so much from, and profited by, this very well-done and helpful bibliography of mediaeval French literature.

W. P. F.

BOOKS RECEIVED

Autran, Charles. L'Epopée indoue: Etude de l'arrière-fonds ethnographique et religieux. Paris: Editions Denoël, 1946. 409 p.

Cecchi, Emilio. Scrittori inglesi e americani. Milano: Arnoldo Mondadori, 1947. 442 p.

Carlini, Armando. Il problema di Cartesio. Bari: Gius. Laterza & Figli, 1948. 194 p.

Dante Alighieri. Rime. A cura di Gianfranco Contini: Seconda edizione riveduta e accresciuta. Torino: Giulio Einaudi, 1946. 295 p.

Eliot, T. S. Notes towards the Definition of Culture. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1949. 128 p.

Elson, James Hinsdale. John Hales of Eton. New York: King's Crown Press, 1948. 199 p.

Errante, Guido. Marcabru e le fonti sacre dell'antica lirica romanza. Firenze: Sansoni, 1948. viii, 299 p.

Fairchild, Hoxie Neale. Religious Trends in English Poetry. Volume III: 1780-1830. Romantic Faith. New York: Columbia University Press, 1949. xi, 549 p.

Friederich, Werner P. An Outline-History of German Literature. With the collaboration of P. A. Shelley and O. Seidlin. New York: Barnes & Noble, 1948. vi, 326 p.

Grebanier, B. D., Samuel Middlebrook, Stith Thompson, and William Watt (editors). English Literature and Its Backgrounds. Revised Edition. Volume One: From the Old English Period through the Age of Reason. New York: Dryden Press, 1949. xxiv, 1192 p.

Inial, Sœur Marguerite Félicie. Henri Davignon: Ecrivain belge. Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1948. xiii, 182 p.

Isopescu, Claudio. Saggi Romeno-Italo-Ispanici. Rome: Angelo Signorelli, 1943. 311 p.

Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Practical Reason and Other Writings in Moral Philosophy. Translated and edited with an introduction by Lewis White Beck. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949. xv, 370 p.

Lemaire de Belges, Jean. Les Epitres de l'amant vert. Edition critique publiée par Jean Frappier. Lille: Giard; Genève, Droz, 1948. xlix, 103 p.

Lenormand, H.-R. Les Confessions d'un auteur dramatique. Paris: Editions Albin Michel, 1949. 344 p.

Maldonado de Guevara, Francisco. La Maiestas Cesarea en el Quijote. Madrid: Instituto "Miguel de Cervantes" de Filologia Hispanica, 1948. 107 p.

Olschki, Leonardo. The Genius of Italy. New York: Oxford University Press, 1949. vii, 481 p.

Petöfi, Alexander. Sixty Poems by Alexander Petöfi. Translated into English Verse by Eugenie Bayard Pierce and Emil Delmar. Introduction by Joseph Remenyi. Budapest: Petöfi Society of Budapest, 1948. 78 p.

Rousseaux, André. Littérature du vingtième siècle. Paris: Albin Michel, 1949. 259 p.

Weatherly, Edward H., A. Pelzer Wagener, Edwin H. Zeydel and Avrahm Yarmolinsky (editors). The Heritage of European Literature. Boston: Ginn and Co., 1948. xv, 782 p.

Wellek, René, and Austin Warren. Theory of Literature. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1949. x, 403 p.

To appear in forthcoming issues of *Comparative Literature*

Goethe und die Schweiz.
By Fritz Strich.

Breton Folklore and Arthurian Romance.
By Roger S. Loomis.

Franco-German Literary Relations in the Nineteenth Century: A Survey of Problems.
By Henri Peyre.

La Multiplicité des plans, source d'émotions.
By Jean Hankiss.

Gabriele d'Annunzio lecteur d'André Malraux.
By Guy Tosi.

Zanella, Coleridge, and Shelley.
By A. Lytton Sells.

Découverte du monde et littérature.
By Jean Babelon.

Boscán and the Classics.
By Arnold G. Reichenberger.

La Roumanie dans la nouvelle littérature provençale.
By Alexandre Cioranescu.

Literary Relations in the Light of Goethe's "Wiederspiegelung."
By L. A. Willoughby.

Los tratos de Argel.
By Joaquín Casalduero.